This book explores and maps the relationship between borders, security and global governance.

Theoretically, the book seeks to establish to what degree, and in what ways, traditional notions of borders, security and (global) governance are being eroded, undermined and contested in the context of a globalising world. Borders are increasingly being reconceptualised to account for connectivity as well as divisions, at the same time as focus is shifting from permanence to permeability. The ambivalence ascribed to bordering processes is at heart a security concern; borders are not only entwined with state formation but are also attempts at governing securities, identities and histories.

Proceeding from a critical rendering of statist conceptualisations of borders, security and governance, the book not only emphasises the politics of borders, mobility and relocations, but also provides a shared groundwork for interrogating the spatial conditions for bordering and border work as manifestations of a continuously deferred becoming rather than being. A principal contribution of the volume is its scrutiny of how borders are enacted and perceived in and through the everyday, and of how such production and construal can make sense as acts of resistance to various forms of governing. Such a focus reveals the necessity of investigating how governing from afar affects the possibilities and tendencies to securitise as well as desecuritise, within as well as beyond elite settings.

This book will be of much interest to students of border studies, human geography, governmentality, global governance and IR/critical security studies.

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1 Introduction
Bordering securities in a global world

Catarina Kinnvall and Ted Svensson

On 18 August 2013, David Miranda, partner of the Guardian journalist Glenn Greenwald who had written a series of stories revealing mass surveillance programmes by the US National Security Agency (NSA), was held by UK authorities as he was in transit through London Heathrow's airport on his way home to Rio de Janeiro. David Miranda was stopped by officers and informed that he would be questioned under schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, a law that applies only to airports, ports and border areas and which allows officers to stop, search, question and detain individuals. Miranda was held for nine hours, the maximum time an individual can be held without being charged, whereupon he was released while officials confiscated his mobile phone, laptop, camera, memory sticks, DVDs and games consoles. The decision to detain Miranda was considered 'lawful' by the High Court on 19 February 2014, and was justified by 'legitimate' and 'very pressing' interests of national security. Earlier in the year, the British Prime Minister David Cameron had ordered Britain's top civil servant, Cabinet Secretary Jeremy Heywood, to contact the Guardian about material it had obtained from Edward Snowden. The discussions resulted in the newspaper destroying a number of computer hard drives in July 2013, under the supervision of intelligence experts from the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ – the British equivalent to the NSA). Snowden received temporary asylum in Russia in August 2013, thus escaping US charges of theft of government property, unauthorised communication of national defence information and wilful disclosure of classified communications intelligence. Top-secret documents leaked by Snowden have, however, continued to form the basis of stories around the world, not least in Britain and the US, about unauthorised electronic surveillance.

This story, from unauthorised surveillance, to the Snowden revelations, to the attack against the Guardian and the detention of Miranda, is a telling example of how the governing of borders and security has become increasingly intertwined in a global world of digital media and terror discourses. Unauthorised surveillance and the close cooperation between security agencies, such as the NSA and the GCHQ (among others), are both examples of the outsourcing of borders in terms of increased surveillance of activities across national borders in the name of cyber security. According to Guardian reporting (Friday 21 June 2013), the GCHQ started 'Mastering the Internet Programme' in 2007 (later referred to as 'Tempura' and similar to the NSA's 'Upstream'). This involved plugging into the cables that
carry internet traffic into and out of the country and garnering material in a process repeatedly referred to as SSE – thought to stand for ‘special source exploitation’. Through such governing of cyber security, the GCHQ and branches of the Home Office have thus been able to respond to real or imagined fears of internal and external threats from unknown sources across domestic borders. Used as an example, UK’s bordering performance is a good illustration of how processes of integration and globalisation have forcefully exposed the particular nature of territorially based systems of governance and spawned a resultant need to attend to the changing role of state borders. The case of Edward Snowden and the revocation of his passport after he left US territory also show how the actual bordering process is becoming outsourced to airlines and to international airport officers in other parts of the world. In this sense we could talk about a debordering of state borders, but the Snowden case and the ensuing tension between Russia and the world is also being played out as a rebordering process in which the longing for secure borders is being rewritten in a narrative sense. In addition, the re/debordering of security issues manifest in this particular story calls into question the dividing line between state and civil society actors in relation to the media. In an age when surveillance of digital media is increasing, the newsrooms and editorial offices are becoming important sites for de/rebordering practices, but also for resistance. Snowden, Greenwood and his partner Miranda, and not least Alan Rusbridger, the editor of Guardian, all display evidence of such resisting practices as they have become increasingly involved in the questioning of cyber manipulation and interference – of surveillance. The psychological impact of these events cannot be underestimated as they are profoundly about limits to such techniques. What this case clearly shows is how borders are becoming increasingly malleable. As the governing of borders and security breeds quests for both more surveillance and intensified resistance it prompts and enables connectivity as well as dispersion.

This book is concerned with these processes of governance, bordering and security as connected to a number of theoretical discussions and empirical events. Of particular interest is to grasp the malleability of borders as these are changed, questioned and performed away from state sovereignty and control at the same time as representatives of states and other imagined communities become involved in new techniques of surveillance and control to reinstate borders and boundaries beyond territorial limits. This involves a discussion of borders and bordering in a geographical sense but equally important is the re/debordering of the mobile subject as witnessed in the Snowden/Miranda case and how these mobile subjects are becoming securitised and governed in a world largely defined by quests for security. However, it also points to the desecuritising and debordering acts of resistance and even retaliation against such techniques and how these are played out at a global level.

Borders and bordering

The idea of a ‘borderless’ world, so much in vogue in the 1990s, has had to give way to more complex notions of the nature and content of borders in general and
state borders in particular. The Snowden/Miranda example shows how borders are ‘now everywhere’ (Balibar 1998), being hard and soft at the same time (Eder 2006), and that it is conceivable and necessary to think of bordering processes as simultaneously enacting vernacularisation and cosmopolitanisation (Rumford 2006). It is also a relevant illustration of how borders are enacted, materialised and performed in a variety of ways (Johnson and Jones 2011). Consequently, attempts at encountering, construing and defining the ‘border’, ‘borderlands’ or the ‘frontier’ have come to draw upon and employ nearly every psychological or geographic conception of space while addressing the problem of pinning down and making borders, boundaries or limits theoretically cognisable. The notion that borders are now everywhere may need some further reflection, however. Ansi Paasi (2011) forwards two important qualifications. One is that borders are often rooted in historically contingent practices and discourses that continue to be related to national ideologies and identities in which emotional bordering tends to be loaded into national celebrations, memorialised landscapes and other elements of national iconographies. A second development can be found in the extent to which technical landscapes of control and surveillance have gained in importance in a post-9/11 world. These may consolidate state space at the same time as they may exist everywhere. Hence we are not denying the importance of state border conceptions, but adhere to a growing body of literature that emphasises the complexity and modality of borders and bordering that are not limited to the state.

Much contemporary social theory has thus become increasingly concerned with the changing nature of borders. Central themes in the social sciences – globalisation, cosmopolitanism, network communities, mobilities and social flows – have prompted social theorists to place borders more centrally in the study of society and international relations (Rumford 2006; Nield 2006; Raley 2008; Salter 2008). To speak of borders, of space and time, says Louise Amoore, ‘is to pose a particularly geographic problem in such a way as to bring the discipline of geography into conversation with work from across the humanities and social sciences’ (2011: 64). As border studies have become more interdisciplinary, the role of state borders has become more complex (but far from irrelevant) and other borders and boundaries have come into focus, distinguishing neighbourhoods, localities, cities, regions, macro-regional blocs, national, ethnic, religious, cultural and civilisational groupings (Balibar 2004; O’Dowd 2010). Here the emphasis is often on the (re)demarcation of borders as identity construction and control. As border studies have developed and entered other disciplines, there has been a marked shift in focus from fixed physical and geographical borders to bordering or ‘borderwork’ (Rumford 2008; van Houtum 2005), including attempts to understand more general processes of debordering and rebordering. This book falls within this critical shift as it attempts to cross disciplinary boundaries. However, as discussed further below, some border conceptions continue to be more powerful than others, thus affecting and influencing the ways in which borders work on the ground.

It is important to recognise that the ‘border’ is at present not an entity, process or term that is assumed to be given or always-already existent, neither as an
object of analysis nor as an analytical modality or site for normative political thinking. Borders are far from being just lines on a map. Borders are hence being reconceptualised to account for connectivity as well as dispersion or divisions, at the same time as focus is shifting from permanence to permeability. The latter results in, on the one hand, a necessary scrutiny of what an altered border conception means for the rendering and experience of the everyday and, on the other, in a need to ponder questions related to the expressions and instrumentalities of boundary drawing that are intrinsic to attempts at delimiting any political community. Drawing on Chris Rumford’s (2011) proposition for scholars to ‘see like a border’, it is possible to outline a number of novel dimensions included in such a vision. One is to acknowledge that bordering processes permeate everyday life at a political, social but also psychological level. It is further to recognise that borders do not always work on behalf of the state if understood in terms of institutionalised borders and a securitised defence. Rather, as explicated in the section below on desecuritisation, local bordering activity may involve the dis-identification of state practices – for example, a refusal to let the sovereign speak or decide. Methodologically this can become evident in alternative narratives of resistance. Seeing like a border, Rumford says, does not always imply seeing as the subaltern or identifying with the marginalised, however. Rather it can suggest a focus on all those involved in creating and recreating borders – those actively participating in ‘borderwork’ – to outline the power struggles involved in this process. Finally, it means recognising that borders are often invisible to some but not to all. The effects of NSA’s or GCHQ’s surveillance techniques may remain invisible to a majority of American and British citizens, while they were highly visible to David Miranda after he had spent nine hours in detention under the Terrorism Act 2000. However, borders can be invisible in many other respects, involving conformity to identity boundaries that are vastly unequal or patriarchal, thus embodying institutionalised narratives and norms of conduct that remain unchallenged.

**Mobilities and the (im)mobile subject**

Shifting our attention from permanence to permeability necessitates a focus on and questioning of space and place, as subjects are becoming increasingly mobile and as crucial changes are occurring in mobility practices. People move, things move, ideas move. Mobility, as Tim Cresswell (2006) argues, exists in the same relation to movement as place does to location. A politics of mobility consists of the entanglement of movement, representation and practice, in which ‘constellations from the past can break through into the present in surprising ways’ (Cresswell 2010: 18f). What we are witnessing today is a dialectical relationship between mobilities and moorings (Brenner 2004: 64) in which different degrees of ‘motility’, i.e. potential for mobility, are evidence of unequal power relations. This focus on ‘immobility’ for certain groups of people problematises the so-called ‘grand narrative’ of mobility and fluidity and its concern with movement, change and placelessness (Hannam et al. 2006; King and Christou 2011; Scuzzarello and
Many feminist theorists have for instance criticised the idea of ‘romantic subjectivity’ and the emergence of a ‘cosmopolitan’ mobility pattern, arguing that it ‘depends upon the exclusion of others who are already positioned as not free in the same way’ (Ahmed 2004: 152) and that it is ‘linked to “bourgeois masculine subjectivity” that describes itself as cosmopolitan’ (Skeggs 2004: 49, quoted in Hannam et al. 2006: 3).

A mobilities paradigm hence involves tracking the movement of the border on the ground. One way of doing this is to focus on how sovereign power intersects and moves with and through the bodies of migrants and authorities. The attempt made by France to reintroduce border controls to Italy in order to manage the influx of migrants from the Maghreb in the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011 is a clear example of such intersection (Scuzzarello and Kinnvall 2013). Another striking instance of sovereign power mapped onto (individual) bodies could be found in the airplane carrying the Bolivian President Evo Morales in the aftermath of the Snowden escape. The plane, suspected of carrying Snowden, was prevented from crossing European airspace and forced to refuel in Vienna, where it was stopped and searched by Austrian officials. According to the Guardian (5 July 2013), Ministers of the European countries appeared to have had their instructions from the United States government and it did not take long before claims that Morales had been ‘kidnapped by imperialism’ were made by the Bolivian government.

These examples show how borders are related to societal power relations (Paasi 2009). This means that we should study them in context and that we need to be able to answer questions such as who demarcates borders and who constructs narrative boundaries? When and for what purposes do these processes take place? The literature on border studies emphasises the role of political elites in the creation of borders and boundaries. For instance, David Newman (2011) argues that borders are created by political elites who see themselves as acting in the interest of their community and who have the power to keep out ‘people and influences which are perceived, at any point in time, as being undesirable’ (2011: 35f.). Such an understanding of borders underlines mobility as a politically contested process in which rescaling and restructuring of spatiality must be understood in the light of different regimes of economic regulation and state governance (Hannam et al. 2006).

Studying mobilities thus means studying the contested discourses surrounding the mobile subject, but it also involves an engagement with those (mobile) discourses, policies, practices, ideas, authorities, people and institutions that enact borders. Such mobilities are involved in the reorganisation of institutions across the globe and in the movement of risk and dangers as physical and mental spaces become entwined.

Securitising borders, governing mobilities

As noted in the Snowden/Miranda example, the heightened ambivalence ascribed to bordering processes is at heart a security concern. Borders and boundary drawing incessantly permit or prevent those deemed desirable or undesirable from
gaining entry or access into a particular country, community or group. For many of these, a borderless world continues to be an illusion.

The celebrated debordering of the state … is far more selective than the inflated rhetoric of globalization would suggest. Debordering is being accompanied in many places by a partial rebordering in the form of enhanced policing. Even as many borders have been demilitarized in the traditional realm of national security, as well as economically liberalized to facilitate commercial exchange, they are also now more criminalized to deter those who are perceived as trespassers. Thus it may be more accurate to say that the importance of territoriality is shifting rather than simply diminishing.

(Andreas 2003: 3)

Policies aimed to secure territorial borders are often implemented through the use of emergency narratives, intended to create a sense of uncertainty and fear, in which mobilities can be governed (Amoore 2006; Aradau 2009; Honig 2009). Emergency narratives call for immediate action, forceful measures and direct interventions and can justify polarised boundary constructions in which friends and foes are properly delineated. Responding to narratives of emergency is also a way to create order from projections of chaos and flux. Within this milieu, as William Walters (2006: 197) argues, ‘security becomes something to be marked a “solution”’.

Borders as sustenance, enactment and becoming is hence not solely or primarily entwined with state formation in a strictly material sense, as it involves more diffuse attempts at governing securities, identities and histories. Expressed theoretically, security – consonant with revised perceptions of borders – does not thus belong foremost to the domain of inter-state relations. Rather it is progressively seen as finding resonance in threats and vulnerabilities that arise within states or in challenges to international or global society as such. The consequent broadening and deepening of the security debate is, for example, discernible in the accentuation of ‘critical’ as well as ‘human security’ in which securitisation and desecuritisation have come to refer to elements of societal and existential security, often outside and beyond the spatial expanse of the nation state. It is, furthermore, detectable in the increasing emphasis on how e-borders, virtual or biometric, and ‘portable’ borders are utilised as governance mechanisms through which subjects are rendered mobile, predictable and threatening in accordance with influential notions of belonging and apartness (Amoore 2006).

Geographers have highlighted the importance of remote political borders for delineating differences focusing on e.g. immigration raids (Coleman 2009), data monitoring (Amoore 2007), offshore detention facilities (Mountz 2010) and cognitive boundaries of categories (Jones 2009), while political scientists, political sociologists and international relations scholars have demonstrated a concern for border security discourses (Salter 2010), the limits of sovereignty and virtual biopolitics (Bulley 2009; Vaughan-Williams 2010) and internal threats (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006). Here, the workings of discourses on and practices
of citizenship, denizenship and re/de-citizenship (see Walters 2006) are brought to the forefront, bringing together state, power, control, social responsibilities and possibilities (Paasi 2011). This conveys that the state ought not to be conceived as the sole centre and origin of sovereignty. Rather, the state recurrently encounters and negotiates parallel forms of sovereign bodies that exercise, or aim to exercise, influence over the governed subject. Thus, the appeal to and persistent reinscription of borders, sovereign powers and state apparatuses is reflective of bids for securitisation, both on behalf of majority populations and in relation to other group constellations.

This shifting emphasis in security studies closely resembles a body of work in critical geography, according to which the primary undertaking ought to be less concerned with the location of borders and, instead, direct attention towards what the b/order represents to those experiencing and engaging it (van Houtum 2000). Borders, Paasi argues, are enacted and performed not only as ‘discursive or emotional landscapes of social power’ but also as ‘technical landscapes of control and surveillance’ (2011: 63). They often constitute pools of emotions in which fears and insecurities can be used for both progressive and regressive purposes (Kinnvall 2004, 2012). Accordingly, territorially induced and enclosed modes of governing security and borders are thus increasingly subject to critique and conceptual revisions. In congruence with such developments, a significant locus and concern in recent academic debates has been the stress on how certain modes of arranging politics spatially are dependent on variations in the knowledge production of space.

Desecuritisation and debordering: From dispersion to connectivity?

Within this emerging body of literature, notions of ‘governance’ and particularly ‘global governance’ are concurrently altered. As a possible corrective to rationalist, prescriptive and top–down models, bottom–up approaches to global governance have gained in significance, parallel to the emergence of an intense debate concerning the appropriate rendering of the terms ‘governing’ and, not least, ‘governmentality’ (see e.g. Larner and Walters 2004; Shani and Chandler 2010). A growing inclination to deploy a Foucauldian-inspired analytics of neoliberal governmentality is traceable in endeavours that seek to further debates on the relation between freedom and security (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006). An adjacent undertaking has transpired in the form of critical engagements with the development of advanced systems for monitoring and regulating the exercise of freedoms, and with the related question of the possibility to resist ongoing deployments of such security apparatuses (Salter 2008; Vaughan-Williams 2008; Edkins and Pin-Fat 2005).

It has, for example, been argued that everyday practices of de-bordering and desecuritising might entail and constitute resistance beyond mass mobilisation, often involving dis-identification from state practices. If, as Claudia Aradau has argued, ‘securitization orders social relations according to the logic of
political realism and institutionalizes an exceptionalism of speed, extraordinary measures and friend/enemy’, then desecuritisation needs to become a ‘normative project which reclaims a notion of democratic politics where the struggle for emancipation is possible’ (2004: 391). Hence, we must think of emancipation in terms of bottom–up approaches allowing for subjectification and reappropriation of alternative narratives that can resist and subvert hegemonic dominance. At heart is the challenge to sovereign power from those at the margins of knowledge production – the return of the political – or in the words of Jenny Edkins: ‘The protests reclaim memory and rewrite it as a form of resistance’ (2003: 216). Storytelling is often a powerful way to politicise borders and challenge sovereign power. ‘The narrative exchanges give reflective voice to situated experiences and help affinity groupings give an account of their own individual identities in relation to their social positioning and their affinities with others. Once in formation, people in local publics often use narratives as a means of politicizing their situation’ (Young 2000: 73). Resistance is thus an inseparable part of power relations and storytelling remains an important way to change such relations.

Understood as a practice of resistance, narrative change can contribute to what Foucault has named ‘anti-authority struggles’. Rather than constituting rational deliberative argumentation, such struggles are often messy, agnostic and contain divergent worldviews. However, as the assumed ‘emptiness’ of certain spaces indicates, as suggested in our own and Annika Bergman Rosamond and Ben Rosamond’s contributed chapters, there is nevertheless a contiguous and enduring need to consider the consequences of a disjuncture between territory and the expanse of political community, particularly in settings marked by interstate attempts at securitising border practices and the bordering of subjectivity.

**Aim of the book**

We are concerned to explore and map the multifaceted nature of borders, mobilities, security and governance. Theoretically the book seeks to critically engage traditional notions of these concepts in order to establish to what degree, and in what ways, these are being eroded, undermined and contested in the context of a globalising world. In this collection of essays we, accordingly, proceed from a critical rendering of statist conceptualisations of borders, mobilities, security and governance in order to enable an acknowledgment of the post-liberal imaginary (Chandler 2010), in which the limits to liberal rule, and to its mobilisation of legitimacy, transpire and find accentuation. Such a venture does not solely allow for an overall emphasis on the politics of borders and mobility, it also provides a shared groundwork for interrogating the spatial conditions for bordering and border work as manifestations of a continuously deferred becoming rather than being (see Dubow 2004). We are hence not only interested in depicting and mapping how borders have undergone relocations and reordering from one spatial and delimited context to another, or in how state borders are recentred and reinscribed. Rather, a principal contribution of the volume is its scrutiny of how borders are enacted and perceived in and through the everyday, and of how such
production and construal can make sense as acts of resistance to various forms of governing. How, to echo Anthony Cooper and Chris Perkins’s chapter, might we conceive the intersection between mobilities and borders, between rationalities of governing and bordered subjects? How, as Tugba Basaran enquires, are securitised populations to be conceptualised if law works as a liberal technique of governing human conduct? For the analysis of and conceptual debates on security, the latter commitment means that emphasis will shift onto practices and epistemic regimes whereby populations are included or excluded from citizenship rights, but also to how borders and border work intertwine with de-citizenship and re-citizenship making. As a consequence, the volume is constructed in a manner that encourages and facilitates attentiveness towards how security issues on all levels of analysis, including the level of the individual, to a significant extent are framed by movement, mobility and bordering practices. Such a focus necessitates a treatment of how governing from afar, from a distance, affects the possibilities and tendencies to securitise as well as desecuritise, within as well as beyond elite settings.

Outline of the book

The book is divided into ten chapters, including the Conclusion. Chapters 2 and 3 are both focused on how borders have become increasingly mobile and the extent to which they require ‘movement’ to function as borders. In bridging the literature on borders and mobilities, the authors suggest that governing practices surround these processes and work as acts of securitisation. Using the example of the UK bordering practices in Chapter 2, Anthony Cooper and Chris Perkins emphasise the legitimacy of, as well as resistances to mobility-dependent borders and show how the imagined mobile subject becomes bordered and how such bordering impacts on the everyday life of citizens. In Chapter 3, Mark Bevir provides a genealogy of what he refers to as ‘joined-up security’ to more clearly delineate the historical relationship between borders, security and governance and the alarming tendencies to naturalise this relationship. He is specifically focused on how governing and governmentality provide particular kinds of logics that interact with political processes in a historical sense. Using the example of homeland security, Bevir shows how new kinds of mobilities in terms of networks have relied on a post-liberal governmentality, and how such networks have been particularly powerful in the so-called ‘War on Terror’, affecting the moral boundaries of state policies.

Chapters 4 and 5 address aspects of ‘protection’ and ‘humanitarianism’ as these provide a basis for as well as limits to the bordering of securities. The governing of humanitarian space is the focus of Chapter 4 in which Tugba Basaran describes this space in liberal democracies as a site of politics where different bodies compete for the right to relieve suffering. The chapter investigates the governing frameworks that established liberal democracies draw on in relation to nation state borders and the redrawing of moral borders. It becomes a matter of governing ‘precarious lives’ in which the boundaries of humanitarian acts are drawn and
transformed into non-humanitarian acts under the banner of security. The theme of liberal governmentality is further elaborated and critiqued in Chapter 5, where Katherine Allison proceeds from the notion of border thinking to question and expose the heterogeneity of power and the tenability of the concept of liberal governmentality if viewed through a West/non-West binary. Allison examines this border thinking practice through an empirical study of how the Women Peace and Security Agenda has been framed within the context of Western intervention in Afghanistan and through attempts to address Afghan women’s security following the removal of the Taliban.

Chapters 6 and 7 are both concerned with bordering practices ‘on the ground’ as played out in the securitisation and governing of citizenship discourses. In Chapter 6 Paul Nesbitt-Larking discusses how securitising laws and regulations in recent decades have complicated existing citizenship regimes and how, in many places, these have rendered certain visible minorities vulnerable both to state surveillance/control and associated forms of social/cultural exclusion. On the basis of interviews with young Muslims in Canada, he illustrates how the everyday socio-psychological bordering of belonging works in relation to security concerns and governing citizenship techniques. Similarly, in Chapter 7 Maria Rovisco looks at how the experiences of artistic and cultural engagement of young refugees can foster a cosmopolitan identity outlook, involving everyday practices of de-bordering and desecuritisation. Such practices may eventually challenge governing processes from above as these young people gain access to the public representation (of themselves and others) in new communicative spaces.

How to desecuritise bordered categories is also the focus of Chapters 8 and 9 which are both concerned with how borders are created and constructed in spaces that are often rendered ungovernable and insecure. In Chapter 8, we – Catarina Kinnvall and Ted Svensson – are particularly interested in how religious discourses and narratives act as security-providers during such times of heightened insecurity and how they are likely to become securitised in response to a discourse of ungovernable space. Using the case of Pakistan, we show how narratives of security have been governed in relation to global discourses on terror and how the securitisation of Islam and the reconceptualisation of space have served as powerful linkages between militants and the Pakistani establishment. Annika Bergman Rosamond and Ben Rosamond congruently provide empirical illustrations of how reconceptualisations of space can make us rethink political community as spatialities of governance. Using the example of the Arctic region, they suggest that intensified securitisation and inter-state competition complicate new forms of community, identity and solidarity, thus limiting the range of possible variants of togetherness, affiliation and citizenship that might arise in the region. Finally, the concluding chapter attempts to bring together and critically analyse the patterns that have emerged in the amalgam of theoretical approaches and empirical case studies throughout the book.
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References


2 Mobile borders/bordering mobilities

Status functions, contemporary state bordering practices and implications for resistance and intervention

Anthony Cooper and Chris Perkins

The border has traditionally been understood as a single, staffed physical frontier, where travellers show paper-based identity documents to pass through. This twentieth century concept can be subject to abuse with controls often geared to fairly crude risk indicators such as nationality … This philosophy will not deal with the step change in mobility that globalisation has brought to our country. We believe a new doctrine is demanded, where controls begin offshore and where we use information, intelligence and identity systems to allow scrutiny at key checkpoints on the journey to and from the UK.

(UK Government Home Office 2007)

Introduction

Observing the relatively recent securitisation of state borders – something of a ‘re-bordering’ in Peter Andreas’s (2003) broad terms – has complemented and advanced our understanding of contemporary state bordering practices. As nicely outlined in the introduction to this edited volume, there has been a critical, theoretical and methodological shift away from observing singular borders (seen as fixed geopolitical lines) to approaches that consider bordering as a complex array of overlapping socio-political spatial processes. Where the former rendered borders stationary, peripheral and at best secondary to the seemingly more important business of what went on within or across the state, indicative of a ‘container model of society’ (Beck et al. 2003), the latter approach places borders more centrally and integrally in the daily lives of ‘ordinary’ people and sees them as prime sites where continual state construction, reconstruction, and transformation can be studied (Anderson et al. 2002). An important outcome of this empirical and methodological shift from borders to bordering has been the key acknowledgement that borders are diffuse and infused throughout society and consequently part of what can be called the securitisation of everyday life. Borders, in this regard, are no longer at the border, which has important consequences when considering what a border is, where it is located and what it should (or should not) do. This is particularly relevant too when taking into account the much discussed mobility management and regulatory aspect of borders (wherever they
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may be located) which function to unevenly, disproportionately and paradoxically channel inward and outward flows of information, goods and particularly people. All of this has led some commentators to argue that borders are becoming as mobile as the mobilities that are crossing them (Vaughan-Williams 2010; Cooper and Rumford 2011).

In this chapter we focus on two particular but overlapping aspects of mobility in the context of borders and bordering. As highlighted by Rumford (2008b), the first aspect takes into account the dynamic between the ubiquity and heterogeneity of contemporary surveillance oriented state bordering and the more outwardly visible borders located at traditional points of entry. On the one hand, the most effective components of state bordering are arguably becoming completely diffused and spatial while, on the other hand, borders located at traditional points of entry (or the edges of a polity) are being made more visible in order to appease public perception of what a border is, what it should do and its effectiveness in doing it. As Rumford (2008b: 639) points out in the context of the UK, ‘one of the consequences of moving the border offshore is that its visibility decreases at the same time as its effectiveness increases’. The second aspect looks at the ways in which certain borders require movement to be (or to function as) borders. Movement here can be categorised into two overlapping dynamics. First, the ways in which borders are becoming networked, spatial and in one sense divorced from the fixed crossing points of entry associated with traditional border variants. And, second, the ways in which many of these borders specifically require movement to function accordingly, either in terms of the border itself, or in terms of people and things crossing them. While they will be discussed in detail below, examples of these mobile, mobility dependent, borders are the UK’s “juxtaposed” borders whereby UK passport checkpoints are spatially extended to, and located at, international transport hubs at major cities such as Paris and Brussels. Even less visible or recognisable perhaps are networked borders functioning along major transport routes (Walters 2006) and supermarkets and rural farms (see Rumford 2008a), enacted and maintained by non-state actors on behalf of the state in a relationship that has been characterized as ‘remote control’ (Lahav and Guiraudon 2000). And, perhaps the most concentrated expression of mobile and mobility dependent borders, is the idea of the ‘biopolitical’ border in which the human body itself is rendered a prime location of border control becoming, to paraphrase Amoore (2006: 338), ‘the portable border par excellence’.

We want to examine this relationship between more traditional territorial borders, often perceived to be visibly exuding an air of immobility and permanence, and those borders that are completely mobile, diffused and networked to the point that they are no longer instantly recognisable or commonly perceived as borders, albeit in their traditional guise (see Rumford 2008b). This relationship is particularly important because it captures the way in which securitising borders has come to mean the continuous and necessary governing of mobilities wherever it may be required, while at the same time territorial states continue to find sovereign expression in the more traditional and standard geopolitical requirement of visible and recognisable ‘crossing points of entry’. In this chapter, however, we want
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to discuss the possibility that while the perceived strength of mobile, mobility dependent, borders lies in their ability to be ‘less border-like’, in doing so they create the possibility for linguistic spaces of resistance that challenge their own legitimacy and subsequent effectiveness. We argue that highlighting this dynamic provides an example of how non-state actors can shape border securitisation policy and practice by questioning the legitimacy of what state borders should and should not do.

To show this we want to build upon our previous work in which we developed a framework for a ‘thin theory’ of borders utilising John Searle’s notion of ‘status functions’ and Friedrich Kratochwil’s writings on normative rule structures in particular (see Cooper and Perkins 2012). Here we argued that the word ‘border’ can be seen as a place holder for a number of overlapping processes and that bordering is very much a practical activity where an array of actors (of which the state is only one) can draw upon different sources of legitimacy – or rule structures – in order to frame, produce and resist borders. On this logic, the mobile (mobility dependent) border observed and discussed in this chapter requires a fragile assemblage of actors, rules and objects – both intentional and unintentional to it – in order to extend and exert itself, yet crucially, it is this fragility that makes possible a space for resistance and intervention. This, of course, will be discussed in detail in the relevant section.

The chapter will progress in the following way. First, we observe and discuss the ‘how, where and why’ of state border securitisation before specifically discussing mobility dependent borders briefly introduced above. Second, we succinctly outline our ‘thin theory’ of borders by discussing in more detail the idea of status functions in relation to bordering. As already alluded, this section builds upon our previous work in which we have discussed a bare bones mechanism for understanding bordering that is not limited to rigid definitions of territorial edges. In doing so we make the case for extending the discussion to the securitisation of state borders and in particular how to better understand the supposed legitimacy of, as well as resistances to, mobility dependent borders. In the third and final section we essentially combine both discussions – in the sense of introducing the theory of the previous section to the general debate on current border securitisation – by looking at a current, and contentious, UK bordering practice whereby, at the time of writing, the UK government is advocating the use of poster vans informing illegal immigrants to go home or face particular consequences. This practice is also taking place along side security spot-checks on potential illegal immigrants – considered by many to be singled out through racial profiling although denied by the UK government – at certain places along the UK transport network.

Performance, mobility and governance: The ‘how, where and why’ of contemporary state border securitisation

Contemporary state border securitisation has been, and indeed continues to be, well documented across the social science literature, particularly post 9-11 and the
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The emergence of the so-called ‘war on terror’. Chris Rumford (2008b) has observed how more traditional borders in the UK are being made more visible in terms of the introduction of new uniforms and so on. This can also be mirrored by the current wave of TV programmes such as ‘UK Border Force’, or ‘Border Security: Australia’s Front Line’ whereby border guards are seen to be going about the business of successfully protecting territorial space at recognisable locations (the ‘UK Border Force’ programme follows the work of the UK Border Agency at Heathrow Airport and the maritime ports of Dover and Calais). Yet, as Rumford (2008b) also points out, border securitisation is less about closing the territorial door – in terms of higher fences, bigger signs and more watchtowers and border guards and so on – and more about (nation) states managing, categorising and thus controlling those ‘variously powerful networks and flows criss-crossing their porous borders’ (Urry 2000: 1). Rather than a borderless world, therefore, the ‘criss-crossing’ power and efficiency of people and things on the move is, more often than not, the direct result of specific border functions and not because of their absence (Cooper and Rumford 2011: 262). At the heart of the matter is the need to simultaneously keep borders open for business but closed to those deemed undesirable and untrustworthy (see Nevins 2002), as acknowledged by the UK government:

> The aim of border control is to sort traffic into legitimate and non-legitimate and maximise the effort directed against movements that would, without action by the state, be detrimental to the UK, while minimising the burden on those that would not.

(Cabinet Office 2007)

This dynamic has brought about some novel observations and theorisations that not only highlight contemporary state bordering practices in general terms but, in doing so, also advance debates on sovereignty, citizenship and the nature of state transformations. Many of these observations uncover bordering practices and processes that are less recognisable vis-à-vis more traditional practices. What follows is a brief overview of some relevant literature and debates in order to embed our argument more clearly.

Much has been made of the blurring of traditional territorial logics and the rupture of territorially bordered compartments of comfort and familiarity upon which other social/cultural boundaries are fixed (Bigo 2001: 96). While many of these discussions go beyond the aims and scope of this chapter (but see Walker 1993; Campbell 1996; Albert et al. 2001 and Vaughan-Williams 2009, amongst many others), this blurring is evidenced in the way borders have become ‘asymmetrical membranes’ (Hedetoft 2003), a metaphor amongst many used to capture the ways in which borders unevenly and disproportionately categorise and channel inward and outward flows of people and things. These borders are not limited to conventional limits in the sense that they have been observed to function most effectively within, across and outside of the state, a dynamic captured by Balibar’s (2004: 1) oft quoted insight that borders are ‘dispersed a
little everywhere, wherever the movement of information, people, and things
is happening and is controlled’. Precisely where these borders are likely to be
required has been well documented too. Conforming to Balibar’s logic, the control
of movement has been observed and studied in airports as well as international
railway stations often located in capital cities, providing simple examples of
border control residing well away from the supposed conventional territorial
limits of the ‘state’ borderer. The UK, for example, has ‘juxtaposed’ borders in
place at the Eurostar terminals in Paris and Brussels, as well as the ferry terminal
in Calais, a general move particularly favoured by the UK government who have
been quick to point out the benefits in the context of unwanted immigration:

Juxtaposed controls in France and Belgium have contributed to a 70 percent
reduction in unfounded asylum claims since 2002. The juxtaposed process
is an excellent example of what we can achieve when we work with our
European partners.

(UK Government Home Office 2007)

Apart from simply emphasising the usefulness of juxtaposed borders, a key
insight into government thinking is the way border function is framed in terms of
mobility governance, defined in the quote in relation to (illegal) immigration and
associated ‘unfounded asylum claims’. The ways in which the sharp end of state
border securitisation has become governance oriented – filtering the ‘wanted/
unwanted’, ‘founded/unfounded’ – has arguably further fuelled the increased
diffusion, mobility and changing topography of state border controls.

This emphasis on governance has led Andreas (2003) to argue that many
western borders are becoming less hardened and militarised while at the same time
becoming securitised in more subtle ways. Suggesting that more intensive law
enforcement and de-militarisation has accompanied the economic liberalisation of
borders – or neo-liberal bordering – Andreas (2003) has emphasised a fundamental
reconfiguration of the border in the sense that they are becoming prime sites of
stringent law enforcement. For Andreas (2003: 107) such reconfiguration involves:

[C]reating new and more restrictive laws; constructing a more expansive
policing and surveillance apparatus that increasingly reaches beyond
physical borderlines; promoting greater cross-border police cooperation and
use of neighbours as buffer zones; deploying more sophisticated detection
technologies and information systems; redefining law enforcement concerns
as security concerns; and converting war-fighting agencies, technologies, and
strategies to carry out crime fighting missions.

Andreas’s insight captures the emphasis on external cooperation strategies
espoused by the UK government in the aforementioned Home Office quote.
Likewise, such reconfiguration tacitly brings to the fore the increased need for
information capture, storage and exchange deemed important for state borderers
interested in tracking and regulating mobility (see also Amoore, Marmura and
Emphasis is also placed on the mobility of the border itself – or the increased reach of state securitisation/surveillance apparatuses well beyond traditional state limits – as Andreas (2003: 78) points to a shift from internal law enforcement concerns to overlapping internal and external security concerns. Capturing state concern over the regulation of mobilities and the fundamental requirement to categorise, Andreas (2003: 78) discusses what he calls ‘clandestine transnational actors’ (CTAs). Such actors, it is argued, are deemed and categorised by the state to be non-stable and have the ability to cross borders with relative ease, they violate state laws as well as attempting to evade them permanently, and they conform to market demand and high profits. They include the ‘usual suspects’: the traffickers, the terrorists bent on causing maximum destruction to meet ideological ends, and somewhat disturbingly, unauthorised migrants simply seeking refugee status or more commonly access to labour markets. To this end, the latter group, who merely want to work, have been categorised as threatening and factored into motivations of securitization carried out at the border.

Similarly, albeit from a slightly different vantage point, Didier Bigo (2001) has also observed this particular aspect of border reconfiguration, arguing that the traditional roles of the police (conventionally active within a territory) and the military (conventionally responsible for protecting the territory itself) have become more uncertain when viewed in relation to (im)migration and, invariably, the border. Framed within a context of the evolution of ‘(in)security’ and fear, Bigo’s (2001: 96) concern relates to what he sees as the ‘limits of our political imagination’ in the face of a contemporary blurring of the ‘frontiers between inside and outside’. For the sake of this chapter this ‘limit’ can be taken to mean the Weberian geopolitical imagination that relies on the objectivity and fixity of defined and recognisable borders. As a corrective, Bigo employs the spatial metaphor of the ‘Möbius Strip’ – a one-sided geometric surface where what is inside and what is outside become indistinct – which is put forward as a ‘new topology of security’ (2001: 96) rejecting ‘an objective border between inside and outside, friend and foe, law and exception’ (Bigo 2007: 16). Operating within this new topology, emphasis is placed on the subjective and explicitly intersubjective nature of the ambiguous border between inside and outside in which, according to Bigo (2007: 16), ‘zones of indetermination appear’ and ‘zones of conflagration (of violence and of meanings) emerge’. These zones, theoretically framed within a critical reading of Foucault and Agamben in particular, become spaces of normalised exclusion – banned places in what Bigo has termed the ‘banopticon’ – populated by individuals ‘excluded from both inside and outside, from both friendship and enmity, from both law and exception’ (Bigo 2007: 17; see also Vaughan-Williams 2008, 2009). Not too dissimilar from Andreas’ CTA’s, these individuals are deemed unwelcome, undesirable and threatening, collectively considered and categorised as bogus asylum seekers, illegals and terrorists, embedded within stereotypical notions of race, poverty and inequality (Bigo 2007: 31).

Bigo’s ‘zones of indetermination’ – the banopticon – is epitomised by, and very much the work of, the biometric border. And with it, the all-reaching state
border apparatus becomes a fundamental space where our identity is performed and observed. Mark Salter (2007), for example, points out that the border submits everyone to the gaze of sovereign examination, not simply non-citizens or those deemed illegal, whereby we must all confess and perform our identities accordingly. Yet particularly for specific groups, profiling and subsequent categorisation has always already occurred, risk already determined, blame already attributed and events and actions already anticipated through the continual production and imposition of generalised and normalised uncontested master narratives (see Bigo 2002; see also Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking 2013). As Louise Amoore (2006: 338) alludes: ‘in effect, the biometric border is the portable border par excellence, carried by mobile bodies at the very same time as it is deployed to divide bodies at international boundaries, airports, railway stations, on subways or city streets, in the office or the neighbourhood’. The association between biopolitical technologies of control and state securitisation practices drives the mobility of borders in relation to those who are ‘crossing’ them and opens up questions of where the state border is located as well as what the border should do. It also highlights the ways in which certain borders require mobility to be borders. Categorisation and control of mobilities (and associated sovereign performances) take place visibly at traditional points of entry – usually international transport hubs – but it has also been observed to be, less visibly, taking place elsewhere. The UK state borders functioning at the Eurostar terminals in Paris and Brussels requires frequent movement across them to be borders as the very nature of these juxtaposed borders is to filter mobilities wherever it is deemed to be required.

Surveillance orientated biometric bordering is even more dispersed to the point of complete diffusion because these state bordering processes lack a distinct location and/or crossing point and as such are unrecognisable as borders or simply unseen. These borders fundamentally need the mobilities to function, to filter, categorise and control, that is, without mobility, either by the borders themselves or by people and goods across them, they stop being borders. The concept of ‘remote control’ (see Lahav and Guiraudon 2000) provides a nice example of dispersed biometric bordering as well as another example of mobile mobility dependent borders in general terms. Here, the job of state bordering is delegated to other (non-state) agencies and individuals operating on behalf of the state, summed up thus:

Along with civil servants (immigration officers, border patrols, liaison officers and consulate personnel), a wide range of ‘sheriff’s deputies’ (Torpey, 1998) that include sending and transit countries, carriers, security agencies, travel agents and hotel personnel, employers, local social services, hosts and sponsors are all urged to reach deep into societies to uncover undocumented foreigners, deter asylum-seekers and prevent the exit of the ‘huddled masses’. (Guiraudon 2003: 191)

Highlighting the way in which the principle of ‘remote control’ has been utilised as an effective securitisation process, as well as the way in which such
a process has transformed our understanding of where the border is and what it does, William Walters (2006) has discussed the example of European transport routes. According to Walters (2006: 194), the UK government identified cross-border road haulage as a backdoor where those seeking entry to the UK could do so with relative ease. Consequently, the UK authorities vigorously enforce ‘carrier liability laws’, forcing private transport companies, under the threat of large fines, to effectively bring in often sophisticated measures to police migrants (hidden bodies). For Walters (2006: 195), keeping within the context of pan-European road haulage, this opens up the possibility that ‘the entire road transportation system becomes a kind of networked border. The border transforms into a mobile, non-contiguous zone materializing at the very surface of the truck and every place it stops.’ At the same time remote control places emphasis upon the categorisation and profiling aspect of bordering to determine who is invited, who is denied, and, perhaps more importantly, who is excluded. This in turn opens up parallel questions concerning who (or whom) is doing the categorisation and for what reasons.

Returning to Rumford’s (2008b: 642) argument, a particular aspect of a much wider schematic of what he calls ‘spaces of wonder’, borders have become domesticated and familiarised. The more governments opt for less visible border options, the more they feel the need to instigate traditional, more familiar and increasingly visible borders in equally familiar places. The visible border becomes an act of display by the state aimed at the public audience (Lint, 2008), which is needed to rectify the problem of the state’s supposed increasingly visible lack of sovereignty, while at the same time the real and effective business of state bordering – mobility management and governance – is less visible. We want to understand how these mobility dependent borders can be logically considered an integral part of state bordering in ways that go beyond simple definitions asserting that state borders are required wherever movement needs to be controlled. To this end, in the next section, we succinctly introduce our idea of bordering as the imposition of status functions in order to better explain why less visible, completely dispersed and mobility dependent borders outlined thus far are made legitimate on the one hand, but can also be resisted, contested and de-legitimised on the other.

**Borders and status functions**

The concept of status functions is a necessary aspect of John Searle’s wider discussion on the construction of social reality. For Searle (1995) objective ‘brute’ facts exist in the world independently of human representation but are nevertheless required for the formation of social reality. He argues that material objects or brute facts only have a function that is imposed upon them which, in turn, is not intrinsic to the object (Searle 1995: 14). In other words, things like money, passports, citizenship and national identity, and so on, only have status and meaning because of what he calls collective intentionality, that is, they are given representation (and function) through general agreement and recognised
as such by enough people to become reality. Searle asks, then, how can objective facts seemingly exist, and be taken for granted, from a world of intersubjective ideas? Traditional borders have often been seen to have physical attributes and associated functions that have become accepted and recognised over time by enough people and within a certain context. In this regard, the function placed upon a brute fact – in this case a material border – is always relative to the viewer and the background assumptions within which the viewer is able to place the border. The border may change materially, yet its status and function remain depending on context. Such logic has allowed us to argue that:

"Bordering as a process is a form of sorting through the imposition of status-functions on people and things, which alters the perception of that thing by setting it within a web of normative claims, teleologies and assumptions. Bordering is, therefore, a practical activity, enacted by ordinary people as well as (nation) states, to make sense of and ‘do work’ in the world."

(Cooper and Perkins 2012: 57)

On this understanding the crucial aspect of the border in its traditional guise is that, over time, it becomes a place that has a status function imposed upon it ‘but the nature of that function is to impose further status-functions to create institutional realities, i.e. to situate things, people and ideas within networks of legitimate meaning’ (Cooper and Perkins 2012: 61).

This is the case for the institutional fact ‘terrorist suspect’ that, at the border, via illocutionary speech acts, can be imposed onto a person who is deemed to fit certain criteria. Here, illocutionary speech acts refer to people or things that have the legitimacy to speak in the name of the border (Perkins and Rumford 2013) in doing so reinforcing its ability to enforce status even further. Examples of this occurrence are numerous. In 2004 Yusuf Islam, for example, a British singer formally known as Cat Stevens who converted to Islam in 1977, was famously denied access to US; he only found out his name was on a watch list when he was detained by US officials in the process of sending him back to the UK. In another example, Ms Ghuman, a music scholar, was detained as a potential terrorist by US authorities, and later banned from re-entering, because everything about her was deemed suspicious, from music cassettes to the fact that she spoke the Welsh language (Bernstein 2007). Nick Vaughan-Williams (2009: 118) has also written about the shooting of Jean Charles De Menezes by anti-terrorist officers in the wake of the 7/7 London bombings in 2005 for supposedly acting suspiciously and refusing to obey police instructions. This list could go on, but in relation to the examples given, all three were innocent, having no links whatsoever to terror organisations, yet regardless of this had status functions imposed on them and were entered into a sense-making regime that becomes active whenever they enter a space within which that regime is valid. It shows how, in all three examples, the people were made sense of in a certain way because of the imposition of status functions and the creation of institutional facts, while at the same time nothing about them had changed (see Cooper and Perkins 2012: 62). Indeed, in
each case the individuals concerned were found to be acting normally, contrary to their newly found status at the border: Yusuf Islam is involved in extensive charity work and peace campaigns, Ms Ghuman was found to be innocent after the US authorities admitted a mistake but was still not allowed to return to her previous status, and Jean Charles De Menezes was posthumously cleared of any wrongdoing, with the London Metropolitan police admitting its terrible ‘mistake’. Indeed, Vaughan-Williams (2009: 118) makes an interesting and important point regarding the accepted narrative of the freak mistake by the mainstream press and general public alike:

[A]n uncritical acceptance of the discourse of the ‘mistake’ reifies rather than questions the very framework within which the killing of Menezes has been valorised. In other words, by merely accepting the discourse of the ‘mistake’ as a starting point in reflecting on Menezes’s death, we run the risk of colluding with rather than offering a critique of the activities of sovereign power.

In this quotation, Vaughan-Williams raises questions about the legitimacy of the imposition of status functions in terms of their origins and the conditions under which they are formed. To this end, using the work of Friedrich Kratochwil, we can begin to understand how the legitimacy of bordering processes – put forward here as the imposition of status functions – ‘stems from the reasonable accountability of actions given a background of pre-reflexive understandings of the world’ (Cooper and Perkins 2012: 62). On this logic, the legitimacy of any bordering relies upon bordering practices – and practices at the border – being socially reasonable. For Searle (1995: 144), similar to Bourdieu’s (1990) ‘habitus’, the background is a set of dispositions formed via social interactions over time, which is influenced by institutional rule structures (see also Cooper and Perkins 2012). Different border institutions, therefore, have several language-borne representations that over time have come to form part of our pre-reflective background assumptions about what a border is, what it ‘looks’ like and what it should do (Cooper and Perkins 2012: 63). This allows people to make sense of what goes on at the border. We pre-reflexively show our passports – and even confess our identities in Salter’s (2007) terms – because that is simply what we are supposed to do. As Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking (2013: 347) argue, borders have ‘ontological dimensions’. This dynamic alludes to what Kratochwil (1989: 32) calls ‘neustic’ force, which, in the context of our discussion on bordering, refers to giving assent to practices and discourses that subsequently fade into the background, becoming common sense aspects of socio-political life. It is a form of fixity that becomes fixed through social attitudes towards it.

To understand (and indeed study) any border, therefore, requires an understanding of the rule structures within which the border is embedded. In other words, if a border is coded to categorise mobile bodies as ‘terrorists’ or ‘illegal’ and so on, the meaning of these terms can only be understood and constituted – and the border subsequently understood and constituted as legitimate – by
understanding the further consequences of the rule structure sequence in which they are embedded. Crucially, however, different rule structures, regimes and ways of thinking overlap, and consequently different ways of thinking about, acting about and discussing any given border or bordering process can all have authority – have neustic force – and the interplay between these sources of authority provide a space for intervention and resistance. Collectively, people may uncritically accept and make legitimate who is to be ‘excluded’ through a process of collective intentionality – determine the optimal degree of border permeability (van Houtum 2002) – but at the same time the perception of strong borders may be lacking for a proportion of the collective or alternatively other sections may reject certain bordering practices altogether, enforcing their own border narrative. In this regard, mobile and mobility dependent borders can become so un-border-like that legitimate claims can be made against them in terms of what they do and/or where they manifest. With this in mind, in the final section of the chapter, we want to discuss some examples of current UK bordering policy – current in terms of being discussed in the UK media at the time of writing – in order to illustrate this interplay between sources of authority and sense-making regimes. This will be framed in relation to our previous discussion on mobile, mobility dependent, state securitised bordering practices.

‘In the UK illegally?’ Three examples of current UK mobile bordering practice and subsequent resistances to such practice

Three recent UK government anti-illegal immigration schemes offer an illustrative example of how the logic of mobile, diffuse borders plays out, and the implications mobile bordering has for intervention and resistance. The first features a border that is quite literally mobile. In July 2013 the UK government launched a campaign across six London boroughs to encourage illegal immigrants to leave the country voluntarily. The campaign made use of vans displaying large adverts reading: ‘In the UK illegally? Go home or face arrest’ followed by number to text and receive ‘free advice, and help with travel documents’. The vans also displayed the number of illegal-immigrant-related arrests in the past week. In the background was the figure of a Home Office official, dressed in a black uniform and holding a pair of handcuffs. The second example saw immigration officials with UK Border Agency labels on their uniforms conducting spot checks at targeted railway stations across the country (BBC 2013). The third was the use of social networking site Twitter to broadcast examples of successful immigration arrests, including pixelated photographs of suspects arrested across the UK (Batty 2013). Taken together, these three constitute highly visible examples of the UK’s mobile borders in action.

However, this government initiative was met by a strong backlash that demonstrates the double-edged nature of mobile bordering. As we have argued traditional bordering relies on the presence of the state-maintained border, which by virtue of repetitive practice through time has become sedimented as a taken for granted, common-sense aspect of being in a world of nation states (Cooper and...
Mobile borders/bordering mobilities

Perkins 2012). The traditional state border, in other words, is an institution that has taken on the appearance of objectivity (Perkins and Rumford 2013), becomes one of the many background assumptions about how everyday life works, and is acted towards as such. Furthermore, the scale of traditional bordering practices mean that only the territorial state, with its resources and monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, is able to maintain them. This does not preclude intervention in the traditional border, as for example the work of Amoore and Hall (2010, 2013) has demonstrated. However, the introduction of diffused mobile borders within the polity itself has the effect of producing multiple, smaller sites for contestation of the border while simultaneously lowering the barriers for engagement in border politics. Intervention is no longer against the monolith at the edge of the polity, but at multiple sites proximate to everyday experience.

This can be seen in the responses to the three initiatives introduced above. The vans have produced a mobile site and template that takes the border debate away from the territorial fringes. Intervention has ranged from parody to legal challenge. Pukkah Punjabi, for example, called the number on the van to request help travelling between Willesden and Harrow: the resultant messages posted on Twitter detailing his conversation with immigration officials reached hundreds of thousands of people (Punjabi 2013). In another example, human rights charity Liberty commissioned their own vans, with the message, ‘Stirring up tension and division in the UK illegally? Home office, think again’ displayed in a similar font and colour scheme to the original (Walker 2013). In terms of legal challenges, the method of van billboards has been referred to the advertising standards agency (APSA), both for the potentially offensive use of the term ‘Go Home’ and the statistical claim that 106 arrests where made in ‘your area’ last week. The spot checks and the broadcasts of immigration arrests have produced a similar wave of parody and legal dispute. The spot checks have raised questions about the criteria used to single out those to be approached, with government officials insisting that people are stopped based upon intelligence and behaviour rather than racial profiling, while others have argued that officers ‘appeared to be stopping and questioning every non-white person, many of whom were clearly ordinary Kensal Green residents going to work’ (Withnall 2013). The train stations became sites of contestation of the border when 30 members of the Southall Black Sisters, a group established in 1979 by Asian women, began protesting against UKBA officials (Quine 2013). With regards to the Twitter broadcasts, activists and lawyers have pointed to the potential illegality of referring to those arrested as immigration offenders before this has been proven. Both initiatives have been lampooned in the media, and in particular on Twitter, where government action has been likened to the dystopian novel The Hunger Games (Dixon 2013), and compared to the Stasi.

This case illustrates three aspects, or three paradoxes, of the UK’s mobile borders that have broader implications for mobile bordering itself. The first we term the paradox of visibility. The networking of diffuse, mobile borders means that they do not have the same performative power as the traditional state border; indeed as we have discussed these borders may be invisible to the vast majority.
But in order for the state to perform its territorial integrity, to show that its borders are working, it has to make its mobile bordering processes visible and thus bring novel bordering practices under the spotlight. As discussed above, traditional bordering practices at the edge of the territorial state have, over the passage of time, become part of the background assumptions of actors regarding how mobility works. Importantly, this means that the state does not have to justify the border at the edge of the state, it is taken for granted. However, novel bordering practices such as the billboard vans or the spot checks at train stations do not have the same taken-for-granted quality; they pull people up short by interrupting everyday expectations of how borders function, are worthy of remark and therefore likely to be discussed. This leads to the second aspect: the paradox of diffusion. Diffused, mobile borders may be effective in the micro-regulation of flows of people and things, but they also produce multiple sites, and multiple forms of contest and negotiation that can potentially go beyond the state’s monopoly on the exercise of power. The ‘Go Home’ vans illustrate how these two points work in tandem. They were an attempt to perform the mobile border, and thus firm up the state’s claim to territorial integrity, but the act has also produced a highly visible site for Liberty’s counter-message as well as intervention in bordering practices via legislation designed to regulate not bordering but advertising. In the terms of the analytical framework set out above these novel bordering practices are not reasonably accountable within the context of pre-reflexive understandings of how borders operate within our social worlds.

The third aspect relates to the ubiquity of bordering as an everyday practice, which we term the paradox of proximity. As these three examples demonstrate, novel mobile bordering strategies rely not only on the act of sorting the ‘wanted’ from the ‘unwanted’ but also the active justification for the sorting practice itself. This justification must appeal to pre-reflexive understandings of just treatment of particular categories of people. As Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking (2013: 346) argue,

The fact that borders are politically constructed means they have to find their legitimacy in boundaries, i.e. the cultural and political narratives about a society, its culture, territory and history; about who is a member of that society and, consequently, who is an outsider.

Of course, as long as the practice of sorting remains invisible there is no need for justification and, to a lesser extent, so too as long as the sorting occurs at the edges of the territory. While the filtering of mobile bodies may be deemed ‘acceptable’ or ‘legitimate’ at traditional points of entry, targeted at people literally ‘coming’ or ‘going’, this example of mobile bordering in the midst of society asks deeper questions concerning identity, citizenship and community. It creates potential division between migrant and non-migrant communities, entrenching who legitimately belongs and who does not in cultural and racial terms. It evokes concepts of the ‘home’ and subsequently what it means to be (in this case) legitimately British and who fits this meaning and who does not. It implies what
William Walters (2004: 241) has termed ‘domopolitics’, which evokes a ‘fateful conjunction of home, land and security’. Domopolitics, according to Walters (2004: 241), captures a particular political as well as socio-cultural logic in which: ‘[E]very people should have (at least one); home as a place we must protect. We may invite guests into our home, but they come at our invitation; they don’t stay indefinitely. Others are, by definition, not invited.’ The ‘Go Home’ campaign in the UK, therefore, evokes the dividing practice of ‘we’, ‘our’ and ‘they’.

However, due to the paradox of visibility, mobile borders require accompanying messages in order to justify the act of bordering. The proximity of mobile borders, brought about by the paradox of diffusion, has the potential to make them a part of everyday debate and problematise the narratives that they are embedded in. The ‘Go Home’ message is a particularly good example of this. The Immigration Minister Mark Harper has argued that the message is ‘merely telling them [illegal immigrants] to comply with the law’ and that ‘by no stretch of the rational imagination can it be described as “racist”’ (Sankey 2013). However, this polysemic symbol has quickly been reframed and placed within a different narrative: the context of racist National Front graffiti of the 1970s, and this renarrativisation has been broadcast to hundreds of thousands of people (Punjabi 2013). This tactic has been very effective in de-legitimising the vans – de-legitimising this mobile border – and effectively ending this particular bordering practice. The parody is also significant as it points to other forms resistance to bordering can take. Once the Home Office released images of immigration related arrests on Twitter, those images were instantly remediated, the messages subverted and the arrests de-legitimised. Again the form in which the original bordering practice took place became the site of resistance, as the Home Office’s own ‘immigrationoffenders’ hashtag was used to hijack the message and put forth the arguments of those against the policy. This problem of contextualisation, or management of the narrative in which the border policy was embedded, was made all the more difficult when the story was picked up by the mainstream media.

Finally, this case is an example of what Perkins and Rumford (2013: 273) have referred to as a ‘point of indeterminacy’, whereby the apparent fixity of an institutional arrangement, in this case the UK border, ‘becomes unfixed’. Overnight the UK border became an object of scrutiny, the subject of critique among the general public who now felt the border impinging on them. The proximity of the border, now visibly active at local train stations and broadcast across the internet, produced sites of contest where groups such as the Southall Black Sisters have challenged border policy. In effect the barrier to popular engagement with borders has been lowered, and a space for participation in border politics produced by the logic of mobile borders and its internal contradictions.

Some concluding remarks

In this chapter we have focused upon what we formulate to be mobile, mobility dependent, borders – juxtaposed borders as well as diffused and networked
biometric and smart borders – deemed increasingly necessary and legitimate by the state to defend its interests. We have sought to discuss in detail how and why these borders are made legitimate by some (the state) and contested by others without recourse to simple empirical descriptions which assert that state bordering is required wherever the control of movement and associated information is required. This discussion has been informed by Rumford’s (2008b) insight into the visibility of borders, whereby certain borders are becoming less visible to a large proportion of people on the one hand, while at the same time, as a direct consequence, other more traditional borders are gaining extra visibility. At the same time we wanted to understand how these ‘less visible’ state security bordering practices could be made visible and subsequently offer some insights into how they could be, and are being, challenged and resisted.

Building upon our previous work we essentially argued that mobile, mobility dependent, borders are made legitimate through their ability to impose status functions on people and things falling within the ‘border remit’, which can only be understood by looking at the wider background assumptions within which the bordering takes place. Indeed, the institution of the border itself is also the product of the imposition of status functions and its subsequent background normative position. Yet herein lies the problem. These mobile borders, often requiring mobility to fulfil their function, have lost their traditional material guise and as a result are less recognisable for many as borders – they have become un-border-like. The fact that these state bordering practices take place within and throughout society means that they can be discussed ‘out of context’, which means the state loses the ability to determine or fix what is legitimate practice and what is not. Mobile borders, in other words, by definition, create their own possibility for challenge and resistance. In this regard, the examples taken from the UK discussed in the final part of the chapter illuminated how such bordering practices become discussed – become objects of scrutiny – whereby the state (UK government) loses the ability to set and control the narrative. Indeed, the examples showed how the seriousness of the mobile border – part of the wider networked state border – became undermined using humour, a particular aspect of the examples that would benefit from further study.

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3 Joined-up security

A genealogy

Mark Bevir

Joined-up security refers to the agenda, reforms and practices associated with the application of joined-up governance to security policy. Joined-up governance refers more generally to a distinctive policy agenda that seeks to promote efficiency and effectiveness by fostering networks and partnerships among the public, voluntary and private sector organisations involved in any given area of policy. These networks and partnerships are meant to ensure that the relevant organisations communicate with one another, thereby enabling them to collaborate more effectively and to benefit from the synergies arising out of such collaboration. These joined-up or whole-of-government approaches initially appeared in domestic policy, especially social welfare policy, in states such as Australia and Britain. They remain prominent although they are now often supplemented by other ways of thinking, such as those associated with behavioural economics and ‘nudge’ technologies.

Joined-up security is, therefore, a post-Cold War phenomenon that breaks with realist and liberal ways of managing security in international politics (Baldwin 1995). It embodies a widespread belief that the new security threats of the post-Cold War era cannot be effectively addressed by established realist and liberal practices (Lebow 1994). It shifts the management of security away from both the state-centric approaches favoured by many realists and the formal institutions favoured by many liberals towards a reliance on more diverse actors and more flexible ways of working (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Hall and Biersteker 2002). Within states, joined-up security promotes new roles for foreign and defence ministries and also new cross-government and international linkages involving other ministries (Brook and King 2007; Hall 2010, 2013). Within the international sphere, joined-up security promotes networks of states, non-government organisations (NGOs), international institutions and agencies, transnational corporations, activists, epistemic communities and other organisations (Hollis 2010; and more generally Slaughter and Hale 2011; Streets 2009).

This chapter provides a genealogy of joined-up security, emphasising its roots in two developments in the social sciences during the late twentieth century. First, from the 1980s onwards, some scholars of international relations began to expand the concept of security (Bevir and Hall 2014). In particular, theories of securitisation drew attention to non-traditional threats and also to the extent to
which security depended on the provision of a range of socio-economic goods. As these theories permeated policy, so approaches to security began to emphasise the management and delivery of the relevant socio-economic goods. Second, from the 1970s onwards, scholars of planning and public management began to champion networks and partnerships as alternatives to bureaucratic hierarchies and markets (Bevir 2010). As these theories dramatically grew in influence during the 1990s, so policy-makers turned to ‘joined-up’ or ‘whole-of-government’ arrangements to manage and deliver the socio-economic goods that were deemed to be prerequisites of security.

So, joined-up security is an example of the way expertise can supplement and trump democracy in security policy (Eriksen 2011). To avoid any misunderstanding, however, I should say that the ties between social science expertise and public policies are not invariant. For a start, there are debates among social scientists: the rise of securitisation has not eclipsed realism or liberalism. In addition, policy-makers typically draw on diverse ways of thinking in different settings and at different times: security governance today is notably eclectic, taking ideas from all kinds of sources, and states often pursue realist agendas and promote liberal arrangements even as they increasingly rely on joined-up networks. Finally, policies rarely work as policy-makers expect them to, let alone as academic theories suggest they will. Public officials, non-governmental organisations and citizens constantly interpret and resist policies in ways that do much to define how the relevant policies work in practice. Nonetheless, all these qualifications are compatible with a broad genealogy tracing joined-up security back to social science theories of securitisation and networks.

The rise of securitisation

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union posed serious challenges to analysts and practitioners of international relations. For a start, the Cold War era had been dominated by realist and liberal theories of international relations, neither of which had predicted the events of the 1990s. Many observers concluded that realism and liberalism were defunct precisely because they demonstrably failed even to identify the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Gaddis 1992/3; Baldwin 1995; Betts 1997; Lebow and Risse-Kappen 1995). In addition, realist and liberal theories seemed unable to explain the new security threats that rapidly emerged after the end of the Cold War, let alone to prescribe adequate policy responses to these threats. These new threats were perceived to lie at the levels of the state, society and individual, rather than in the structure of the international system. The threats included a resurgence of ethno-nationalist violence in the post-Communist world and the global South (von Hippel 1994) and a shift to new forms of conflict that were fought not by disciplined state militaries but by irregular forces, often unrestrained by either international humanitarian law or the basic norms of warfare (Kaldor 1999). Yet other threats arose from environmental degradation and climate change, on the one hand, and poor governance, on the other (Duffield 2001).
The new security threats posed dilemmas for analysts and policy-makers because they seemed, in the minds of many observers, to be inexplicable in terms of realist and liberal theories of international politics. The resurgence of ethno-nationalist violence undermined the core realist or liberal claims that modern politics and international relations were driven by instrumental rationality or by ideological rivalries, and thus could be explained and remedied by power politics or by ideational and institutional change.

As observers concluded that realist and liberal theories had failed, so they looked to new accounts of global security. Some scholars argued that ‘ancient hatreds’ or even primordial ‘clashes of civilizations’ were the main causes of contemporary conflicts (Kaldor 1993; Huntington 1993). Many theorists argued that international relations were better conceived in terms of socially constructed identities than in terms of interests or institutions (Wendt 1992; Katzenstein 1996). Others scholars agreed that materialist explanations of the causes of political violence were inadequate, but then concentrated their attention less on identities than on the ‘discourses’ that they argued constructed threats and convinced policymakers to act in certain ways to address those threats (Jones 1999).

Although these new theories were in part responses to the post-Cold War era, many of them drew on ideas with longer pedigrees. Since the 1960s some scholars had been arguing that both realists and liberals had too narrow a concept of a security threat and, as a consequence, failed to promote suitable policies (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 101–55). Peace researchers argued that a concentration on military and political threats had led to a neglect of the ‘structural violence’ of social injustice and of economic inequality (Galtung 1969). Other scholars concentrated on different threats and different responses. In *This Endangered Planet* (1971), for example, Richard Falk argued that pollution and resource depletion were creating threats to human well-being that were just as serious as inter-state wars – even nuclear wars. By the 1980s, these kinds of arguments had helped to generate an extensive debate over the meaning of ‘security’, the proper obligations of scholars in the field, and the policy implications of scholarly theories (see especially Buzan 1983).

In the aftermath of the Cold War, security analysts drew on these earlier ideas and debates to develop new theories of global security that responded to the new threats of the age (Smith 1999). Their varied theories shared two key features. First, these theories were less statist than were realist and liberal theories. They were sceptical of the realist and liberal claim that building national security entailed greater security for individuals and communities. They argued, to the contrary, that the state itself was sometimes the principal threat to the security of citizens. Second, these theories were less focused on military threats than were realist and liberal theories. They expanded ‘security studies’ to focus on political, economic, social and environmental threats. In practical terms, they suggested that building security required more than simply improving the capacities of police forces and militaries.

Despite these clear similarities, the new theories divided into different schools. Constructivists concentrated on identities and the social meanings of security
practices, with the Copenhagen school working especially on ‘securitisation’ (Williams 2003). Critical theorists and postmodernists looked in particular at the ways in which political discourses generated security threats and pointed to political responses (Jones 1999; Booth 2005, 2007). Feminists drew on both constructivism and critical theory to advance research substantive foci on gender and war (Enloe 1990; Tickner 1992).

All these new theories helped to inspire new policy agendas, including human security, state-building and humanitarian intervention. These policy agendas responded to the new security threats that scholars had identified from the 1960s onwards, and they did so by self-consciously breaking with realist and some liberal modes of thought and practice. All these agendas were driven by Western states, and some were resisted by some non-Western states, although not all of the resistance came from outside the West.

So, although the concept of ‘human security’ became famous mainly following the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report of 1994, it arose from earlier work, dating back to the 1960s, by peace researchers, environmentalists and theorists such as Buzan (1983). The concept of ‘human security’ involved a self-conscious act of ‘securitisation’, that is, the act of rendering something not conventionally considered a security issue into a security issue in order to give it greater political salience (Williams 2003). Like earlier radical security theorists, advocates of ‘human security’ argued that to properly address the range of threats facing many people, especially in the developing world, it was necessary to shift the ‘referent object’ of security away from the state and towards individuals and communities. The UNDP report argued: ‘the world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives’ (UNDP 1994: 1). A year later, at the 1995 World Summit, the UNDP and other actors sympathetic to the cause pushed for a new global socio-economic order that would address ‘human security’ by channelling resources hitherto devoted to national security and economic growth towards sustainable development in the global South.

All Western states adopted the human security agenda in some form or another. Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and others reorganised their aid and development efforts to boost funding in the relevant areas. In the UK, the Department for International Development (DFID) was founded in 1997, and then grew so rapidly, both in size and in responsibility, that by 2009 its budget dwarfed that of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) (Hall 2013). Australia’s AusAID underwent a similar phase of growth over a similar period. Even in the US, the argument that human security and development in the global South was essential to security has had an impact, for successive US National Security Strategies throughout the post-Cold War period have emphasised the need for development assistance to address issues of human security.

State-building was, like human security, an attempt to improve standards of governance and so tackle sources of insecurity. State-building involved democratisation, institutional reform and economic development. All these aspects of state-building were thus ‘securitised’: they were no longer just ends in themselves; they became, in addition and sometimes more importantly, means
to improve national and global security. State-building in its various guises was to undermine those autocratic regimes that threatened both the West and their own citizens. It was to eliminate those socio-economic causes of dissatisfaction and discontent that had enabled autocrats to come to power in various non-Western societies (Duffield 2001). In the 1990s, these security considerations inspired the West to attempt to aid states to make a transition from various forms of authoritarianism to liberal democracy by encouraging them to adopt – or even imposing on them – certain standards of institutional design and economic management. In the 2000s, the focus of the West shifted from transitional states to ‘failed’ or ‘failing states’ such as Afghanistan or the Solomon Islands. Democratisation and good governance were thus merged into broader projects of state-building in places where even the rudiments of government had broken down (Wesley 2008).

The human security and good governance agendas diverted resources conventionally spent on military power towards measures to prevent the emergence of non-traditional, and mostly non-state-based, security threats. But Western states also showed growing concern in the post-Cold War period with using military force for ‘humanitarian intervention’. Humanitarian intervention tackled immediate state-based and non-state-based threats to the security of individuals and communities. As a policy agenda, it had few historical precedents (see Wheeler 2001). It even seemed to challenge entrenched international norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention in a way that has inspired a prolonged debate about the extent and value of these norms.

Humanitarian intervention responded to the conviction that human rights abuses in conflicts ought not to be tolerated, regardless of whether a sovereign state was the abuser. It also echoed popular concern in the West about a number of abuses that got extensive media coverage. Nonetheless, what really made humanitarian intervention possible was the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which began in the 1970s. Crucially, RMA included the development of ‘smart’ weapons, such as laser-guided bombs, that minimised the risks to the pilots using them and to non-combatants who were in the area under attack. RMA seemed to enable Western militaries to use force without suffering combat casualties and without inflicting the kind of death and injury on innocent civilians that would likely turn public opinion against military action.

Six major humanitarian interventions were conducted by Western states in the twenty years after 1991. These interventions were in Bosnia (1991–5), Somalia (1992–4), Haiti (1994), East Timor (1999), Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011). Each intervention provoked debate about its justification and legality. The justifications generally turned on both moral considerations and security concerns. As the moral considerations have been discussed at great length elsewhere, and are not in any case the focus here, they can be set aside. The security concerns are more relevant.

Humanitarian intervention demonstrated the extent to which statist modes of thought about security had been displaced by new thinking. This new thinking was partly the result of the sheer weight of argument about the apparent effects of ‘globalization’ on international relations (Sassen 2002). It was also partly due
to the widespread belief that the pursuit of national security had not generally led to improved security for individuals and communities. Both of these sources of the new thinking appear in Tony Blair’s famous Chicago speech on the ‘Doctrine of International Community’ (1999). Blair delivered this speech during the Kosovo conflict. He argued that what he called ‘isolationism’, the practice of standing aside from the conflicts of others, had been made impossible by ‘global interdependence’. And he then went on to say:

We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not. We cannot refuse to participate in global markets if we want to prosper. We cannot ignore new political ideas in other countries if we want to innovate. We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we want still to be secure.

Clearly humanitarian intervention was not driven solely by moral imperatives. ‘[I]n the end’, Blair argued, ‘values and interests merge’ (Blair 1999).

Although humanitarian intervention remained controversial, it led to a partial renegotiation of international norms and practices. At Canada’s behest, an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was created in 2000. The following year the Commission presented a report to the UN, titled ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (sometimes abbreviated to R2P or RtoP). This report argued that sovereignty should be conceived not as an inalienable right but as a trust that embodied a duty to safeguard the security of citizens. This new view of sovereignty was broadly endorsed by the members of the UN General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit. All states were then reminded that they had a responsibility to protect against war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, and the UN was treated as having a right to take appropriate measures to ensure that states upheld this responsibility. Although the 2005 World Summit did not settle the issue of whether armed humanitarian intervention was justifiable, it made some progress towards consensus about the meaning and extent of sovereignty in international relations (Bellamy 2009).

Human security, state-building, and humanitarian intervention are policy agendas that derive in part from the new theories about international relations that came to the fore in the post-Cold War period. These policy agendas became, in turn, new challenges for theorists and practitioners. They posed moral challenges about who should act for whom, why, when and how, and they posed practical challenges of implementation. As we will see, joined-up security emerged as theorists and practitioners responded to these moral and practical challenges by drawing on new technologies of governance.

The rise of networks

By the turn of the century, new theories of international relations had inspired policy-makers to emphasise the extent to which national and international security required the management and delivery of socio-economic goods. But it is
one thing to want to deliver such goods and quite another to have a well-defined approach to doing so. Joined-up security relies here on networks, as opposed, for example, to bureaucracy or markets. To understand why it does so, we need to explore changing fashions in planning theory and public management. Although this exploration of planning theory may appear to be taking us away from security, a genealogy of joined-up security has to show not just how the concept of security got expanded, but also why policy actors often try to manage the expanded world of security using networks, partnerships and the other technologies that go with joined-up governance.

Planning theory long encouraged a rational approach based on centralised forms of knowledge and organisation (Hall 1988). Modern planning developed, together with Keynesian economics, during the economic crises and the great depression of the inter-war years. Planning then relied on hierarchic and bureaucratic institutions to collect and study data, to evaluate courses of action and to implement decisions. Karl Mannheim (1940) famously argued that such planning was inevitable given modern demographic and technological trends. His work sparked a debate over planning and freedom, with free market theorists such as Frederick Hayek (1944) battling against planners such as Barbara Wooten (1945). Initially, after the Second World War, the planners dominated much state action and international policy-making, including development policy where modernization theory became increasingly popular (Gilman 2007). But in the late 1970s and early 1980s planning theory went through a crisis, with the rise of neoliberalism leading to a rejection of rational planning in favour of marketisation and contracting.

Rational planning was subject to numerous criticisms. Hayek inspired other neoliberals to argue that it was impossible and that it created bureaucracies that were inherently inefficient and unresponsive. In addition, even mid-level social scientists began increasingly to accept accounts of the incremental nature of decision-making or the dominance of economic interests in the planning process (Lindblom 1959; Molotoch 1977). Progressive social scientists began to suggest that rational planning failed to respond effectively to the needs of the poor (Grabow and Heskin 1973).

Mid-level social scientists may have turned away from rational planning but they rarely adopted micro-level theories or championed markets as did Hayek. Instead they developed new approaches to planning, including transactive planning, social learning theory, and communicative planning theory (Forester 1989; Friedman 1973; Healey 1997). These new approaches differed from rational planning in championing informal structures and wider participation, with planners having a more facilitative and less directive role. The new approaches thereby located planning in networks based on partnerships and interactions with the community.

The shift from rational planning to more informal approaches appeared in the rise of concepts such as ‘wicked problem’ (Rittel and Webber 1973; and more recently Conklin 2006 and Paquet 2006). Most definitions suggest problems are wicked if they exhibit a cluster of features such as being fairly unique, lacking a definitive formulation, being subject to multiple explanations, lacking a test to decide the
value of any response to it, all responses to it being better or worse rather than true or false, and each response to it having important consequences such that there is no real chance to learn by trial and error. Typically these features mean that wicked problems are interrelated. Any wicked problem has complex links to others. Any response to a wicked problem has an impact on other wicked problems.

Planning theorists argue that wicked problems explained the failings of hierarchic bureaucracies. Departmental silos undermine the coordination that is needed to address interrelated and intransigent problems. The state confronts a growing number of cross-jurisdictional challenges and a declining ability to respond to them. Wicked problems require more collaborative and innovative approaches with agencies working across organisational boundaries both within and outside the state. Some planning theorists thus argue that informal networks and looser planning processes provide a way of dealing with wicked problems. Partnerships and joined-up governance may enable state agencies to collaborate with one another and voluntary and private sector organisations. Such partnerships are especially important to address problems that lie beyond the reach of single government agencies. They provide a framework in which several organisations can interact and collaborate in mutually beneficial ways.

The changing nature of planning theory reflects a broader shift in mid-level social science toward the new institutionalism (Healey 1999). The new institutionalism is highly amorphous, consisting minimally of rational choice, historical and sociological strands (Hall and Taylor 1996). The latter two strands are the ones that interest us. They try to preserve mid-level analysis by emphasising social embeddedness and the role of structures and norms as determinants of social life.

New institutionalists respond to the challenge of rational choice theory by distinguishing themselves from old institutionalists (Hall and Taylor 1996; Peters 1999; and for discussion Adcock et al. 2007). They imply that the old institutionalism was overly formal and legalistic, concentrating on constitutions and the official rules governing states and other organisations (March and Olsen 1984). Often they associate this formal legalism with a privileging of hierarchic bureaucracy as a rational form of organisation embodying a rational approach to planning. In contrast, they define their own new institutionalism as open and receptive to informal norms and organizations, including networks and partnerships.

The new institutionalism thus has considerable overlap with network theories. On the one hand, new institutionalists use the concept of a network to describe the inevitable nature of all organisations given that individuals are socially embedded. They imply that hierarchies and markets are networks, for the concepts of embeddedness and network suggest that human action is always structured by social relationships. Thus, the concept of a network provides many institutionalists, such as Mark Granovetter (1973) and Walter Powell (1990), with a theoretical rebuttal of rational choice theory. On the other hand, institutionalists suggest that networks are better suited to many tasks than are hierarchies or markets. Thus, the concept of a network also provides institutionalists with a way to challenge neoliberal policies. Institutionalists imply that states typically should promote networks not markets, trust not competition, and diplomacy not the new
public management. Institutionalists typically combine these two different ways of conceiving of networks by suggesting, first, that all organisations take the form of embedded networks, but, second, that those organisations that best resemble the ideal type of a network will reap the benefits of so doing.

Today many institutionalists accept neoliberal arguments about the inflexible and unresponsive nature of rational planning and bureaucratic hierarchies. However, instead of promoting marketisation and managerialism, they favour joining-up and networks (Granovetter 1994; Powell et al. 1996). These new institutionalists think that networks are characteristically flexible and responsive structures that allow for the structured and yet informal environments in which social actors operate. They argue that competitiveness and efficiency derive not only from markets and competition but also from stable relationships that are characterised by mutual trust, social participation and voluntary associations. These new institutionalists thereby suggest that in many circumstances networks offer a superior mode of coordination to both hierarchies and markets. In their view, networks combine an enabling and facilitative leadership with increased flexibility, creativity, inclusiveness and commitment.

Many institutionalists reject rational choice theory and the neoliberal faith in markets on the grounds that they ignore the embedded nature of social life. However, they also reject a focus on formal planning and hierarchy. In their view, hierarchies can sometimes provide a context for trust and stability, but the time for hierarchies has now passed. Hierarchies were useful for the routines and patterns of behaviour that dominated Fordist economies, but they are less suited to the new knowledge-driven global economy. The new times in which we live require states to foster innovation and entrepreneurship if those states are to compete effectively. The new times require networks in which trust and participation combine with flexibility, responsiveness and innovation.

Planning theorists, institutionalists and mid-level social scientists generally have turned to networks. Many of them suggest that networks can combine the best features of markets, including flexibility and efficiency, with the desirable features of hierarchies, including stability and the ability to concentrate on long-term issues. In their opinion networks can overcome the problems associated with managerialism and out-sourcing: networks offer the benefits of long-term stable relationships and genuine cooperation in contrast to a short-term focus on immediate profits. Some institutionalists argue here that the private sector is marred by an endemic short-termism: competition and the need to make an immediate profit lead companies to neglect long-term investment and stability. This argument suggests that there are some advantages to the public sector being comparatively sheltered from competition. State agencies can concentrate on building collaborative relationships that will provide the long-term advantages associated with stability, trust and collaboration.

The turn to networks has inspired a new belief in the virtues of joining-up and public–private partnerships. Joined-up governance requires horizontal and vertical coordination between organisations involved in public policy. Although the boundary between policy-making and policy implementation is blurred,
joined-up approaches look different in each case. Joined-up policy-making tries to bring together the varied agencies involved in addressing a particular problem, such as juvenile crime or counter-terrorism. Joined-up policy implementation tries to simplify the delivery of services to citizens by improving coordination among different agencies – an example being the way agencies are brought together in one-stop shops at which the unemployed can access benefits, training and information about jobs. In both cases, joined-up governance draws on the idea that networks can effectively coordinate the actions of a range of actors and organisations.

Partnerships can be between public, private and voluntary bodies, as well as between different levels of government or different state agencies. Neoliberals often thought of partnerships as contractual market-based relations, such as those associated with competitive tendering and out-sourcing. In contrast, new institutionalists generally believe that public agencies should build and maintain long-term relationships based on trust with suppliers, users and other stakeholders. Public–private partnerships are meant to embody a shared commitment and a degree of cooperation beyond that specified in a formal contract.

**Joined-up security**

Joined-up security arose as joined-up governance spilled over from domestic approaches, where it had first taken root, into defence and security policy. In many cases, this spillover was deliberate, with policy-makers transferring to the security sector approaches that they had used elsewhere (Webber *et al.* 2004: 4). Policy-makers often transferred these approaches in response to what they perceived to be new non-state-based security challenges, such as transnational crime, terrorism and illegal migration. As these threats appeared across policy sectors and across national borders, so they seemed to require transnational and joined-up responses. As a result, from the 1990s onwards, states and international organisations increasingly sought to tackle security issues by engaging other actors, including NGOs, environmental organizations, think-tanks and private firms.

Although sovereign states usually remain at the core of joined-up security, states themselves increasingly rely ‘on the cooperation and resources of non-state actors, such as private security companies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations’ (Krahmann 2003: 6). In so doing, states have moved away from their historic adherence to practices based on the idea of a balance of power, security regime or security community. They have begun instead to craft new practices characterised by the proliferation of new security agencies, the functional specialisation of these agencies (especially in non-traditional security issues) and the partial fragmentation of alliances and regimes into ‘coalitions of the willing’, as well as an increasing use of private sector security providers. ‘Decision-making’ now ‘proceeds through negotiation’, and ‘policies are implemented in a decentralized fashion’ (Krahmann 2003: 13).

The examples of counter-terrorism or homeland security and of development or fragile states can illustrate the rise, extent and variety of this joined-up approach to security.
Homeland security

The terror attacks of 11 September 2001 prompted massive reforms of US security and more limited reforms in Europe (Bossong 2008). The reforms sought to foster networks aimed at preventing other terrorist attacks. Initially the main language was that of ‘interagency coordination’, but policy actors soon began explicitly to relate such coordination to whole-of-government and joined-up approaches (Kilcullen 2006; McDonough 2006). Homeland security is thus a clear example of the attempt to promote coordination and central control in an otherwise increasingly fragmented environment. It extends joining-up from public management to national security (Brook and King 2007).

At the federal level, the Bush Administration responded to the 9/11 attacks by creating a new Cabinet-level department. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) brought together a patchwork of twenty-two agencies responsible for diverse territories and activities. These agencies included the Coast Guard, the Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Customs and Border Protection, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Immigration Customs Enforcement, the Secret Service and the Transportation Security Administration. The rationale for the DHS explicitly mentions ‘collaborating and coordinating across traditional boundaries, both horizontally (between agencies) and vertically (among different levels of government)’ with the equally explicit aim of creating a ‘cohesive, capable and service-oriented organization whose cross-cutting functions will be optimized’ so as better to protect the ‘nation against threats and effectively respond to disasters’ (Department of Homeland Security 2004).

The DHS focuses on gathering and analysing intelligence. It gathers information by cooperating with intelligence assets on federal, state and local levels, as well as private and voluntary sector organizations. Inside the DHS, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis collates and analyses this information so as to enable the DHS to advise policy-makers and disseminate information back to its federal, state, local and private sector partners. The DHS is thus meant to act as a cache for intelligence that is accessible to policy-makers and law enforcement agencies. It is meant to break down barriers between agencies, promoting a free flow of intelligence.

Joined-up approaches to security and emergency are spreading in America at the local as well as the federal level. Many local authorities have introduced initiatives that foster cooperation and coordination among agencies involved in emergency management and response (Fosher 2009). For example, Arlington County, Virginia, has created an emergency management team composed of the police and fire departments as well as various officials from the public works and public health departments (Anderson 2004). In addition, the County has negotiated with its neighbours to establish aid agreements under which they all share resources across jurisdictional boundaries. The idea of shared resources here extends to protocols and practices: it includes the interoperability of radio systems and the use of standard emergency response equipment so that any agency’s tools will work when responding to an emergency anywhere in the region; and it
includes a uniform incident management system covering issues such as which agency will take the lead in responding to particular types of emergency.

Fragile states

Joined-up approaches have also spread to policy responses to state-building, especially to aid and intervention in fragile states (Duffield 1997). Up until the 1990s, debates about aid were usually conducted in terms of underdeveloped states and their economic needs. More recently, however, greater attention has been paid to fragile states and the wicked problems they confront. Fragile states are defined not just by poverty but by related problems of weak governance and violent conflict. Donor states increasingly conceive of aid as requiring a joined-up approach that addresses all of these problems simultaneously. They argue that effective aid to fragile states depends on networks that combine actors and issues associated with security, foreign policy and development.

Donor states increasingly approach fragile states through a whole of government approach that emphasises the importance of coordination among policy actors involved with diplomacy, defence and development. By 2005, Australia, Germany, the UK, the US and other states had established dedicated units to coordinate departmental efforts to aid reconstruction in fragile states. Several states were also exploring novel funding arrangements to encourage greater interdepartmental collaboration.

Unsurprisingly the whole of government approach quickly took root in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In 2005, the Fragile States Group of the OECD Development Assistance Committee devised Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States that highlighted the importance of developing coherent programmes that spanned the administrative, economic, political and security domains. The Group then set up a workstream, chaired by Australia and France, to devise a framework for an explicitly ‘whole of government’ approach (OECD 2006). The international community has moved towards support for a whole of government approach to aid more generally. From February to March 2005 a high-level forum on Joint Progress Toward Enhanced Aid Effectiveness met in Paris. It brought together over a hundred countries as well as international institutions such as the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the OECD, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme. The forum resulted in the Paris Declaration, which calls for greater harmonisation, alignment and managing of aid in relation to a set of monitorable indicators.

All cases of a whole of government approach to fragile states and aid more generally emphasise the alignment of expertise and actions concerned with economics, governance and security. In addition, many organise funding to encourage such alignment. Pooled funding and joint budget lines allow resources to be orientated towards specific problems and goals rather than following established bureaucratic domains or agency affiliations. For example, the UK has established an Africa Conflict Prevention Pool and a Global Prevention Pool, in
order to prompt collaboration among a wide range of policy actors in the creation of integrated strategies. Finally, some whole of government approaches try to build aid strategies in partnership with private sector actors. One example is the involvement of private companies in the reconstruction of war-torn societies.

The OECD points to Canada’s operations in Haiti as a good example of the whole of government approach. Canada has been a leading proponent of this approach since adopting it in an International Policy Statement of April 2005. The approach lay behind its formation of inter-organisational networks in Ottawa and on the ground in Haiti.

Canada’s policies towards Haiti and its operations in Haiti were devised and planned by an Interdepartmental Steering Group and an Interdepartmental Working Group. The steering group brought together the agencies involved in the operations: the Canadian International Development Agency, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Department of National Defence, the Privy Council Office and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. This steering group defined broad procedures and budget for the operations in Haiti. Within this broad framework, an Interdepartmental Working Group managed the operations. This Working Group brought together the expertise involved in the operations, including specialised departments such as Correctional Services Canada, Elections Canada and the Department of Justice, all of which possessed different aspects of the expertise needed to realise the objectives defined by the steering committee.

Operations on the ground in Haiti were primarily executed by the diplomatic corps and security personnel. The whole of government approach appeared again in the emphasis placed on coordinating between these groups and between them and other relevant actors. The presence of security personnel and peacekeepers was a collaborative effort among the Canadian International Development Agency, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which collectively provided about a hundred personnel to United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. In addition, the diplomatic corps in particular collaborated with the international community and especially with Haitian officials, providing a channel for local ideas and inputs.

A whole of government approach to fragile states may seem intuitively appealing. Yet clearly a number of important challenges remain (Patrick and Brown 2007). Donors talk about combining economics, governance and security, and they send experts from all these fields, but they often fail to develop comprehensive strategies that unify the aid and services they provide.

**Conclusion**

In homeland security, aid to fragile states and many other areas, there has been a noticeable trend towards joined-up approaches. I have offered a genealogy of this trend. Historically joined-up approaches to security arose out of the conjunction of two largely unrelated developments in the social sciences during the later twentieth century. First, new theories of international relations encouraged a
process of securitisation in which otherwise social and economic issues were reconceptualised as the potential bases for security threats. Security policy thereby became intimately connected to policy agendas such as development and state-building, as illustrated by the example of fragile states. Second, new theories of planning and public management encouraged a reliance on networks and joining-up, rather than hierarchies or markets, for the formulation and implementation of public policy. As this joined-up approach has spread from domestic policy to international relations, so it has become widespread in counter-terrorism, homeland security, aid and state-building.

Genealogies do not only help to explain the rise of social practices; typically they also act as denaturalising critiques of those practices (Bevir 2008). So, in revealing the contingent roots of joined-up security, this chapter challenges any assumption that joined-up security is a neutral and scientific response to new policy problems. It suggests, on the contrary, that joined-up security is as much the construction of particular traditions of social science as it is a scientific response to new policy challenges.

References


4 The curious state of the Good Samaritan

Humanitarianism under conditions of security

Tugba Basaran

A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, when he fell into the hands of robbers. They stripped him of his clothes, beat him and went away, leaving him half dead. A priest happened to be going down the same road, and when he saw the man, he passed by on the other side. So too, a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by on the other side. But a Samaritan, as he travelled, came where the man was; and when he saw him, he took pity on him. He went to him and bandaged his wounds, pouring on oil and wine. Then he put the man on his own donkey, brought him to an inn and took care of him.

(Luke 10: 25–37)

In this renowned biblical parable, the Samaritan is praised for assisting the stranger in distress: for providing medical support by bandaging his wounds, for providing him with transport by placing him on his donkey, for providing him with temporary housing by bringing him to an inn. The Good Samaritan has long entered the vernacular as a compassionate person who unselfishly helps strangers in need an emblematic figure for the duty to render assistance, and in a wider sense an allegorical personification of humanitarianism. He has come to symbolise active compassion for the suffering of others, compassion that requires altruistic acts beyond empathic concern. As most people would agree, if we encounter a stranger in dire need, we should assist that person; this is not a question of charity, but a question of duty. The widespread praise for the Good Samaritans, coupled with the public outrage and condemnation at the encounter of the Priest and the Levite, the bystanders, appears to confirm the existence of a well-aligned social compass that requires us to emulate the conduct of the Good Samaritan. Curiously, whilst the conduct of the Good Samaritan is generally encouraged, the Good Samaritan is legally discouraged in liberal democracies from helping certain strangers in distress, amongst those notably the figure of the irregular migrant.

People usually deemed Good Samaritans are increasingly questioned, intimidated and prosecuted for emulating his works: for helping people in distress by providing medical support, transport or temporary housing. Recent policies, laws and practices demonstrate attempts at realigning the social compass for particular populations deemed less worthy of humanitarianism. In Italy, people
have been prosecuted for rescuing shipwrecked passengers on the seas, in France
for providing accommodation, and in the United States for leaving water in the
desert to reduce death by dehydration (Basaran 2014; Burridge 2009; Webber
2006). People acting out of humanitarian motives, with neither direct nor indirect
benefit to themselves, are increasingly exposed to administrative and criminal
sanctions for their conduct, including fines, detention and even imprisonment.
These include clergyman, doctors, social workers and activists, as well as
established humanitarian organisations, churches and support networks. Both
individual and collective humanitarian acts, whether spontaneous or organised,
are targeted by state authorities seeking to govern the humanitarian sector in the
name of security. Following established humanitarian principles of humanity
and impartiality, humanitarian acts are to prevent and relieve suffering, without
discrimination, giving priority to the most urgent suffering. Under conditions
of security, a distinction between welcome and unwelcome humanitarianism
is introduced, as unwelcome populations are increasingly precluded from
humanitarian concern. The state of the Good Samaritan is ambiguous and
contested in liberal democracies.

To expose the curious state of the Good Samaritan, this article analyses how
the humanitarian space is governed by liberal democracies in order to limit active
compassion towards certain members of society. It starts from the presumption
that a lack of humanitarian assistance cannot be attributed only to individual
disposition, but rather constitutes a collective societal problem. In the name of
security, the state assumes a special role in regulating humanitarian spaces. Co-
 opting humanitarianism under security responses, state authorities shrink the
humanitarian space and restrict the possibility to act as a Good Samaritan. To
narrow the boundaries of humanitarian spaces, liberal democracies redefine the
nature and scope of humanitarianism, determining what counts as a humanitarian
act, who counts as a humanitarian actor and who the humanitarian subject may be.
By implication certain acts, actors and subjects are excluded from the humanitarian
space and no longer perceived as of humanitarian concern. This allows liberal
democracies to distinguish between an official (authorized) humanitarian space
and an unauthorised space, in which humanitarian acts and actors are at best
tolerated, and at worst penalised. Contemporary approaches demonstrate an
unsettling facility in converging security concerns with humanitarian issues
in liberal democracies by redefining certain humanitarian acts as security acts,
reclassifying certain humanitarian actors as potential accomplices to crime. This
departs from the core principles of humanitarianism, namely preventing and
relieving suffering without discrimination and giving priority to the most urgent
of suffering, by categorising humanitarian subjects as worthy and unworthy,
deserving and undeserving. This not only penalises and criminalises Good
Samaritans, but has wider societal and normative effects, likely to disrupt any
kind of empathy towards unwelcome populations, unsettling bonds of solidarity
and humanity. Ultimately, the gradual securitisation of humanitarian spaces has
the potential to undermine the very foundation of humanitarianism – the notion
of a single humanity.
The curious state of the Good Samaritan

To expose the curious state of the Good Samaritan, this article analyses how humanitarian spaces are governed, and in particular how they are contracted, in the name of security in liberal democracies. To forward the argument, this chapter will begin with governing of humanitarian spaces under conditions of security in liberal democracies (section one). This is followed by an analysis of the configuration of boundaries of humanitarian spaces in liberal democracies under conditions of security, focusing on humanitarian acts, distinguishing between authorised and securitised acts (section two); humanitarian actors, distinguishing between accredited and penalised actors (section three); and humanitarian subjects, distinguishing between worthy and unworthy subjects (section four). It concludes with remarks on the current state of humanitarianism in liberal democracies. Through these analyses this chapter seeks to highlight the ways through which liberal democracies shrink humanitarian spaces through liberal techniques of governing and particularly through the rule of law.

In this sense, this chapter is a continuation of my current research on governing indifference in liberal democracies, producing collective indifference to human suffering by establishing a system of sanctions (Basaran 2014). It seeks to explore how state authorities attempt to guide human conduct, to look away from human suffering and even to permit death in support of security policies. As such, analysing the governing of humanitarian spaces requires nothing less than an inquiry into problems central to governing, namely, how to govern human conduct, that is, to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable conduct, and lead subjects towards acceptable conduct (Foucault 1982). In line with works seeking to understand governing of societies and techniques of governing (Foucault 1991; Dean 1999), this research seeks to analyse the governing of indifference in liberal societies and how laws and the legal complex work as a liberal technique of governing human conduct, of governing through indifference to securitised populations (Basaran 2010). It contributes to a wider research agenda focused on limitations of fundamental rights in liberal democracies, how the rule of law can be employed to undermine fundamental rights, and how illiberal practices are normalised in liberal regimes (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; Basaran 2010).

Governing the humanitarian space

Governing the humanitarian space is of utmost importance in liberal democracies; in fact, it is a fundamental component of governing security. Hereby, governing refers to the ability to set the boundaries of the humanitarian space as to create an official (authorised) humanitarian space, with the capability to define authorised acts, the actors and the subjects. By implication certain acts, actors and subjects are regulated from the official humanitarian space, no longer perceived as of humanitarian concern or nature. This contrasts with the idealised image of the humanitarian space in liberal democracies as an ungoverned and uncontested space, welcoming and even promoting a diversity of individual and organised humanitarian acts, towards all human beings (for critiques of this apolitical representations of altruism and humanitarianism, see e.g. Barnett and Weiss 2008;
Humanitarian acts by civil society actors, whether distributing food to the hungry or providing shelter to the homeless, appear to depend only upon individual disposition (goodwill), set apart from the realm of governing by liberal democracies. The impression is conveyed that anybody can be a humanitarian actor, anybody can be a humanitarian subject, and any action pursued out of humanitarian motives should be considered humanitarian in nature. In this idealised portrayal, the role of the state and governing are left out, and only occasionally discussed as enablers but not disablers of humanitarianism.

So far, much of the research on humanitarian spaces and their boundaries has primarily focused on the roles of humanitarian organisations in conflict and war situations. Researchers have analysed various aspects of this international humanitarian complex, including international law and humanitarian interventions; the institutional humanitarian complex and individual organisations; disjunctions among the ideals of humanitarianism and their more complex political practices, including the role of professional aid workers, questions of agency, the military-humanitarian complex and the role of humanitarian organisations in the prolongation of conflicts (Barnett and Weiss 2008; Bornstein and Redfield 2011; Fassin and Pandolfi 2010; Feldman and Ticktin 2010; Minear 2002; Rieff 2002).

Many of these analyses have forwarded an important point, namely the political nature of humanitarianism, embedded within relations of ethics and politics. They have led to ‘debates over boundaries, unity and purity of humanitarianism’ (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 5). The humanitarian space in liberal democracies during times of peace is equally fragile and precarious, however, when placed under pressure in the name of security, for a specific category of securitised humanitarian subjects, often the marginalised of society, whether homeless or irregular residents. Humanitarianism in liberal democracies is tied to questions of security, altering and narrowing the boundaries of the humanitarian space. Under conditions of security, the humanitarian space is shrunk, limited to a few privileged humanitarian organisations to the exclusion of other organisations and equally to the exclusion of spontaneous individual interventions, limited to interventions at specific sites and towards certain subjects.

The humanitarian space in liberal democracies is a site of politics, a field of competition among various actors, including state and non-state, for-profit and non-profit, organised and individual actors, competing to govern human suffering and human welfare. Referred to as humanitarian government, they are competing on the right to relieve suffering, on governing ‘precarious lives’ (Fassin 2011; Agier 2010). This includes the right to define the boundaries of humanitarianism, what counts as a humanitarian act, competition for funding, questions of regulations and the distribution of humanitarian responsibilities. In this competition, the very notion of humanitarianism is a contested term, referring to diverse practices for relieving suffering ranging from emergency relief to welfare, from disaster victim to asylum seekers, including domestic and international engagements. Discourses of humanitarianism render the term even less precise. The discursive deployment of humanitarian reason is mobilised widely, using moral concerns to explain and justify a broad range of national and international policies and practices, ‘from the
treatment of poverty … to the justification of public actions, political causes and even wars’ (Fassin 2011: p. x), potentially allowing for any political agenda to be linked to questions of humanitarianism and embedded in a framework of moral concern and ethical responsibility.

In this sense, governing the humanitarian sector is in essence governing discourses and practices of what counts as humanitarian, that is, drawing the boundaries of humanitarian acts – by deploying the humanitarian reason for new issues or alternatively by withdrawing the humanitarian reason for certain acts. State authorities are important actors in discourse and practice, effectively largely determining the nature and scope of humanitarianism. The humanitarian space is a highly political and regulated space with clear guidelines on permitted acts, permitted actors, and permitted subjects of care, widely under the regulatory powers of the state, particularly under conditions of security. State authorities are capable of altering, narrowing and controlling the boundaries of humanitarian spaces. These interventions seek to distinguish between categories of humanitarianism, humanitarian acts and actors, depending upon the subject of humanitarian concern. Providing aid to unwanted and often securitised parts of society, such as the homeless, irregular migrants and unwanted minorities, is often rendered more difficult, and even disallowed, at specific sites or under certain circumstances. Narrowing the boundaries of the humanitarian space in the name of security allows for the transformation of ordinary humanitarian acts into security acts with the consequence that those who would usually be deemed Good Samaritans are vulnerable to being criminalised for aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime, for being an accomplice to an offence perceived as harmful to society at large. The surveillance and governing of humanitarian acts has become an integral part of the states’ comprehensive security strategy, seeking to separate and isolate suspect subjects.

Hereby, an important liberal technique of governing conduct and drawing the boundaries of humanitarian spaces, is the legal framework, including both legal rules and legal practices. Laws have an ambivalent role in defining humanitarian spaces. They are used both to further and to restrict humanitarianism. It is the latter role of laws as a means of restricting humanitarian action that is of particular interest to this study. Under the banner of security, liberal democracies regulate and contract humanitarian spaces, define and negotiate the legal boundaries of humanitarian spaces through demarcations of humanitarian acts, actors and subjects. The boundaries of humanitarian acts are narrowed, with some ordinary humanitarian acts redefined as security acts, triggering criminal penalties, including fines and imprisonment. Further, a distinction among humanitarian actors is introduced, allowing only accredited actors to be engaged in certain humanitarian acts; the privileges are often to the detriment of the non-accredited actors who may be tolerated or penalised. Ultimately departing from the core principle of humanitarianism, preventing and relieving suffering without discrimination, and giving priority to the most urgent suffering, humanitarian subjects are categorised as worthy or unworthy of humanitarianism. Without a positive legal guarantee of humanitarianism, liberal democracies can easily legally limit humanitarian acts
and actors towards certain humanitarian subjects in the name of security and thus effectively shrink the humanitarian space for some. Liberal democracies can not only withdraw the legal basis for certain humanitarian acts and actors, but can also render difficult the work of humanitarian actors in practice, whether they be individuals or organisations, through administrative regulations, withdrawing funding resources and creating administrative or spatial barriers between humanitarian actors and humanitarian subjects (Agier 2011).

On authorised humanitarian acts

What is a humanitarian act? Following the parable of the Good Samaritan, the nature of humanitarianism, or which acts count as humanitarian acts, seems to be intuitive, and even commonsensical. In practice, however, defining what counts as a humanitarian act is fundamentally a political question; it is of paramount importance for regulating the humanitarian space, shrinking it in the name of security and, thereby, not only restricting the possibility to act as a Good Samaritan but eventually shaping societal relations of empathy and compassion. Of particular importance for understanding the nature and contraction of humanitarian spaces in liberal democracies are the boundaries between humanitarian acts and security acts. Under conditions of security, ordinary humanitarian acts, such as providing food to the hungry or saving the lives of the shipwrecked, can become security acts eliciting criminal sanctions. In absence of a positive legal definition, humanitarian acts are legally indeterminate; the boundaries of humanitarian acts are fluid, messy and continuously under alteration in relation to security concerns. To understand, then, what counts as a humanitarian act, we first need to answer what does not count as a humanitarian act, rendering bare the boundaries of humanitarian acts: what would ordinarily be assumed to be humanitarian in nature but is contested by law in letter or in practice.

Over the last two decades an increasing number of laws, regulations and practices have been devised and employed with the intention of discouraging humanitarian assistance or limiting what would usually be deemed acts of the Good Samaritan. Many of the laws that discourage humanitarian assistance are embedded in efforts to prevent, criminalise and punish human smuggling and human trafficking. They illustrate a rising normative and legal consensus, agreed internationally and implemented nationally. Initially granting an implicit immunity for humanitarian motives, they have come to provide a fertile ground for punishing humanitarian acts, leading to the potential penalisation and criminalisation of humanitarian actors by including them under the umbrella of human smuggling and human trafficking. Key in the analysis of the boundaries between security acts and humanitarian acts are supranational laws that provide the legal framework for domestic law, particularly the international pillar for human smuggling, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) and its Protocol from 2000 (UNTSI39574), along with its corresponding European pillar, the Schengen Convention from 1990 (OJ L239) and its subsequent modifications and incorporations. These laws demonstrate multiple ways of setting the boundary
between humanitarian acts and security acts, a facility of moving from one realm to the other, with a remaining ambivalence between protection and criminalisation of humanitarian acts.

To safeguard the humanitarian space from security concerns, criminal laws often provide an implicit or, in very few cases an explicit, protection. The implicit protection of humanitarian acts is achieved through a distinction between for-profit and non-profit acts. UNTOC’s Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (SM Protocol), for example, requires within their definition of smuggling an element of financial or material gain (art. 3), hence, effectively excluding humanitarian acts and other non-profit acts. Equally the Schengen Convention of 1990 limits penalties for assisting irregular migration to purposes of gain (art. 27(1)). These laws differentiate between acts according to the motives of the actors: criminal sanctions need to be motivated by commercial objectives, distinct from non-commercial, altruistic and humanitarian objectives. The protection of humanitarian acts is usually provided for implicitly by drawing a distinction between for-profit and non-profit acts; explicit references to the protection of humanitarian acts are rare. One such example is found in French legislation. Explicit references to protection of humanitarian acts were integrated in the French migration legislation CESEDA in 2013 (CESEDA L622–4) only after prolonged prosecutions of humanitarian workers and hard-fought concessions by organised civil society actors, including challenges in courts over more than a decade, ultimately requiring the legislature to incorporate protection for humanitarian motives.

The facility with which humanitarian acts can be implicitly protected through a distinction between for-profit and non-profit motives also implies that they can be just as easily implicitly withdrawn by omitting any reference to humanitarian motives. The 2002 EU Directive defining the Facilitation of Unauthorised Entry, Transit and Residence (Dir 2002/90 in OJ L328/17 and Decision OJ L328/1) provides an important demonstration of how humanitarian protection can easily be undermined. This Directive requires Member States to create criminal offences for aiding unauthorised entry, transit and residence, and omits humanitarian protection by simply ignoring a distinction between profit and non-profit acts. Assisting to enter and transit requires the element of intentional assistance (art. 1.1.a), but not of financial gain. Herewith EU legislation effectively annuls the distinction between commercial and humanitarian motives for assisting to enter and transit. Instead, it provides only an optional humanitarian exception clause, stating that Member States ‘may decide not to impose sanctions … where the aim of the behavior is to provide humanitarian assistance to the person concerned’ (art. 1.2). By not requiring Member States to refrain from prosecuting humanitarian actors and providing this as an option only, the EU legislation opens up possibilities for targeting humanitarian actors with criminal sanctions. Further, the Directive broadens the target population of sanctions by including both direct and indirect aid, and an extension of identical sanctions from perpetrators to accomplices and instigators alike (art. 2), thus leaving humanitarian actors in a legal minefield and rendering them vulnerable to prosecution.
An indication of the boundaries of humanitarian acts, or the foreclosing of the humanitarian space in the name of security, is not only to be found in the legal texts, but prosecutions and trials of various humanitarian actors and have also significantly redefined the humanitarian landscape. In the United States, for example, two volunteers for the humanitarian organisation No More Deaths were charged with (conspiring to and) transporting migrants, carrying up to 15 years’ imprisonment and a US$500,000 fine, for transporting three migrants from the desert to a Tucson medical centre (www.nomoredeaths.org). In Italy, three members of Cap Anamur, another humanitarian organisation, were charged for aiding and abetting crime under the Italian penal code (CP, art. 110) in the matter of clandestine immigration (DL, no. 286, 25 July 1998, art. 12) and for disregarding orders of disembarkation for taking thirty-seven people in distress between Libya and Lampedusa on board, an act that would, under ordinary circumstances, be regarded as a rescue operation. The prosecution demanded a fine of €400,000 per person and imprisonment of four years on charges of assisting irregular entry (CP, art. 110; DL 286/98, art. 12 i, iii e, iii bis). Even though all of the accused were eventually acquitted, the prosecutions fulfilled important deterrence effects. Apart from criminal charges, a variety of administrative charges have also been employed to marginalise humanitarian acts. These include charges such as contempt of public officials in France, punishable by up to six months imprisonment and a fine of up to €7,500 (CP, arts. 433–5); or public littering in the United States for leaving water bottles in a desert reserve (US v. Millis 2010; Cohen 2010). The creativity of charges and the willingness to prosecute members of humanitarian organisations can be taken as clear signals on the part of the state to narrow the humanitarian space.

Apart from legal rules and practices another significance of law in governing humanitarian spaces derives from its use for legal deterrence. The threat of punishment is often used implicitly, such as through laws, prosecution and trials, to send a general message on acceptable conduct; it is also used explicitly, however, in policing practices stressing the possibility of lawsuits. The French border police, for example, is known to have systemically distributed information leaflets to passengers on expulsion flights, highlighting the various criminal penalties enlisted under the Law of Civil Aviation, and stressing the possibility of civil lawsuits by the airlines (www.gisti.org). This narrowing of the humanitarian space, through legal rules and practices, combined with deterrence measures, by displaying warning signs for certain humanitarian acts, is well understood by professionals of humanitarian organisations and the individuals operating at these sites, whether passengers or fishermen. State authorities seek to govern human conduct through various legal techniques as to induce public disengagement, counter humanitarian engagement and narrow the humanitarian space.

Setting the boundaries of humanitarianism, by defining what counts as a humanitarian act, in discourse and in practice, and what is authorised as such in law, demonstrates how the definition of humanitarian acts is fundamentally political, elaborated in relation to questions of security. The multiplicity of legal approaches towards humanitarian acts is a sign of the vulnerability...
of humanitarian actors in face of security, when even saving lives can be discouraged. Contemporary approaches affirm the need for the integration of explicit humanitarian protection clauses into law as to protect humanitarian acts and actor; the lack thereof leads to indistinctiveness of humanitarian acts from security acts, and results in increasing the Good Samaritan’s vulnerability to criminal and administrative charges.

**On accredited humanitarian actors**

Who is allowed to perform humanitarian acts? Anybody can and, given the circumstances, even *should* be a humanitarian actor. Under conditions of security, the state assumes a special role in governing the humanitarian space by regulating not only permissible humanitarian acts, but also the diversity of humanitarian actors. In support of this, the plurality and diversity of actors that usually occupy the humanitarian space, including both organisations and individuals, are reduced to a handful of accredited humanitarian organisations with access, control and management functions for humanitarian spaces under conditions of security. State authorities construct the ‘official humanitarian space’ to privilege foreseeable, manageable, organised forms of humanitarian care as part of a care, control, surveillance and policing continuum. The question, then, of who is allowed to perform humanitarian acts becomes a political question and is of paramount importance under conditions of security.

Accreditation becomes an important prerequisite for becoming part of the official humanitarian space. To participate and remain in the official humanitarian space, humanitarian actors have to play by the rules and accept state-assigned roles and functions, which limit their ability to define and negotiate humanitarian acts. Even more, it is critical that they receive state cooperation as to fulfil their humanitarian mission in the first place. Examples hereof are the various detention centres throughout Europe, with restricted access, service and mobility regulations for the humanitarian sector. Accredited humanitarian organisations have an important function in extending basic welfare and relief, which, whilst necessary also serves to extend humanitarian work under the guidance and umbrella of the government. Consequently, humanitarian organisations can become forced or voluntary actors of security policies and even more humanitarianism can become a technique for the government to avoid legal responsibility by delegating responsibility (Campbell 1998; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005). Under these conditions, it is hardly surprising that accredited humanitarian organisations can hardly be regarded as truly independent actors.

Accreditation of humanitarian actors has a double function: accreditation provides certain humanitarian actors with privileges and equally withdraws it from others. By definition inclusion requires exclusion: through the accreditation process, the definition of who counts as a humanitarian actor and what counts as a humanitarian act is excluded, the state regulates who is excluded from the humanitarian space. This concerns a great majority of humanitarian actors. The accreditation and exclusion of humanitarian actors often go hand in hand with an important security strategy,
the spatial isolation of securitised subjects. Irregular migrants are when possible, made invisible to the public through detention in waiting zones, camps, deportation by special carriers and such. Third parties, including humanitarian organisations, solidarity networks and the media are widely excluded from these spaces or require special authorisation to enter, hence effectively limiting possibilities to become a Good Samaritan (Basaran 2010). Many organisations and usually all individuals are excluded from these spaces of security, as is also typically any form of unorganised humanitarian support by individuals. An important distinction between individual humanitarian acts and organised humanitarianism (i.e. humanitarian organisations) is established, with a preference for the latter.

The state regulation of humanitarian space is complemented by taking on humanitarian functions itself through its security agencies, serving both security and humanitarian purposes with the double agenda of security and care. It is hardly surprising that, in times of security, the state often privileges its own actors, state institutions or accredited actors to conduct humanitarian governance to the exclusion of independent actors or spontaneous interventions. Security agencies take on humanitarian functions and functions of care, particularly evident especially at borders. Border management agencies such as Frontex in Europe or BORSTAR in the United States with a mission to rescue and provide humanitarian support.

The humanitarian space is generally portrayed as a neutral and apolitical space, inhabited by individuals and organisations that seek to relieve immediate and urgent suffering, a space beyond politics, a sanctuary for humanitarian actors and subjects beyond the control of warring parties and/or state control. Upholding humanitarian principles, and remaining outside of politics is supposed to guarantee access. However, all access to the humanitarian space is, under conditions of security, essentially based on political compromise and results from the interplay of a range of actors’ interests and actions and a number of preconditions to providing humanitarian acts. Neutrality and independence of humanitarian actors are under these conditions hardly possible, increasingly compromised by the state’s authorities, regulations and funding, seeking to co-opt humanitarian organisations, by allowing them to operate in the official humanitarian space on the condition that they respect its boundaries and its rules. This official humanitarian space is under conditions of security a contracted humanitarian space.

Under conditions of security, humanitarian actors are split by the state into various factions: those that are part of the official humanitarian space, as established by the state, and respect its rules for engagement, a privilege reserved for the few; and the great majority of humanitarian actors, including all of the individual actors, who are either tolerated or penalised for their humanitarian acts. Humanitarian acts are separated into accredited forms of care with the non-accredited humanitarian acts left in a vulnerable state, potentially reclassified as crimes and acts against public security be pursued with the full power of law and policing. By providing the parameters of the official humanitarian space, the state defines access, control and management of humanitarian spaces for individuals and organisations.
Unworthy humanitarian subjects

Habitually, the parable of the Good Samaritan is read with an emphasis on its protagonist; it does not say much about the man in distress, a man on the road between two cities, stripped of his clothes, beaten and left half-dead. We don’t know if the ‘man’ is from Jerusalem or from Jericho, whether he is a prosperous man or a pauper, his age or family status – for a good reason: it shouldn’t matter. The message is that, if we encounter a person in dire need, we should assist. Compassion and care should be accorded in a blind and impartial manner, according to need and not according to status. Humanitarian assistance must be provided on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress, regardless of nationality, race, creed, gender, ethnicity or political opinion, requiring that everybody be treated as part of humanity (see also ICRC 1965; SCHR 1994). Contemporary liberal approaches, however, illustrate increasingly a distinction between humanitarian subjects.

Certain unwelcome populations are legally precluded from humanitarian concern. These include not only the irregular migrant but also other marginalised populations, such as the homeless. Humanitarian acts, such as providing a meal, a place to sleep and even medical services, leaving water in the desert or rescuing on the seas, are made subject to inquiries and prosecution, for which the Good Samaritan has to prove their innocence, assert their humanitarian motives. The characteristics of the humanitarian subject increasingly define whether s/he can benefit from humanitarian support, whether they are seen as worthy or unworthy of humanitarian support. The characteristics of the humanitarian subject become of paramount importance for contemporary humanitarian acts in liberal democracies.

Under conditions of security, a distinction between worthy and unworthy humanitarian subjects is legally introduced. For this to take place the humanitarian subject is reconfigured from the victim to the suspect-victim. Under conditions of security humanitarian reasoning relies upon the discursive reconfiguration of the humanitarian subject. The humanitarian subject, usually portrayed as an innocent, helpless victim, brought into the situation through external factors, relies on the ‘vocabulary of suffering, compassion, assistance and the responsibility to protect’ (Fassin 2011: 2). The humanitarian subject is reconfigured under conditions of security from the victim to the figure of the suspect-victim, blurring the traditional boundaries between the suspect and the victim. The suspect-victim is primarily defined through his/her relation to law, committing an unlawful act, whether this is sleeping in a forbidden place, or residing without permit in a country. The unlawful act is seen not only as an act but also as a reflection of the character of the person. S/he is portrayed as untrustworthy, in a situation of distress, hardship and destitution through their own fault, seeking to benefit from and exploit the compassion, kindheartedness and benevolence of others. Hence, the suspect-victim is deemed less deserving or unworthy of humanitarianism. In this situation the Good Samaritan who seeks to assist suspect-victims deemed unworthy of humanitarianism, becomes a suspect him/herself.
Humanitarian reasoning not only requires human suffering but a justified innocent suffering, thus undermining the core principles of humanitarianism rooted in humanity and impartiality. Humanitarian acts are to prevent and relieve suffering, without discrimination, giving priority to the most urgent suffering. The distinction between deserving and undeserving humanitarian subjects undermines this critical principle of humanitarianism. Humanitarianism becomes discriminate, distinguishing between a duty towards most of the population, and a charity or criminal act towards others legally attributed the status of unwelcome. The double standard of humanitarianism is in itself an expression of developing societal norms, but it equally has important normative implications for societal cohesion. The impacts of these policies are not only exposure to human suffering and death, but more importantly they contribute to collective indifference becoming a norm toward certain populations. This has a significant impact upon societal relations and the kindness of strangers. It authorises and justifies differential treatment, the normalisation of a two-tier society, allowing for distinctions in humanity, and defining who falls within the remit of the humanitarian norms, who is worthy of aid and accepted as part of humanity and who is beyond this scope, classified as less worthy. In these cases it is hardly the norm that is questioned, but the scope of its application, its universality.

The state of the Samaritan

In the parable of the Good Samaritan, the Samaritan is praised for unselfishly helping a stranger in need and most of us would agree that humanitarian acts should be protected and even encouraged. Recent policies, laws and practices provide a different guidance however. They demonstrate an unsettling facility in securitising and criminalising humanitarianism in liberal democracies by redefining certain humanitarian acts as security acts, by classifying certain humanitarian actors as potential accomplices to crime and distinguishing between worthy and unworthy, justified and unjustified human suffering. In a contemporary version of the parable, the Good Samaritan would have to look closer at the man in distress, know where he is from, consider whether he is allowed to stay, and question his legal status before deciding whether or not to intervene. If the man in distress belongs to a welcome population, the Samaritan would have the duty to assist; if the man belongs to an unwelcome population an obligation to resist, possibly even to report and to assist with his deportation. When laws penalise and criminalise assisting strangers in distress, sanction the provision of transport, housing and medical care, the parable of the Good Samaritan may end differently. After all the Samaritan might be forced to follow the path of the Priest and Levite, and leave the man stranded, or alternatively, question the positive laws of his land and expose himself to legal punishment in the name of an ulterior justice.

The curious state of the Good Samaritan serves as a microcosm of liberal democracies, raising complex questions on fundamental rights, the limits of liberal democracies and the notion of humanity. It provides an insight into the
The curious state of the Good Samaritan

normative order of liberal democracies. Governing the humanitarian space is governing compassion in the public space (Fassin 2011). The transformation of humanitarian acts into acts of security not only penalises and criminalises Good Samaritans but ultimately has wider societal and normative effects likely to disrupt any kind of empathy towards unwelcome populations, unsettling bonds of solidarity and humanity. Barriers to contact are created, significantly raising the cost of empathy and activism. Eventually, through processes of normalisation and socialisation, state authorities contribute to disengagement from particular populations in liberal societies, absolving people from the consequences of their conduct, raising the threshold for taking personal responsibility for the suffering of securitised others. Requiring collective abstinence from humanitarian acts and guiding human conduct directly through state policies, laws and practices, but also more subtly by shaping norms, socialisation and expectations, is a means of securing indifference towards securitised populations. Ultimately, the securitisation of humanitarian spaces, gradually and incrementally, has the potential to undermine the very foundation of humanitarianism – the notion of a single humanity.

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5 Border thinking and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

Reapproaching global governmentality and Eurocentrism

Katherine Allison

Introduction

Recently the emergence of a body of scholarship inspired by Foucault’s theorisations of governmentality has begun to explore the potential of its extension beyond the domestic levels of state and civil society towards the level of global governmentality (see inter alia Death 2011; Lipschutz 2005; Merlingen 2006; Neumann and Sending 2010; Sending and Neumann 2006; Walters and Haahr 2005; Zanotti 2005). These attempts to apply governmentality beyond its more usual remit have been subject to challenge by those more sceptical as to the erosion of governmentality’s spatial limits (Chandler 2009; Joseph 2009, 2010; Selby 2007). The primary charges made against global governmentality that are central to this chapter concern the applicability of liberal modalities of power and governance in the non-Western world and the degree to which we can characterise the global order as liberal in a world still driven by decidedly non-liberal national interests and imperial power politics.

The unfolding of these debates points to an undoubted need for further careful study of the possibilities of governmentality and the localised variations in its presence and application. Here I demonstrate how an emerging security agenda centred around women, conflict and peace is illustrative both as an example of governmentality and as a means to engage with these animating debates concerning the global and local possibilities of governmentality. What I want to argue is that these particular objections to governmentality are problematic in two particular ways: first, in that they do not engage with Foucault’s diversifying and heterogeneous understandings of power relations and, second, in that they are located within a framework that replicates an unreflective Eurocentrism. As such, what I wish to suggest is that the Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPSA) of global governance speaks to the imperative to recognise that liberal governmentality is not something that ‘self-generates through an endogenous logic of immanence’ (Hobson 2007: 96) in a Western heartland which may then be transposed to the supposedly non-liberal periphery. What I am calling for here is for further developments in the study of global governmentality to be attentive to the bordering moments, practices and spaces of governmentality that question a binary division of liberal and non-liberal realms. The shaping of liberalism,
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and its movement across seemingly ‘liberal’ and ‘non-liberal’ spaces, reflects a process of co-constitution that reveals the heterogeneity of liberalism. In doing so I look to connect Foucault’s concepts of power with possibilities to recognise and critique Eurocentrism. To do so is to draw out how both are primarily concerned with the decentring of power and the reified account of what constitutes liberal governmentality is shown to be untenable. This approach to the global reach of governmentality can be given specificity through engagement with the framework of ‘border thinking’ proposed by Walter Mignolo (2000a, 2000b). Through border thinking there is a recognition that there is no space outside of liberal modernity. However, we gain a position from which to theorise and observe the contested production of liberalism across seeming divides of difference.

In developing these arguments the chapter is structured in the following way. The first part outlines the key premises of Foucauldian accounts of governmentality and reviews the major debates that are shaping the emergence of global governmentality scholarship. I highlight how this debate fails to fully address liberalism as a hybrid practice and continues to locate liberalism in Eurocentric, universalistic terms that bypasses its co-constitution with its supposedly non-Western other. Via attention to border thinking and returning to Foucault as a theorist concerned with decentring universals and exposing the heterogeneity of power, the tenability of governmentality functioning through a West/non-West binary may be questioned. This framework is illustrated via attention to the WPSA as it expands to become an increasingly visible site in global security governance. I outline how in many senses the WPSA may appear as a paradigmatic example of a liberal governmentality with a global purview, yet its significance here lies more in its ability to illustrate the contested and fractured nature of liberal governmentality. Drawing upon this, I then examine how the WPSA has manifested within the context of Western intervention in Afghanistan and the attempts to address Afghan women’s security following the removal of the Taliban. As a case study the WPSA in Afghanistan challenges Eurocentrism and provides insight into a practice of border thinking and a co-constitution of liberalism across a seeming liberal/non-liberal boundary.

Governmentality

Foucault’s theorisations of governmentality are not available to us as in the form of a precise and systematic body of scholarship but stem largely from his lectures at the Collège de France in the late 1970s. At the crux of governmentality is a concern for the population rather than the territory of the state as the focus of government and political economy is instituted as a guiding principal of governance (Foucault 2007: 106). Concern for population is also where the concept of biopower becomes significant. Prior to the eighteenth century, power had been exercised largely in a sovereign juridical form and was concerned with adjudicating over the taking of life. However, in the modern era, the objective moves to an onus to make life lived in the optimum way possible. The operation of biopower takes two forms. The first is a disciplinary power that acts upon the bodies of individuals,
observing them, producing knowledge about them and seeking to render them docile via the operation of institutions such as clinics, prisons, schools and so on. The second takes a more totalising form and is concerned with the viability of life at the level of population. The operation of this latter form of biopower creates a technological rationality that aims to regulate and correct life in order to ensure its successful continuation. In short, ‘It exerts a positive influence on life, endeavours to administer, optimize, and multiply it’ (Foucault 1990: 137). This requires the use of a multiplicity of strategies concerned with promoting public health, controlling migration, increasing life expectancy, managing reproduction and so on. Central to governmentality is the activation of a particular form of freedom. As societies grew more complex and began to escape the direct purview of sovereign power, strategies to shape the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault 2000: 341) developed centred upon the freedoms associated with the economic sphere and a self-limitation of government (Foucault 2007: 353). This is not a relinquishing of all sovereign power but a shaping of power to ‘structure the possible field of action of others’ (Foucault 2001: 341).

Within governmentality we may identify two broad but interrelated strands. In the first sense it can operate as a general and overarching framework to analyse formations and practices of power regardless of their form or location (Dean 1999). The second form of governmentality is more specific and isolates a particular rationality of political power. Emerging from Foucault’s study of German Ordoliberalism, this form of governmentality is closely related to liberalism and neoliberalism (Foucault 2007, 2008). It is this latter account of governmentality and its relation to liberalism that has informed the debate concerning the spatial limits of governmentality. And it is this formation of liberal governmentality that is of interest to me here. However, in many respects, these arguments may be construed as less about the insights of Foucauldian thought and the nature of governmentality than an alternative debate concerning the delineation of zones of liberalism. Emerging from this broadly critical stance against liberal global governmentality are two primary objections. First, that governmentality may only manifest within the advanced liberal governance of the West where a dominant modality of liberal governmentality premised upon the logics of freedom stands in contrast to societies deemed outside the purview of liberalism. Here disciplinary power holds sway in a reversion ‘back to something more basic’ (Joseph 2010: 225). The framework for structuring the relationship across the seeming liberal divide is that of Western prescription or even brute imperialism. For Joseph the task is therefore to understand ‘the imposition of governmentality on societies where the social conditions are quite different from those where these techniques first emerged’ (Joseph 2009: 419). The second concerns the accusation that adherence to global governmentality overemphasises the liberal nature of the global political order and its ‘unity, evenness and indivisibility’ (Chandler 2010; Joseph 2010; Selby 2007: 336) and does not therefore appreciate the continued centrality of state sovereignty and imperial interests.

There are two particular objections that should be made to this. First, the division between advanced liberal societies and the liberal periphery both relies upon
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and reinforces a profoundly Eurocentric vision. Here I approach Eurocentrism as encapsulating the assumed uniqueness of Europe. This is understood as manifested through a process of self-creation that is separate from the rest of the world. Europe’s distinctiveness is then understood as the primary driver of world history and the most significant force in human development (Hobson 2004). Europe gradually shifts over time as new spaces in North America, Oceania and parts of the Far East become imbued with the cultural and political rationales and practices of Europe. Subsequently, Europe expands and becomes coterminous with the ‘West’ (Barkawi and Laffey 2006: 331). Second, and relatedly, the effects of this are not merely ones of political exclusion of the non-Western world, what is obscured is the intrinsically hybrid nature of liberalism and its co-constitution across what appears to be a clear liberal divide. This does not deny the presence of imperialism, difference and the unequal power relations that Joseph and Selby draw attention to and they may well be correct when they suggest that some accounts of governmentality have assumed too readily and uncritically its global presence. However, the problem with their stance is that they locate unevenness across a liberal/non-liberal divide. This replicates an unsustainable global dualism that ignores the hybrid nature of liberalism and its co-constitution across seemingly liberal and non-liberal spaces (Laffey and Nadarajah 2012). As Doerthe Rosenow encapsulates, ‘Heterogeneity does not start with the distinction between “liberal” and illiberal … It starts much earlier, namely within the paradigm of (neo)liberalism itself’ (Rosenow 2009: 508).

Writing from a declared Marxist perspective, Selby and Joseph adopt a transformative stance reflected in their valid concern that for those who posit a liberal global order ‘Foucault ends up being used less to interrogate liberalism, than to support what are in essence reworked and reworded liberal accounts of international politics’ (Selby 2007: 334). Yet they also cannot avoid engaging in a parallel practice of seemingly reaffirming that which they wish to critique. However critical one seeks to be and whether one is writing from a Marxist or Foucauldian perspective, the overarching acceptance of a liberal West versus a non-Western periphery whose relationship operated via the transfusion of the former into the latter, needs to be recognised. John Hobson refers to this as ‘subliminal Eurocentrism’ that unlike ‘conscious Eurocentrism’ does not ‘celebrate the West but is highly critical of it. But what makes it Eurocentric is the assumption that the West lies at the centre of all things in the world and that the West self-generates … before projecting its global will-to-power outwards through a one-way diffusionism so as to make the world in its own image’ (Hobson 2007: 93).

This then raises questions as to the forms of counter-critique to the anti-global governmentality stance that may be mobilised and the more general failure to more fully interrogate the problematic ways that liberalism is invoked uncritically as a global marker of difference. Even sophisticated counter-arguments such as those centred upon locating the nuances in the form of liberalism that Foucault was concerned with (economic liberalism over political liberalism) (Vrasti 2013), or the empirical demonstration of the presence of liberal governmentalities with truly global reach (Methmann 2013), or the specific formations governmentality
may take in non-Western contexts (Death 2012), still do not manage to question the assumed presence of a liberal/non-liberal divide. They remain within the Eurocentric logics of a liberal project shaped in the West and exported to the rest of the world and, as such, are limited in their contribution to more fundamental questioning as to how liberalism is shaped and transmitted.¹

In sum, we have reached a point beyond an initial concern with the geospatial ordering of liberalism to a much wider consideration as to how governmentality studies are failing to acknowledge their Eurocentric foundations and the consequent erasure of those voices seemingly located beyond the sphere of ‘advanced liberalism’. As the intellectual field grows, and as liberal logics continue to shape global governance practice, it becomes ever more pressing to address this lacuna. In the next section I look to address this by first reconsidering the seeming absence of Foucault in the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of the global governmentality critique and second by forwarding liberalism as a dynamic process of interaction that is not tied to any territorial dualism through engagement with Walter Mignolo’s framework of ‘border thinking’.

Reapproaching governmentality and border thinking

As the previous section explored, what underlies the critiques of the viability of global governmentality is the particular way that it has been abstracted as a specific rationality of rule related to liberalism. To contextualise this it is necessary to think carefully about the changing approach within the IR discipline to Foucault evident in how we now seemingly have two Foucaults to accommodate; one who ‘questions and rearranges our traditional ways of producing knowledge’ and one who acts as ‘a historian of the present, rewriting the rationality of our contemporary condition’ (Vrasti 2013). Thus far it is the case that the two formations are travelling largely in parallel with little obvious convergence. The more familiar Foucault whose archaeology of knowledge was central to theory construction, interrogations of power/knowledge and discursive analysis is now joined by one who is evoked to directly interrogate core institutions of government. Attention to how the two Foucaults should intersect is necessarily a growing requirement. The tenability of universalising liberal governmentality and its reduction to a rationality of rule becomes problematised if we (re)connect governmentality to Foucauldian approaches that both make visible and question the essentialisation and reification of ‘liberal governmentality’. This may appear problematic given the critiques of Foucault as himself failing to recognise the Eurocentric limitations of his own thinking (Williams 1997; Jabri 2007). Yet the centrality of Foucault to post-colonial studies in terms of discourse, epistemology and representation (Nichols 2010) is indicative of how the parameters of his work are insightful even if the direct application of it is limited in scope.² This brings to the fore epistemological and ontological premises that make the move to universalise liberal governmentality through its reduction to Eurocentrism untenable.

Connecting accounts of liberal governmentality as a practice with Foucauldian principles of decentring knowledge thus helps us to identify the Eurocentric and,
ultimately, universalising logics that are underpinning it. However, what is also necessary is to examine closely the productive interfaces of liberalism. Essentially this is to shift from a problematic practice that identifies the production space of liberalism solely in the West and then seeks to identify its external frontiers by reference to its ‘failures’ in the non-West. The alternative is not to deny differences, inequalities and the brute realities of Western imperialism. Rather, it is to make evident how differences remain central to a relational shaping of liberal governmentality.

In pushing further this exploration of liberal governmentality as a co-constitution, and in order to access some of the specific political investments and possibilities within it, we may turn to Walter Mignolo’s concept of ‘border thinking’ (2000a, 2000b). Border thinking accepts that liberalism has a global sway and travels along axes of imperialism and inequality. However, there are no unambiguous interiors and exteriors as all societies are imprinted by liberal modernity. Moreover, liberalism has always depended upon non-liberal others, as the creation of ‘dualism lies in the very practices through which European and non-European peoples and places were tied together and is itself productive of these identities’ (Laffey and Nadarajah 2012: 406). Mignolo encapsulates this as ‘By exteriority I do not mean something lying untouched beyond capitalism and follows modernity, but the outside that is needed by the inside. Thus, exteriority is indeed the borderland seen from the perspective of those “to be included”’ (Mignolo 2000b: 724). Border thinking therefore has a dual onus. It recognises the imperialistic and hierarchical foundation of liberalism yet it also encapsulates the inherent relationality of its construction.

This may be illustrated further when we consider how border thinking extends beyond epistemology and is directed towards using the sites of imposition and co-constitution for transformative purposes. The political objective becomes to ‘subsume/redefine the emancipatory rhetoric of modernity from the cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern, located in the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference, towards a decolonial liberation struggle for a world beyond eurocentered modernity’ (Grosfoguel 2008: 16). Thus these are not the foundations of a political project that begins in the jettisoning of liberalism in its entirety. The existing imprint of liberalism would always make this impossible. Rather, they begin from the points of relationality that shape the production of liberalism. In short, what border thinking enables is the ‘redefinition/subsumption of citizenship, democracy, human rights, humanity, economic relations beyond the narrow definitions imposed by European modernity’ (ibid.). With these objectives and premises to the fore, I now wish to look more directly at the WPSA and its manifestation in Afghanistan.

A heterogeneous governmentality: The Women Peace and Security Agenda

The WPSA represents a shift in global security governance. Previously, women and security were understood as conceptually distinct. Women were occasionally
acknowledged as the victims of conflict but their experiences were not directly related with any significance to fundamental understandings of war and security. In contrast, an increasing commitment to recognise the situation of women as a valid and pressing matter of security is emerging. The development of the WPSA may be understood within the increasing preponderance of liberalism since the 1990s. The end of Cold War ended a longstanding East/West division on the issue of women’s rights that had curtailed any development of the issue. Subsequent US hegemony and the growing investment in policies centred upon the logics of the democratic peace have enabled women’s rights to gain a newfound traction in security governance (Harrington 2011). Moreover, the emergence of human security doctrines created new spaces beyond traditional notions of state-centric security where attention to women could find new opportunities to claim legitimacy and relevance (Cohn et al. 2004: 135). These emergent spaces have been both utilised and further expanded by the concerted efforts of an array of NGOs dedicated to transforming security to acknowledge the experiences of women (Cohn 2004). These lobbying efforts reached a high point when the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1325 in 2000. The resolution not only highlights the particular vulnerabilities of women in conflict situations, it calls for a gendered perspective in all aspects of conflict intervention and stresses the rights of women to be active participants in peace processes and post-conflict transitions. UNSCR 1325 has subsequently been supported by the passing of four further resolutions 1820, 1888, 1960 and 2106 that recognise sexual violence directed towards women as an issue of international security and call for women’s greater protection and opportunities for advocacy and 1889 that aims to strengthen the implementation of UNSCR 1325.

UNSCR 1325 and the broader WPSA are now seemingly firmly rooted in security governance agendas and in many respects it seems to confirm the possibility and presence of a governmentality with a truly global reach across societies both ostensibly liberal and non-liberal. UNSCR 1325 has been translated into more than a hundred languages and forty-three countries across both the global North and South have drafted national action plans for its implementation. While the UN has been the traditional home of the WPSA it is increasingly gaining traction beyond the institutional structures of the UN. The recognition of women’s experience in global conflict has been brought into the agendas of bodies such as the World Bank who are drawing connections between women, development and security. Similarly, organisations more typically concerned with security in its military and state-focused guise, including national foreign policy and defence departments and think-tanks such as the US-based Council on Foreign Relations, are increasingly embracing the justifying rationale of the WPSA. Even NATO, supposedly a bastion of traditional, military security concerns, has recently set up a Committee on Gender Perspectives. NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen outlines the reasoning that forms the now accepted linkage between women and security.

The ongoing victimisation of women in conflict situations and the marginalisation of women in matters of peace-building have a profound
The Women, Peace and Security Agenda

impact on global security. Women and girls suffer disproportionately from conflicts and the lawlessness of post-conflict environments. At the same time, women are far too often excluded from playing a role in maintaining, restoring, and defending stability. The results can be seen in rising threats to regional stability, growing violence, and prolonged conflict. I am convinced that we need to confront these issues forcefully … if we are to deal successfully with the security challenges of the 21st century.

(Rasmussen 2010)

Rasmussen’s speech captures two particular logics of liberal governmentality within the WPSA. Within the first we see that attention to women’s security role is made an issue via its relevance to wider issues of population. Rasmussen illustrates clearly the biopolitical imperative of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. He draws our attention to the individualised suffering of women and girls and the threats they face but he then seeks to correct this with strategies that seemingly have little direct bearing upon an individualised experience of gender. Instead he looks to secure the situation of women by recognising threat to the population and seeking its redress at this level. Within the second logic, women’s role in conflict is made visible as an issue of their exclusion and bringing them into security is understood as an issue of women’s rights and empowerment. Within this we may identify logics of freedom and self-government.

The Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security may be used to explore further how the parameters of these logics have been shaped as women have been brought into the sphere of liberal security governance. What is initially evident is how women are made present as the victims of conflict. As such they represent the failure of security and the task here is to locate and comprehend the varying threats and abuses that women face in conflict (United Nations Security Council 2002: 1). Larrinaga and Doucet make a parallel argument in relation to the human security discourse that is construed ‘mostly by defining and identifying the global patterns and trends of human insecurity’ so that ‘human security discourse’s initial move is found in creating the measurements that aggregate the threats to human life’ (original emphasis, 2008: 528). Thus the report of the Secretary-General begins with a biopolitical mapping of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls detailing how ‘women and children are disproportionately targeted in contemporary armed conflicts and constitute the majority of all victims’. The specifics of this include: women’s vulnerability to sexual violence and the risk of pregnancy and sexually transmitted infection; the proliferation of small arms during conflict that may exacerbate domestic violence; the increased workload women face due to the absence of men; the disproportionate number of women refugees; the risk of forced early marriage and the shrinkage of services during conflict (United Nations Security Council 2002: 1–2).

Women are not only present as victims of conflict however. Within the second logic, their participation as agents of conflict prevention and post-conflict transition is also made central. On one level the rationale centres upon the necessity of
including women for the attainment and maintenance of peace. Evidence is deployed to demonstrate the greater likelihood of successful outcomes if women are part of peace processes. As such, women’s experience is conceptualised within a much broader goal than women’s personal rights and protection. The legitimacy of women’s presence is enabled by a seemingly scientific rationale that seeks to prove that women can deliver peace and correct wayward societies, bringing them into the accepted liberal global order. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan outlines:

Efforts to resolve … conflicts and address their root causes will not succeed unless we empower all of those who have suffered from them – including and especially women. And only if women play a full and equal part can we build the foundations for enduring peace – development, good governance, human rights and justice.

(UN 2002: p. ix)

Accordingly, women are thus assumed to be able to reap individual benefit through the amelioration of these wider security threats and are therefore recognised as peacemakers for a wider security good. However, attention to women’s roles as agents goes beyond just their straightforward use-value. It is within this logic that we also see women’s participation in security agendas as reflecting broader debates around the progressive possibilities of the WPSA in terms of gender equality and how feminist ideas have been translated into global governance. Thus it is recognised that the WPSA reflects a wider shift whereby a more overt institutional recognition and value has been afforded to a particular rhetoric of female empowerment. Various feminists have attempted to capture the form and process by which this occurs. For example, Janet Halley locates this shift and terms it ‘governance feminism’, which may be defined as ‘an under recognised but important fact of governance more generally in the early twenty first century. I mean the term to refer to the incremental but by now quite noticeable installation of feminists and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power’ (Halley et al. 2006: 340). What is significant here is how this ‘governance feminism’ within the WPSA is reflective of a liberal governmentality agenda of a self-governance via ‘freedom’.

The WPSA thus appears evident as a form of liberal governmentality within its attention to population and its activation of freedom as a logic of governance. Yet if we are seeking to maintain an approach to liberal governmentality that retains a commitment to addressing its heterogeneities then the assumptions of this should be scrutinised. One way that we may pursue this is by exploring the many debates within the communities of activists, NGOs and feminist scholars who have both supported and critiqued the WPSA’s evolution. The WPSA may be visible as a doctrine of global governance whose justifying rationale is widely accepted and agreed upon within international institutions, yet recognising the contestations that continue to shape it prevents any simple reification of it. Specifically, a move to avoid homogenising the WPSA may be sought by attention to debates...
concerning how we should interpret the apparent success of the institutionalisation of feminism within the WPSA. There is no consensus position that may be identified here, rather feminist critiques draw out a plethora of perspectives on the progressive possibilities of the WPSA.

Thus, we may choose to recognise the WPSA as embodying a remarkable shift within the architecture of global governance in relation to issues of gender. As noted above, its increasing institutional resonance is evident in the number of institutions of global security and development governance who engage with its tenets and are developing their practices accordingly. Not only has the WPSA gained visibility, it also represents a shift in the fundamental understanding of women’s roles in conflict from passive victims to active participants. Moreover, we can identify specific examples of activists using the WPSA for transformative ends. For example, Sundas Abbas argues that UNSCR 1325 has been a valuable tool in helping Iraqi women achieve a 25 per cent quota for women’s seats in parliament (Pratt 2011), while Laura MacLeod has shown how the Serbian Women in Black Movement has used UNSCR 1325 to develop a profound rethinking of security (MacLeod 2011). In contrast, for many feminist scholars and activists this apparent institutionalisation of feminism within global governance is deeply contentious and the WPSA is problematised for the limitations it places on the emergence of a more transformative understanding of security. The notion of governance feminism has been widely critiqued as feminism coopted and neutralised to ensure the status quo (Fraser 2009). As such the WPSA may seek the activation of women’s agency but the failure to acknowledge the structural constraints of a gendered system of inequality poses limitations upon the possibilities of that agency (Shepherd 2011). Including women within existing security structures can marginalise those feminist voices whose objective is to critique the entire system of militarised security. Typically, the justification for including women becomes not one of women’s security for its own sake but their instrumentality and ‘use value’ towards broader security objectives (Cohn 2004). Gina Heathcote has even posited that the WPSA, via UNSCRs 1820 and 1888 and the overarching framework of UNSCR 1325, may be invoked to legalise military conflict (2011).

What ultimately becomes evident is that, although the WPSA may be identifiable within the terms of liberal governmentality, its practice escapes any straightforward containment. Recognition of the heterogeneous nature of the WPSA therefore offers further possibilities to activate border thinking and question the Eurocentric assumptions of a West/non-West governmentality divide. I now wish to explore this further in relation to how the WPSA was manifest in Afghanistan.

**Questioning Eurocentrism: The Women Peace and Security Agenda in Afghanistan**

If the WPSA is visible as a contested example of global liberal governmentality then its implementation in Afghanistan seems to confirm the failure of its presence in any form beyond that of a Western imposition. Women’s rights as a security issue in
Afghanistan were first made visible as a justification for the US-led invasion in 2001, which had a stated aim of freeing Afghan women from the brutalities of the Taliban regime. The inclusion of women in securing the Afghan state and the expansion of women’s rights has continued to occupy the rhetoric of the subsequent NATO operation and the government of Hamid Karzai. Yet these attempts to ensure Afghan women’s security have seemingly stalled as they remain as a key ‘battleground over which competing visions for Afghan society, Islam, and claims to power have been fought’ (Cortright and Wall 2012: 5). The failings of the international mission appear to reconfirm Afghanistan as an unambiguously non-Western space where the reach of governmentality cannot extend. Yet the WPSA in Afghanistan is significant in illustrating the fractured and complex nature of a supposedly Western liberal and non-Western/liberal global divide. It is not the case that the WPSA is a Western self-creation which is then exported to Afghanistan via an imperialistic enforcement. Two examples may illustrate the relationality and mutual constitution of the WPSA and its complex place in Afghan political contexts.

First, I want to argue that what enables the creation of a WPSA in Afghanistan is its positioning in direct relation to what is understood as an unequivocal ‘Other’ in the form of the Taliban/al-Qaeda enemy. Such strategies reflect a longstanding dimension of Eurocentrism whereby ‘the West is defined through a series of contrasts regarding rationality, progress, and development in which the non-West is generally found lacking’ (Barkawi and Laffey 2006: 347). What feminist critics of the initial US actions to ‘rescue’ Afghan women have pointed to is the way that the targeting of the Taliban/al-Qaeda reflects longstanding Orientalist and colonial discourses (see inter alia Stabile and Kumar 2005; Nayak 2006). These discourses, operating through a self/other binary, posit the superiority of the enlightened West over the barbarity of the East and of Islam. In terms of the WPSA their gendered nature is made particularly evident. They instantiate within the WPSA in Afghanistan a logic captured famously by Gayatri Spivak, of ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’ (1988).

What makes this self/other relation viable within the WPSA in Afghanistan is the deployment of varied modalities of power. In order to save Afghan women and enable Afghanistan’s route back to liberal order, what is evident is the operation of both sovereign and biopolitical power. What we saw in the WPSA in Afghanistan was Afghan women being rendered as a biosocial collective whose purpose is both flourishing in and of itself, and to facilitate the security and well-being of the wider population. The condition of Afghan women under the Taliban was presented as a direct violation of their health and welfare. Thus we were frequently told how the Taliban denied women healthcare, restricted their movements and inflicted violent punishment for minor transgressions. While the relationship between sovereign and biopolitical power is much debated, here I proceed on the basis that biopower does not supersede sovereign power in an orderly chronological fashion – rather, they remain as mutually enabling. I would argue therefore that the WPSA in Afghanistan is illustrative of how the operation of sovereign power was deemed necessary in order to delineate Afghan women as a biosocial collective to be saved. Tagma summarises this logic as follows:
'Biopower ... has always required a sovereign articulation of the boundaries of the population (that is, who counts as a citizen) and at what points sovereign violence suspends the law to resolve crises' (2009: 413). In such a way the Taliban/al-Qaeda enemy may be isolated as the threat to Afghan women and the sovereign right to kill may be invoked.

Secondly, I wish to consider how, via the WPSA in Afghanistan, we may understand how liberalism is not simply imposed by the West but is more fundamentally embedded within the fabric of Afghan politics. Attention to this may help us further in understanding the possibilities of resistance to the violent logics and imperialistic practices that have shaped the WPSA in Afghanistan. Border thinking demonstrates how nothing stands squarely outside of liberalism but its active reconfiguration can provide possibilities to contest it, reminding us in the process that “seemingly subaltern actors can and do appropriate, and even “refine”, “Western” security ideas, practices, institutions and discourses for their own interests’ (Hönke and Müller 2012: 388).

Specifically, I want to suggest that the Afghan women’s organisation the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) stands as an example of border thinking and the refutation of Eurocentrism. RAWA has been one of the most vociferous opponents of all the actors engaged in the ongoing struggle to secure the Afghan state and move away from more than thirty years of war. They have offered staunch criticism of the US-led invasion and the broader WPSA in Afghanistan implemented by the Karzai government and its US and NATO backers in the West, as well as the Taliban and mujahadeen. RAWA rejects what it views as an imperialistic agenda of the West in Afghanistan, maintaining that ‘the US government and its allies promised our people democracy, but imposed upon them the most undemocratic, corrupt, and mafia government of our history (sic) ... the US used human rights and women’s rights as an excuse, but Afghanistan still faces the worse kinds of human rights violations and horrifying catastrophes against its women’ (RAWA 2013).

Yet their rejection does not follow a simple liberal/non-liberal division. RAWA has a long history that speaks to a complex relation to the structures of liberal modernity. The organisation has been operative in Afghanistan since 1977 and has campaigned for women’s rights since its founding. Central to RAWA’s vision is an Afghan state founded on the principles of secularism and democracy and a self-determination free from what it regards as the ulterior motives of the US and NATO. Thus through attention to RAWA the ambivalent nature of liberal governmentality in Afghanistan is made evident. The West becomes a target of resistance but the institutions of liberalism remain desired and even central to the very project of resistance. RAWA’s political vision is thus not external to liberalism, rather its presence demonstrates a longstanding inflection of liberalism. RAWA may not embody a consensus position within Afghanistan with its overtly secular agenda (Thrupkaew 2002) but we cannot simply dismiss its presence as a Western imposition into a non-liberal space. To do so is not only untenable within the terms of the complex interplays across the space of liberalism, but denies RAWA’s presence as a potential force of resistance.
Concluding remarks

There is indeed unevenness in liberalism’s global dispersal and plays of imperialistic power are central to understanding the presence of liberal governmentality across varying global and local contexts. Yet a scrutiny, informed by border thinking of the apparent imposition of governmentality, from the, supposedly, liberal West onto the non-West reveals how this division is ultimately untenable. The significance of these debates stretches beyond the immediate question of liberal governmentality’s presences or absences and the specific mechanisms that have shaped a particular identification of it. They reveal the continuing presence of Eurocentrism that lingers even within scholarship that is self-consciously critical of Western power. Recognising this and attempting to change it requires greater engagement with post-colonial critiques that continue to be marginalised within the security studies field. One other way to do this might be to address carefully the seeming emergence of two Foucaults in the discipline. Foucault as a voice speaking directly to the concerns of IR through specific attention to liberalism as an analytic of government and a practice of power may add much in understanding the unfolding nature and practice of security governance. However, how we reconcile this with other understandings of Foucault as a theorist concerned with power as fragmented and the complex effects of power/knowledge should provide important avenues for future research. This chapter’s indication of the possibilities of using Foucault to engage with Eurocentrism may herald further possibilities as governmentality scholarship and post-colonial studies more broadly continue to develop a productive dialogue.

Notes

1 See Sabaratnam (2013) for further discussion as to the scope of Eurocentrism within studies critical of liberal governmentality.
2 Moreover, a small but growing postcolonial literature is directly utilising governmentality. See e.g. Scott (1995), Chatterjee (2004), Duncan (2007) and Sharma (2008).
3 A database on 1325 and the development of national action plans is kept by the Women’s International League of Peace and Freedom. Available at: http://peacewomen.org/naps/.

References


6 Negotiating citizenships and borders of political belonging

Paul Nesbitt-Larking

This chapter undertakes an examination of citizenship in contemporary Canada through an analysis of perceptions of belonging and bordering practices among young Muslims. Recent scholarship on bordering shows evidence of adaptation and resistance towards securitised borders and the construction of alternative places, networks and territories (Rumford 2006, 2013; van Houtum 2005). In the context of this emerging research on bordering practices that stresses a bottom–up approach and calls into question the establishment and cartography of borders, alternative narratives of citizenship and belonging become possible along with a socio-psychological de/rebordering. Through an examination of the phenomenologies of bordering and belonging, the chapter sets out a range of alternative narratives of citizenship. Integral to the strategic governance of North American borderlands, the Canadian federal state has adopted a range of securitising laws and regulations in recent decades that have complicated the existing citizenship regime. It has thereby rendered certain visible minorities vulnerable both to state surveillance/control and associated forms of social/cultural exclusion. Consequently, state surveillance, control and exclusion has vied with a legal-constitutional tradition of openness, trust and inclusion. The dominant discourses of Canada have both conditioned and reflected these state tensions and balances. The growing securitisation of institutions and governance has sharpened the range of tactics available to citizens, inducing conformity in some instances, opening opportunities in other cases, and conditioning resistance/refusal in still others. On the basis of twenty recent and in-depth interviews with young Muslims in Canada, the chapter explores the psychological complexities of bordering and citizenship in three main sections: (1) membership and belonging; (2) identification with political communities; and (3) agencies and practices of citizenship. These sections explore, respectively, three key exemplifications of the complexities and ambivalences of bordering practices: first, the matter of how to belong; second, the question of with whom to identify; and, third, the dilemma of what to do as a citizen. Throughout these sections, illustrations of the social psychology of bordering emerge.
Borders and bordering: A contextualisation

Recent developments in the social theory of borders has placed increasing emphasis on the phenomenology of bordering and therefore social psychological facets of bonds of affection, loyalty, inclusion and exclusion, (de)securitisation, global flows of people, ideas and capital and what Rumford refers to as the vernacularisation (2013) of already cosmopolitanised borders. Areas and lines of demarcation and delineation, notably boundaries, have become increasingly ambiguous, incongruent with each other, and contingent (Grande 2006: 90). Ordinary people are engaged in the bordering practices of an increasingly rhizomatic global order. The scale of bordering is experienced as the most remote and the most local, often at the same time, and borders are inscribed in bodies and minds as much as they are imagined on maps. As van Houtum says, a border can be ‘understood as a site at and through which socio-spatial differences are communicated’ (2005: 672), and ‘borders are now pre-dominantly critically investigated as differentiators of socially constructed mindscapes and meaning’ (2005: 673). For Rumford:

[B]orders have human and experiential dimensions, and can be appropriated by societal actors for non-state purposes; signaling an important dimension of community identity, for example.

(2006: 159)

Understanding borders as social psychological practices rather than as inert inscriptions calls into question the imagined nations and distinctive states of a Westphalian world. As a cosmopolitical practice, bordering and de/rebordering is both self-referential and dialogical. For Turner (2002), Delanty (2006) and Smith (2007) among others, cosmopolitical practice is characterised by:

Irony (emotional distance from one’s own history and culture), reflexivity (the recognition that all perspectives are culturally conditioned and contingent), skepticism towards the grand narratives of modern ideologies, care for other cultures and an acceptance of cultural hybridization, an ecumenical commitment to dialogue with other cultures, especially religious ones, and nomadism, as a condition of never being fully at home in cultural categories or geo-political boundaries.

(Delanty 2006: 42–3)

Delanty’s sketch is an ideal type of certain social psychological characteristics of living in a global world of migrations and increasingly calibrated citizenship regimes. Such a strategy of openness and engagement, however, is by no means the only viable response to the uncertainty and risks of the contemporary global order. An essentialist strategy of boundary making, isolation, exclusion and enclosure is equally plausible.

The two dominant contemporary Canadian discourses on citizenship and belonging reflect this tension. A political discourse of openness and engagement
underpins the Canadian approach towards multiculturalism, grounded in mutual recognition, openness, dialogue, accommodation, agonistic bargaining and care. Such a discourse finds a parallel in a range of state practices, laws and regulations. However, as in other Western states, the Canadian citizenship regime has been substantially securitised over the past two decades. New governance strategies, policies, regulations and procedures have rebordered Canada, most notably through initiatives around a common North American defence perimeter (Muller 2009, 2010). Such state-led developments have been conditioned by, but have also further conditioned, changes in popular discourses of insecurity and belonging, as practices of bordering have become increasingly vernacularised. Based on his research into the mass evacuation of 15,000 Canadian-Lebanese citizens from Lebanon in 2006, Peter Nyers (2010) writes of the contradictions and tensions surrounding the status and well-being of dual citizens and the increasingly performative nature of citizenship. Audrey Macklin (2010) comments on the contrasting stances of the Canadian federal government and the Canadian Supreme Court over the constitutional rights of Canadian child soldier, Omar Khadr, one of the last detainees to be held in Guantanamo Bay. Despite his legal status as a Canadian, whose civil rights had been violated according to the Supreme Court, the Canadian government failed to respond to a Supreme Court finding that the government had been in continuous violation of Khadr’s rights. Instead the government held out for as long as possible before repatriating Khadr, insisting on characterising him as a terrorist rather than a child soldier. Alison Mountz (2004) draws attention to evolving Canadian imagery surrounding refugees in the context of the arrival of a series of overcrowded boats from China on the shores of British Columbia. Combining fears of invasion and the vulnerability of borders with fear of transnational disease and crime, Mountz refers to the shifting loci of governmentality surrounding refugees, from the transnational to the embodied, the local and the banal. The concept of embodiment and governmentality is further developed by Colleen Bell (2006) who describes the new biometric regime of Canadian security, in which surveillance, identity management, pre-emptive measures and biometric governmentality have resulted in complex and plurilocational bordering practices. What unites each of the foregoing Canadian research focuses is the way in which borders have become increasingly diffuse and plurilocalional, travelling 5,700 miles between Toronto and Beirut; operating as delineators of moral/legal contention regarding the inclusion or exclusion of Khadr; and reimagining the immigrant and refugee body along a chain of checkpoints and detention areas.

The social psychology of citizenship and narrative psychology

Citizenship

… no one yet quite knows what it is to be a citizen; it is a status which one must struggle to attain in the face of competing versions of what is proper to struggle for.

(Shotter 1993: 115–16)
Citizenship is ‘an essentially contested concept’ (Haas 2001: 3) and scholarship on the theoretical characteristics of citizenship has been extensive. While this chapter is not intended to contribute to theoretical debates within political science, its findings echo certain aspects of contemporary understandings of citizenship in a broader context (Faulks 2000; Haas 2001; Isin 2008; Isin and Wood, 1999; Isin et al. 2008; Juteau 2008; Kalu 2009; Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Shotter 1993; Turner 1993). Put simply, citizenship is about how people engage in their political societies. Of course, this immediately raises the questions of what constitutes engagement and what are the boundaries of those political societies.

From a political theoretical perspective, Haas says that citizenship ‘constitutes the membership of and belonging to a political community, and consequently the creation of and life as political subjects’ (2001: 4; see also Hartley 2010: 234). But how is such belonging experienced? In particular, how far is citizenship regarded as a positive opportunity for political development or as a defensive response towards insecurity? What constitutes the referential political community(ies) and who or what gets to be defined inside or outside the borders? What sense of agency is contained in the ambiguous concept of subject? Specifically, how do political agents act within and/or against governmental regimes and orders? The empirical research presented below explores these questions through the bordering practices of young Canadian Muslims struggling towards citizenship. Normative political theory defines and delineates citizenship as a set of moral expectations (Gibson and Hamilton 2011: 229; Hartley 2010: 236–7). There are standards for citizenship, duties and obligations that offset the rights granted with membership in a specific political community, notably a nation state. Citizens are expected to be well-informed, to share responsibility for promoting the collective well-being and defence of a society, to express loyalty towards its central institutions and shared traditions, and in general to be engaged in its political and community life (Barnhurst 2007: 17). Such normative facets of citizenship only take us so far. Shotter draws a distinction between the ‘orderly institutions’ of a society and the less ordered realm of civil society in which meaning is routinely constructed (1993: 133). Critically, Shotter draws our attention to the meaning work undertaken when the order of things breaks down, and in so doing illuminates the necessity of paying attention to ‘the diverse sense of the people’. This social psychological bridge is necessary to understand citizenship in the context of increasingly critical phenomenologies of place, network and territory in which the very categories of belonging are in question.

Legal-institutional conceptualizations of citizenship place the focus on those legal rights and obligations that attend formal belonging to a sovereign state. The global reach of experience of many contemporary citizens reveals the limitations of such classifications. Their worlds are very much those in which ‘legal citizenship has become ever more autonomous from political citizenship as globalization erodes the nation state without creating alternative political communities’ (Bellamy 2008: 50). Within the past two decades, citizenship studies have begun to integrate a more transnational and global orientation (Benhabib et al. 2007; Habermas 2001; Somers 2008; Soysal 1994). The emerging field of
cosmopolitical citizenship (Archibugi 2003; Beck 2004; Chataway 2010; Delanty 2006; Grande 2006; Smith 2007; Turner 2002) sets a broader and more open agenda for the analysis of citizenship in a global world. Rather than constructing citizenship as a universal ideal or as a set of legal criteria, it remains open to whatever citizenship might become in the lived experiences of global subjects.

**Narrative analysis**

Rather than arguing that subjects ‘fail’ at citizenship – however defined – or that they are or are not cases in the designated category of citizen, the narrative approach to social psychology seeks to understand how citizens have actually constructed themselves in the contexts of the time, places and settings of their political encounters. Whether from the conventional perspective of good citizenship as internalised compliance to a set of rights and obligations established under a regime, or from the critical perspective of transformative citizenship, discussed below, most existing understandings of citizenship have drawn a binary distinction between conformity and resistance. Within the context of a new global (dis)order, in which distinctions between state/society and local/remote have become blurred, new approaches towards political belonging need to register such shades of distinction. If governance is about ‘the authoritative allocation of values’ (Easton 1965), analyses of citizenship need to register the uncertainties and ambiguities surrounding authority as well as the decreasing capacity of traditional political entities to allocate values.

Citizenship theorist Engin Isin draws a binary distinction between the *habitus* (the internalisation of a culture or a set of dispositions developed over the long term) and what he refers to as ‘acts’ of citizenship (2008: 18). For Isin, acts must be transformative – both of the scene and the agent. He refers to an act as ‘a rupture in the given’ (Isin 2008: 25). However, narratives of citizenship, such as those described later, reveal an altogether more complex natural attitude, with elements of internal contradiction, self-dialogue, conflict within the self and tension regarding a complex of values, beliefs and role expectations, echoes of the past, prefigurings of the future, dislocation in space and change over time. Harré’s conception of social being (1993) and Gergen’s understanding of relational being (2009) are elaborations of the dialectic between the social-public order and the individual-private self. Harré argues that persons only emerge ‘in social milieu in which they are already treated as persons by the others of their family and tribe’ (1993: 4), but that at the same time the growing person has certain native endowments: ‘conscious awareness, agentive powers and recollection’ (1993: 6). Through conscious awareness, agency and recollection the emerging self is in constant interaction and dialogue with those cultures and metanarratives whose internalised form Isin refers to as the *habitus*. Harré and Gergen reject the very conception of static, stable and internalised clusters of concepts and scripts that motivate routine actions on the part of the individual. Isin draws a contrast between what he refers to as ‘activist citizens’, who transform things, and ‘“active citizens” who [merely] act out already written scripts’, that is, act according to
their *habitus* (2008: 38). Narrative analysis demonstrates that activity of the routine and socially reproductive kind always carries within it the potential for activism. Once we accept that self-consciousness, reflexivity and agency are constants in encounters with those cultural, ideological and discursive voices we encounter through a developing biography, then the very notion of fixed roles, stereotypes, schemas and scripts somehow implanted from ‘society’ is unviable.

Moreover, from a political scientific perspective, activity in some contexts is *already* activism. As the revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the more recent Arab Spring demonstrate, for those who have been denied the mundane experiences of democratic rights, gaining the right to vote and to join political parties is in fact to change their worlds. Therefore, not all acts of citizenship are rupturings, and the *cultivation* of citizenship in the self involves what Gramsci refers to as ‘wars of position’ as well as ‘wars of manoeuvre’ (Gramsci 1971). In other words, it is not always strategically viable to engage in a frontal attack (a ‘war of manoeuvre’ or ‘act of citizenship’ in Isin’s terms). It is often necessary to consider, to build consciousness and to slowly and subtly shift the shape of a dominant discourse or a social organization. In the spirit of carnival and play that Gergen develops in *Relational Being* (2009), we can say that some acts of citizenship are gestures, some are massages (and maybe messages too), while others are trial probings or clinical cuttings around affected areas. When it comes to the arena of conventional legal and political practices of citizenship, both to *refuse* to act and to act *deeply* can be expressions of transformative citizenship even if they register superficially as the mundane reproduction of business as usual. By its very nature, the politics of silence and omission as well as alternative expressivity lies below the official radar (de Certeau 1984; Scott 1990). Those with little structural authority or influence may nonetheless be able to inhabit worlds of resistance, whether introspective or shared, which grow up between the cracks of formal institutional settings, which are expressed through humour, the vernacular or song, and which employ symbolic expressions that are only available to those who share the code. Of necessity, such modes of expression include forms that are poetic and deeply rhetorical. Importantly, through their quiet agency, actors are able to transform the morphology of borders and to radically redefine the parameters of inclusion and exclusion, us and them, and here and there. The extent to which such acts of resistance reshape regimes and disrupt dominant strategies of governance is a matter of historical and empirical investigation. Narrative analyses of citizenship are able to discern elements of conformity and resistance that may condition socio-political action and consequent regime shifts. However, the chain of inferences from narrative accounts of the emerging self through mobilisation and collective action to regime change is highly complex and subject to multiple contingencies. This is why most political scientists have wisely stayed away from large-scale political predictions.

Narrative research facilitates the overcoming of categorical and binary thinking with regard to the politics of identity. Far from being fixed attributes and atemporal realities, identities in narrative accounts are fluid and permeable. Thus the recognition of identities means taking agency and consciousness as seriously
as social structure and culture with its grand narratives, master narratives, public
narratives and metanarratives. To construct a narrative of citizenship is not merely
to record events, but often also to invest a set of memories in an affective-driven
manner that may not make sense as acts of citizenship beyond the context of their
emotional setting. In her research in a Bosnian town after the atrocities, Selimovic
(2011) discovered important commonalities among survivors around strategies
of silence – deliberate moves to forget, to protect memories by keeping them
from the public sphere and to show respect towards victims by staying silent.
Countering the argument that silence is (self-)repression, Selimovic identifies the
silent eloquence of the physical act of return and the defiant if banal occupancy of
spaces from which one had been driven. Notwithstanding their deep immersion
in the lived worlds of citizenship, Selimovic’s research participants would not
register as “activist” citizens in Isin’s terms.

Self as citizen among Muslim youth in Canada

In order to illustrate certain characteristics of the narrative approach towards the
political psychology of citizenship, this section draws upon a series of twenty
interviews conducted by myself and Kathy Bullock among Muslim youth in late
2010 and early 2011 in Ontario, Canada. Each interview lasted anywhere between
twenty-five minutes and more than two hours. Our participants were selected
through community contacts and included equal numbers of men and women. Their
ages ranged from 15 to 24, and they came from fifteen different ethnic backgrounds.
Their political participation ranged from nothing to highly active, and the group
included varying degrees of religiosity from secular to devout. Applied to the
study illustrated below, knowledge of the historical and structural setting of young
Muslims in the West, grounded in part in a further set of eighty-eight interviews
with Muslims conducted in Canada and Europe between 2005 and 2008 (Kinnvall
and Nesbitt-Larking 2011), contributes to correspondence validation or cross-
checking the accounts given in the interviews. Repeated exploration of interview
transcripts facilitates consideration of the coherence of participants’ accounts. As
is evident in the sections below, both correspondence and coherence criteria are
integral to the opening up of meanings of citizenship among the participants in
response to the prompt: ‘What does citizenship mean to you?’

Experiences of membership and belonging

Existing studies of citizenship have assumed rather than investigated the nature
of loyalty toward the state, the regime and the political community. The vexed
question of how to belong can be seen in two contrasting narratives of loyal
citizenship drawn from the twenty interviews. Kaleem2 is a 21 year old male of
Indian ethnicity, who is employed as a teacher. He has been in Canada for just five
years and says: ‘I personally don’t like it here.’ He wants to return to Mauritius,
his country of origin. Reflective of his sense of exile, Kaleem adopts a limited and
brittle perception of citizenship, which nonetheless manifests itself as loyalty: ‘I
think I’m a good member of the Canadian society, I mean I always pay my taxes. I’m not doing anything I’m not supposed to … doing what I have to do to keep myself running and not cause trouble for anybody else and myself.’ There is a defensiveness and cautiousness in this formulation. He disavows politics: ‘I’ve never been interested in politics. From back home I was never interested and even over here, I don’t follow at all.’ He regards citizenship as a matter of ‘loyalty to the country’. Probed on this, Kaleem offers his rendition of loyalty:

Well, like being a citizen, you have to follow the rules, whatever they tell you, you know, like the proper way of living as a Canadian citizen … You have to respect the views of whatever it is, the ideas they have, you have to respect those ideas and you have to, like I’m pretty sure being a citizen, you have to vote also.

The degree of compliance and conformity is striking in this passage as is the safety of recourse to a strictly legalistic bordering. It appears that Kaleem regards loyalty as unquestioning adherence to both a legal code and a set of cultural norms. This is very far from citizenship as an entitlement and as an opportunity to contribute to the development of the polity. Critically, he refers to the broad Canadian political community as ‘they’, reflecting the perspective of the visitor and the outsider, even if he is formally a citizen. Kaleem’s loyalty is a contingent and dualistic construct in which following the rules is a form of limited compliance to a regime and in which the political self has been radically and self-reflexively alienated from Canadian public space.

By way of contrast to Kaleem, while Hasani also adopts a loyalist orientation toward citizenship, the foundation of his loyalty is from the inside as an integrated member of Canadian society rather than from the outside as a visitor. Hasani is a 17 year old male of Guyanese/Egyptian parentage, who is in high school. While Kaleem envisions himself returning to Mauritius as soon as he is able, Hasami is planning to enter Canadian political life as soon as he is old enough. While Kaleem and Hasani are both currently low in political participation, it is clear that Hasani intends to engage politically in the future. Hasani is situated in a complex of role expectations that might be regarded as potentially conflictual, and therefore his identity in formation is of particular interest. A visible minority young Muslim male, he is an enthusiastic volunteer in the armed forces cadets, who has already taken part in camps and rescue missions. He expresses a confidence in the Canadian democratic system and a belief that, once he has something to say, he will be able to exert an influence. At present, his knowledge is crude and generalised and so he refers broadly to ‘channels’ and to matters being dealt with at the local level or being ‘sent up’ to higher levels of government in some unspecified way. Such conceptualisations serve as viable place holders and Hasani’s ignorance of conventional political facts should not be taken as an indicator of failure to engage.

Of interest is how Hasani responds to a prompt regarding the Canadian justice system. He has heard of the case of Omar Khadr, the Canadian child detainee at
Guantanamo Bay. His response to this issue is phrased in the passive voice and employs many pronouns as well as repeated qualifiers and disavowals. These are indicators that, while he realises this is a matter of concern for Canadian justice, he is reluctant to be too critical of the Canadian regime or government in this matter:

there is that story of – his name Omar Khadr in Guantanamo Bay. I kind of little bit, like, I know a little bit about it, I’m not really educated about that too much, but I think that the whole thing of they’re trying to get him out or he wants to be able to get out – but they’re not pushing him out or something – so, I think they’re in a situation like that where, you know, the stuff is – there is wrong stuff going on. While they’re in jail, they should be able to – or they should be fighting for their own citizens, so they could get justice.

So hedged and qualified is this statement that by the end of it, it is unclear exactly who or what is being referred to in the flurry of pronouns. Hasani expresses a similar response to his views of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, which has been a combat mission in a Muslim-majority country. Thinking of his future, Hasani regards his network of citizenship responsibilities extending outwards towards sites of global conflict, such as Afghanistan. However, he does not want to imagine killing fellow Muslims in combat. Asked hypothetically about how a Muslim in the army might handle an Afghanistan mission, he states that, if it is their job, they will have to do it. Immediately, however, he envisages them taking on a non-combatant role: ‘like an engineer or a nurse or something like that overseas, where they are still helping out for their country but they are not really going and killing other … Muslims and stuff or killing other people’. Added to this, his view of the existing Afghan mission is one in which Canadians are predominantly engaged in helping out, teaching and training. He envisages himself being able to shape his career in the military as a cadet instructor and member of the reserve, and thereby be able to remain in Canada and not be obliged to serve in particular overseas missions. His view of Canada in Afghanistan is one of a magical transformation of conflict into care and in which the Canadian values of mutual regard and multicultural inclusivity are extended beyond the boundaries of the Canadian state. The basis of Hasani’s loyalty is his country of birth and his national heritage as a Canadian. It is a matter of pride that can be shared with other citizens at key moments, such as the winning of international sports competitions. He exhibits a sense of a collective national consciousness and readily interweaves his own personal narrative into dominant metanarratives of Canadian citizenship.

When it comes to loyalty, each of the two participants, Kaleem and Hasani, might be coded in a questionnaire survey as loyal towards Canada. However, as we have seen, their perspectives are distinctive. For Kaleem, the border acts as a clear boundary between ‘back home’ and Canada. Hasani travels with his border as it accompanies him to places of foreign conflict. With regard to the bordering of Omar Khadr, however, he remains understandably confused. For Hasani, security and insecurity are at the heart of his understanding of citizenship.
Ironically, Hasani attempts to desecuritise his military self through his imagined role as a future member of Canada’s armed forces. From the perspective of governance, Kaleem manifests a rigid and legal-institutional compliance, while Hasani operates with a more civically engaged version of citizenship that at least opens the door to future shaping of the regime.

Identification with political communities

While relatively active in certain respects, Nausheen is reluctant to become too strongly engaged in traditional political activity but has been active in a range of non-traditional political activities. A highly self-confident and thoughtful student of finance, Nausheen is a 21-year-old woman of Pakistani origin, who wears a hijab. Aware of the complexity of hybrid identities, she self-identifies as Muslim, Canadian, Pakistani, a woman and a young person. Such identities implicate her in a complex network of loyalties and associations. Her perspective on citizenship is pragmatic and rights-based. Perhaps reflective of her relatively short time in Canada (eleven out of her twenty-one years) her discourse of citizenship is almost that of regarding Canada as a kind of club with privileges, rather than a focus of emotional attachment. In response to the prompt ‘what does citizenship mean to you’, she says:

I would say it gives me advantages ... What does it mean to me? Also an identity, I guess, that I have this ... card that says I’m Canadian, I would say more advantages more than anything ... Just I guess having that upper hand that you’re Canadian, means you have more rights, I guess, than others in certain situations.

Nausheen is not particularly attached to Pakistan, even though she understands that her parents have a strong connection with their country of origin. Her pragmatism and cautiousness reflect a civic attachment towards Canada that invests little in the country as an object of affection in itself. She exhibits a more cosmopolitical perspective as she discusses her political and charitable role and the compatibility between Islamic and Canadian values: ‘a devout Muslim has, is obliged to ... be an active member of society, so I guess the Abrahamic tradition ...’ Nausheen does not elaborate upon her meaning of the Abrahamic tradition, but its general meaning is to refer to the global Muslim community, some of whom live in Muslim-majority states (Dar al-Islam), while others live in a kind of peaceful exile in Muslim minority state where they can practise their religion freely (Dar al-Amn). The implication of Nausheen’s comment is that she continues to regard the global ummah as her home. In this respect, her sense of loyalty to a collectivity is well advanced even if it is not identified with the nation state but rather with the Muslim diaspora.

Mariam is a 23-year-old female of Syrian ethnicity who is a student of political science. She is the product of an activist family and her own engagement in the political world shows every sign of continuing the tradition. The entire family
Paul Nesbitt-Larking worked hard to elect a Muslim friend to the Canadian Parliament. Mariam speaks of a powerful process of political socialisation in which both her father and certain teachers encouraged her to become active and involved:

"My father is a huge advocate of democracy and of course because … we come from a country [Syria] that doesn’t enjoy that privilege … he would encourage us to write letters to the editors or articles from a very young age … My [civics] teacher was very impressed with me and of course that kind of positive reinforcement is so important for students …"

Mariam is politically knowledgeable and comfortable, with a background in political science and recent acceptance into a prestigious Master of Public Administration programme. As with many of those young people who experience the opportunity to learn through travel, Mariam, on a trip to the USA as a guest of the National Young American Muslim Leader Summit, became aware of how little she knew Canada, which she defines as her own community and country, and how greatly she had been focused on global issues. She said that she herself and others need to become more engaged in their local communities ‘because that’s what’s going to allow us to become productive citizens and participants and sort of dispel … many of the stereotypes that people have about Muslims’.

As the holder of a Canadian parliamentary internship, Mariam has an insider’s understanding of how politics works, and who gets attention and why they do so. She specifically rejects the concept of ethnic voting and tribal loyalties and argues that Muslims should not vote for a candidate simply because he or she is a Muslim. She is strongly committed to full and extensive political engagement as the basis for overcoming stereotypes:

"I think citizenship should be a lot more than symbolic. I think living in a country like Canada … some people are accused of … having a convenient citizenship … We need to promote a culture of … civic participation where people feel like when they get involved in matters … when we promote this idea of what it means to be a citizen which is someone who participates, someone who cares about the people around them, someone who knows how to voice their opinions in a positive way, then people will live out this reality."

She speaks eloquently of the vicious cycle of not integrating because you have been rejected and also of the virtuous cycle of how encouragement leads to positive integration. When it comes to citizenship, Mariam adopts the perspective of balance. Citizenship carries with it both rights and responsibilities and they need to be held in balance. She is a strong supporter of politics as the art of compromise and balance in a pluralistic order: ‘if you’re living in a society and you expect these rights to be given to you, then you have to allow these rights to be given to others because that’s the whole point of living in society, in our diverse multicultural society’. She also refers to the substantive emptiness and therefore the very open possibilities of Canadian citizenship:
I am Canadian and what is Canadian if I’m not Canadian? … If I’m not Canadian, then there are no Canadians really. That’s how I see it now and so … I’m trying really hard to create this fusion identity now that I think a lot of people share with me and in a different way – but I think it’s going to be very different for our children in future for sure.

In her comments, Mariam is reflecting the nuance of belonging identified by Bryan Turner as irony. Irony does not indicate a rejection of one’s place and established network. Rather, ‘irony may only be possible when one already has an emotional commitment to place’ (Turner 2002: 55). Thus the ironic citizen who is engaged in dialogue and exhibits an ethic of care, such as Mariam, exhibits bordering practices that simultaneously include and exclude on the basis of a complex of ever-evolving criteria grounded in dialogue and encounter.

Both Nausheen and Mariam regard Canada as an empty space in certain regards. However, when it comes to governance, their responses are distinctive. For Nausheen, Canada constitutes a convenient place from which to operate as a member of the global ummah. For Mariam, Canada’s emptiness has been foundational to the very core values that she develops as a global citizen. Consequently, while Nausheen’s empty space is simply a lacuna, for Mariam such an empty space is in fact a plenitude of multiple and diverse potential. For Nausheen, civic existence is a set of rights, while for Mariam, it is more a set of duties. Nausheen regards boundaries and the countries they contain as largely irrelevant. Her bordered world is strongly conditioned by a networked understanding of the global ummah. Mariam is also critical of the border but from a different perspective. Mariam’s experiences of being outside Canada and looking in have been strongly formative. Canada becomes a self-reflexive object of scrutiny from the standpoint of both Syria and the USA. Mariam’s enthusiastic endorsement of Canada as a place of possibility and entitlement to self-actualisation reflects an ironic detachment that emphasizes a deeply critical strategy of desecuritisation to live citizenship as an act of engagement, dialogue and care.

**Agencies and practices of citizenship**

What exactly do citizens do when they act as citizens? Our existing stocks of social scientific understanding are enriched through the exploration of narratives.

Fatima, aged 23, and Shaden, aged 24, share much in common. Each woman is a university graduate and young adult of Palestinian origins, working in refugee settlement services. They work together and know each other, and share a general orientation to citizenship. However, in other respects, they are quite distinctive. While Shaden has been fully engaged in a broad range of political activism, Fatima is resolutely focused on community activism and regards conventional politics as an arena in which she cannot exert a meaningful impact. She defines her role in Canada in the following manner:
I grew up in Canada, so I consider Canada to be my home above any other place in the world, and that’s my sincere opinion. My role in Canada … it’s implied in my volunteer efforts, in my workplace, the things that I do … my role here is not to just be another addition to the population of Canada. I want to make sure that I stand out, not only as a Canadian, but as a Muslim Canadian who can make a difference for Canadian society as a whole.

Fatima’s choice of the role metaphor is revealing. For her, actions are a matter of performativity and display and they bring together a script with a set of interpretations. Canada is her chosen stage, but to have made the choice is already to have opened the possibility of performance on other stages. These are the choices of those who cannot take citizenship and national identity for granted. Fatima lives this concept of role through her extensive participation in the local Islamic centre and her charitable work beyond the Muslim community. Her reasons for rejecting conventional politics rest in her conviction that elective politics is insincere, partisan and selfish. While believing that there is not much point in expressing a view to politicians, she does not lack a sense of personal political efficacy. She introduces the concept of ‘holistic indigenousness’, and it is unclear whether she has invented the expression or whether she picked it up in her studies. The concept, as she articulates it, is of great importance to how she regards the future of minorities in Canada and the possibilities of political engagement in the future. Until Muslim Canadians become holistically indigenous, she argues, they will not be able to engage in mainstream Canadian politics. What she means is that a full and profound integration is necessary of all minorities into the broad Canadian political nationality in order for them to engage in the national conversation. For these reasons, grounded in her daily work of helping new immigrants, she is passionately pro integration and speaks of the constant need to bring Muslims into the Canadian national conversation for their mutual benefit: ‘whether they’re Muslims, whether they’re Christian, whether they’re Jewish … it doesn’t matter as long as we’re helping the vulnerable population in Canada so that as an economy we can just grow together’.

Like Fatima, Shaden is highly active and believes in ‘giving back’. She is a more recent immigrant than Fatima and expresses the preciousness of her Canadian citizenship throughout the interview: ‘I believe in giving back because … of where I’ve come from, because of what I’ve seen my parents go through. I really believe that simply being here is a gift.’ She describes herself as ‘very much a political person’ and exhibits a rich and detailed knowledge of Canadian politics, despite the fact that she has lived in Canada less than nine years. Shaden talks casually about picking up the phone to talk to a local MP about the plight of the Palestinians. Her volunteer commitments are extensive through the Muslim Student Association and beyond. As with Fatima, Shaden regards citizenship as a contribution. She says:

I think it [citizenship] plays a big part in shaping how you feel you can contribute to how the rest of the world sees you and how you can better certain things in the rest of the world … when I was in school … she [the professor] asked
would you define yourself as a global citizen, and I remember saying yes and fervently. But now that I think about it I would much prefer to be a Canadian Palestinian trying to make the world a better place, if that doesn’t sound like a block of cheese [idiom – meaning overly sentimental and maudlin] …

Shaden is an avowed and unapologetic idealist, who is powerfully committed to the multicultural possibilities of Canada and stresses the critical importance of sustaining Canadian multiculturalism in light of the deteriorating circumstances for Muslims in Europe:

There may be contradictions in trying to be a Dutch citizen, trying to be a Swedish citizen, but not in Canada … immigration here … has brought people, so many people, from all around the world and everybody’s got their little communities and they can all be different and that’s OK. I don’t want this society to turn into … what’s been happening in Europe where you really have to just become part of the whole … you can be a productive, contributing member of society here … without compromising your values.

Adding to our understanding of citizenship, Shaden argues that the most plausible path to cosmopolitical citizenship is in fact through the generalisation outward of a situated and localised hybrid identity that has been able to develop authentically through the possibilities of deep multiculturalism. Both Fatima and Shaden exhibit strong and determined bordering practices through their performative citizenship across imagined places, networks and territories. Fatima’s goal of holistic indigenousness is focused on a powerful bid to fully inhabit the public sphere in Canada through the relevance of social and community agency. This is a matter of enriching Canada through the integration of Muslim values. Shaden’s goal is to use a Muslim identity to build upon and universalize core Canadian values through conventional political channels in a bid to ameliorate the larger world. In a sense, Fatima’s spatial strategy is centripetal, while Shaden’s is centrifugal.

Fatima and Shaden’s close similarities in age, background and experience make them an interesting couple for purposes of comparison. The greatest distinction between them relates to matters of governance. For Fatima, conventional government and politics is an inappropriate forum for the integration of new immigrants and for their formation into good citizens. Fatima is explicit in her condemnation of insincerity, partisanship and selfishness in government and she exhibits far greater trust in the governance of the voluntary sector. Shaden is equally committed to good citizenship, but manifests it through full and active engagement in conventional politics and government.

**Discussion**

In terms of membership and belonging, what appears superficially to unite Kaleem and Hasani around the concept of loyalty towards Canada in fact reveals two distinctive trajectories of belonging. The concept of loyalty, which might
superficially appear to be matter of being an obedient citizen, can index both marginalisation and integration. Moreover, as we see in the language of Hasani, sometimes experiences of marginalisation and integration can be found in the same citizenship orientation. When Hasani describes his involvement in the military, his degree of integration is hedged with the challenges of being a Muslim who could be called upon to fight other Muslims. When it comes to identification with fellow Canadians as members of a political community, the participants exhibit facets of both/and identification in which various experiences of global belonging work deeply on the reflexivity of citizenship identities. On matters of belonging, we witness two contrasting conceptions of membership in a political community, both of which have been driven by the globalizing experiences of a mobile world.

For Nausheen, Canada is a location of convenience to which she feels only pragmatically connected; she also has little connection to her parents’ country of origin, Pakistan. Her emerging loyalty is to a global ummah of Muslims around the world. By way of contrast, Mariam’s experience of exile from her parents’ country of origin (Syria) as well as the life-changing experience of seeing Canada from the outside, have developed in her a desire for positive integration into Canada based on a developed sense of political or civic nationality. In contrast to Nausheen, Mariam’s loyalty is to a civic ideal located in the nation state. Nausheen, on the other hand, is loyal to a religious diaspora in a perceptually borderless world. Finally, the centrality of the psychological – the idiographic – to the political lives of citizens is vividly displayed in the contrasting narratives of the two Palestinian female placement worker colleagues whose lived experiences of citizenship and agentive selves are distinctive despite their common background and setting. While sharing much in common, the women differ markedly in how they manifest their citizenship. While Fatima rejects conventional politics and focuses on community activism, Shaden embraces the conventional political process. Fatima aims to bring Muslim values home, while Shaden focuses on the broadcasting of Canadian values.

Of their nature, narratives are situated, contingent and always incomplete. It is inappropriate to draw strong inferences regarding future agency across complex and currently inconceivable social settings on the basis of the self-reflections of lives in progress. Our challenges are multiplied when aggregating from individual responses to forms of collective agency. Moreover, as Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) have theorised, the path from behavioural intention to ultimate behaviour is strewn with hazardous inferential leaps. Consequently, we cannot simply predict how such narratives as those presented in this chapter might influence patterns of governance in Canada and beyond. We can, however, take note of the complexity, deep creativity and authenticity of citizenship strategies adopted across the interviewees. We can readily discern aspects of their lived experiences of citizenship that relate to the three core themes of this volume, security, borders and governance. In each case, we can trace in all its complexity the ways in which citizens live their experiences of security, borders and governance, and how they are predisposed to act in response. The contrasts between Kaleem and Hasani profile the concept of security. Kaleem regards security as a matter of
superficial compliance and a diffident withdrawal from the agora of Canadian civic life. Hasani engages in an ironic and complex critical desecuritisation of his and Canada’s military role and he does so in the service of an imagined multicultural, dialogical and caring citizenship. The contrast between Nausheen and Mariam is of relevance to our understanding of borders. Nausheen lives in a networked global order of the imagined ummah in which Canadian nationality is a convenience, along the lines of a credit card or a green card. For Mariam, Canada’s borders are thrown into relief from the outside and the paradoxical strength of Canada’s lack of a core identity is understood and appreciated from the perspective of a troubled Syria or an assimilationist America. Fatima and Shaden’s perspectives illuminate contrasting perspectives on the role of governance in the promotion of good citizenship in Canada. For Fatima, citizenship is nurtured and sustained in civil society and the voluntary sector and it focuses on building the political community through a kind of self-regulating communitarian governance. For Shaden, the conventional apparatus of political representation, of politicians and political parties, is the channel through which to express the demands of citizenship. In their own ways, a large majority of participants interviewed for this project expressed a powerful determination to contribute towards the greater development of the lives of others in Canada and far beyond. Whether they will follow up and how they might do so is prefigured in their recorded words.

Given the accelerating rate of global change as well as the dangers and opportunities of living in an unstable global order in which both space and time are of decreasing relevance, we are increasingly inclined to anchor our existential selves through the accounts we give in response to those circumstances that shape and reshape our biographies. Those needing to understand the nature of political obligation, loyalty, belonging and civic agency in the future will need to pay attention to these accounts. Through an exploration of the voices of young Muslims in Canada, this chapter has illustrated how phenomenologies of bordering and associated social psychological understandings of place, network and territory influence evolving citizenship practices. In so doing, the complexities and nuance of lived experience urge us to open up existing normative, legal and political scientific understandings of citizenship.

Notes

1 I wish to express my collegial appreciation and gratitude to Dr Kathy Bullock for her insights and work in our collaborative project. My thanks also extend to Dr Sarah Scuzzarello as well as two anonymous reviewers for their perceptive and helpful criticisms of earlier versions of this chapter. I alone am responsible for the analyses undertaken in this chapter. A copy of the questionnaire as well as a chart of certain socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics of the participants is available from the author.

2 Proper names used throughout the chapter are pseudonyms.
References


7 Community arts, new media and the desecuritisation of migration and asylum seeker issues in the UK

Maria Rovisco

Introduction

This chapter argues that through community arts practice, forced migrants get the chance to enter into conversation with others as they gain access to the public representation (of themselves and others) in new communicative spaces. It is argued that participatory arts involving refugees and asylum seekers offer a springboard to reconfigure the relation between citizenship and belonging in multicultural Britain. We will see that, by creating safe spaces of dialogue and communication, participatory arts projects pave the way for everyday practices of de-bordering and desecuritisation that challenge ‘from below’ neat legal definitions and social categorisations of the refugee and the asylum seeker. In so doing, they are able to resist the securitisation of asylum and migration issues – e.g. the constitution of the asylum seekers and the refugee as a security threat – in a range of media narratives. Specifically, this chapter investigates ways in which digital media allow community arts groups working with forced migrants to create new interstices, and spaces of freedom and transgression, whereby the symbolic borders that separate ‘us’ (citizens) and ‘them’ (non-citizens) can be negotiated. The chapter begins by probing some of the ways in which community arts practice can contribute to the (de)securitisation of migration and asylum issues by opening up new communicative spaces and alternative social relations that are capable of reconfiguring the relationship between belonging and citizenship. It then goes on to examine how the scholarly and policy-oriented literature on refugee engagement with arts in the UK emphasises ways in which the arts foster participation, inclusion and new relations of communication. We will see that while, on the one hand, participatory arts projects allow forced migrants gain access to the public representation of themselves (and others) by entering into conversation with others, on the other hand, these forms of artistic engagement and cross-cultural exchange cannot guarantee that their voices are, ultimately, heard in the wider public sphere. While digital media can afford greater connectedness and relations of communication in digital public spheres extending beyond the local and the nation, questions remain as to whether, in the context of participatory arts, digital media actually open access to wider networks of belonging. The chapter concludes by probing some of the ways in which arts-based uses of storytelling
struggle to desecuritise migration and asylum issues in the British public sphere. It is argued that, through individualising empathy and constituting the refugee as a needy, vulnerable and traumatised other, participatory arts fail to effectively challenge the exclusionary power of traditional practices of citizenship, and promote dis-identification from non-democratic state practices directed towards individuals and social groups who are not part of the political community.

The (de)securitisation of migrant and asylum issues: Arts, citizenship and belonging

Asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented workers are often constituted as an ‘abject class’ of global migrants because of their ‘unsavoury’ or their ‘dangerous agency’ (Nyers 2003: 1070). Refugees are persons seeking refuge who are made visible as mobile subjects in particular ways. Their mobility is marked and coded; it is linked to persecution, displacement and claims for protection (Mountz 2011: 255), but also to securitised fears and anxieties. As Mountz (2011: 256) puts it, ‘current flows of refugees, irregular migrants, and smuggled migrants are categories that are growing more conflated, and a more generalised notion of everyone on the move has emerged as states reduce numbers and retreat from ideals of multiculturalism’. Forced migrants are constructed as security threats by elite institutional and political elite actors, such as media and government actors, who have the know-how and technologies to produce a discourse on the figure of the enemy and impose their own definition of what constitutes a threat (Bigo cited in Aradau 2004: 394). The legal category of the refugee is constituted as an existential threat to the national community by the very fact that refugees are discursively constructed as a problem, or as ‘matter out of place’, which challenges the national order of things (Malkki 1995: 6). As Malkki (1995: 7) puts it, ‘refugees are seen to haemorrhage or weaken national boundaries and to pose a threat to national security, as it is time and time asserted in the discourse of refugee policy’. Bordering processes can be used to reinstate state power and the idea of a collective body of citizens and can contribute to the demarcation of territorial borders by depicting particular groups of migrants as a security threat (Scuzzarello and Kinnvall 2013: 94). The abject subject (the refugee, the undocumented migrant) stands, therefore, in contrast with the purity of citizenship, i.e. ‘the authoritative, articulate, visible and political subjectivity’ (Nyers 2003: 1074). The possibility of challenging what is constructed as dangerous, or a security threat, comes from understanding desecuritisation as a democratic challenge to the non-democratic politics of securitisation (Aradau 2004). Drawing upon Balibar, Aradau (2004: 402) argues that desecuritisation is linked to a logic of emancipation that challenges security threats by enabling those who have been considered dangerous to speak in order ‘to reshape the relations that institutions have fixed along the lines of security’. She further suggests that there is an argumentative dimension to desecuritisation that calls for an acceptance of dangerous others, of those who would normally be excluded from the Habermasian ideal speech situation, as legitimate discussion partners.
Maria Rovisco (Aradau 2004: 402). Thus the politics of emancipation can work as a strategy of dis-identification from non-democratic state practices towards those others who are not part of the political community.

Yet, the desecuritisation of migration and asylum issues in UK needs to be tied to a politics of emancipation which takes into account the relation between narratives of security, borders and neoliberal governmentality in the British context. In the 1990s, the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ presented a political opportunity to steer the immigration debate towards refugees, a class of migrants who through a process of legal reclassification would be excluded from the state welfare system and paid work. As a consequence of several pieces of asylum legislation introduced by the New Labour government, the figure of the ‘bogus asylum seeker’ was placed at the heart of a public narrative of security which constituted ‘Soft Touch Britain’ as a vulnerable and feminised body whose soft and porous borders are threatened by the invasion of bogus asylum seekers (see Tyler 2013: 84; see also Philo et al. 2013: 35). This narrative goes in tandem with the call for greater border control and the implementation of a highly bureaucratic system through which the asylum seeker is given ‘temporary admission’ to the UK while being monitored by a range of surveillance and control technologies (see Tyler 2013: 86). The constitution of the asylum seeker as a threat to national security – through metaphors of disease, natural disaster and criminality (Mountz 2011: 259) is, ultimately, sustained by an asylum system that dehumanises people seeking refuge by enforcing their destitution and exclusion from public life; for example, by preventing their access to paid work, the welfare system, restricting their mobility through electronic tagging, and reinforcing the stereotype of the asylum seeker as someone who does not contribute to society. Ultimately, asylum seekers find themselves trapped in an ambiguous legal category that denies them entry into the sovereign territory while preventing them from having a voice in public life. The narrative of security which constitutes Britain’s territorial borders as porous and vulnerable to crossing by illegal and bogus asylum seekers needs to be understood against the backdrop of New Labour’s attempts to govern irregular migration from the global South, which require national borders to filter migration flows in order to exclude those deemed ‘undesirable’. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the British government became increasingly engaged with an EU framework that seeks to address flows of asylum seekers and irregular migrants – i.e. ‘unwanted’ migration – while also allowing for the externalisation of territorial borders and of EU priorities onto neighbouring states and regions (Geddes 2005). Furthermore, as noted by Tyler (2013: 93), ‘neoliberal economic policies such as privatisation, deregulation, unrestricted foreign investment … are dependent upon the porosity of borders to flows of capital, including the availability of precarious migrant labour. … It is in the context of this “double agenda” of state formation and economic management, securing borders and opening borders, that refugees became scapegoats.’ Arguably, then, the politics of emancipation can only succeed as a strategy of dis-identification from non-democratic state practices if those who are excluded from the political community can gain access to public dialogue and the representation of themselves (and others) in public life.
It is possible to see the desecuritisation of migration and a politics of emancipation stemming from what Nyers calls abject cosmopolitanism, i.e. ‘the political practices and enduring political problematics associated with refugee and immigrant groups resisting targeted exclusion’ (Nyers 2003: 1073–4). Through such political practices, refugees and immigrants can speak up in order to challenge narratives of security which ‘define the threshold for inclusion in a community and its good ways of life by depicting some immigrant groups as criminals and invaders’ (see Scuzzarello and Kinnvall 2013: 97). These political practices bring to the fore the relationship between citizenship and belonging because political subjectivities – i.e. practices of inclusion and exclusion as well as dimensions of longing and desire to belong in which political subject-positions come into being (Krause and Schramm 2011: 118–19) – can be articulated in the activism of undocumented non-citizen people and refugees to challenge the sovereign power of the state over matters of security. As Nyers puts it (2003: 1071), ‘Anti-deportation activism can, therefore, be read in terms of contemporary disputes about who has the authority to protect, and under what terms and conditions.’ Anti-deportation activists are able to challenge ‘security fixations of the sovereign state’ (Nyers 2003: 1070) in a context in which the endangered can speak for themselves and acquire a political voice even if they do not formally belong to the political community. Abject cosmopolitanism can thus be seen as a practice of de-bordering (Rumford, 2008) carried on by anti-deportation activists, which invites dis-identification of non-democratic state practices. However, Nyer’s conceptualisation of abject cosmopolitanism says little about whether non-citizen people, who are not directly involved in such political practices, can also speak up and participate in public life by engaging in everyday practices of de-bordering and desecuritising.

Even if we accept that those not belonging to the political community lack the know-how and knowledge of political elite actors (Aradau 2004: 404) or activists, I want to argue that the desecuritisation of migrant and refugee issues can only occur when new communicative spaces are created to allow state institutions, civil society organisations, community organisations and refugee and migrant groups to come together to create ‘alternative societal relations’ (see Buzan et al. cited in Aradau 2004: 402) that are capable of reconfiguring the relationship between belonging and citizenship.

Belonging can, but need not, encompass citizenship as political membership, and it is also about the emotions and desires that such membership evokes (see Krause and Schramm 2011). Citizenship can, in fact, be conceived beyond the nation state through social practices in which people are de facto incorporated in society, but not necessarily through the legal status granted by a state (Soysal 1994). While debates about citizenship beyond the state (Isin and Turner 2007) – e.g. cultural citizenship (Rosaldo 1994; Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Stevenson 2001) – are crucial to stress the inclusive dimension of citizenship rather than its exclusionary power, questions remain, as noted by Krause and Schramm (2011: 125), about whether extended citizenship projects carry any meaning for people who lack citizenship and rights by legal definition. Isin’s notion of acts of citizenship – i.e. those deeds by which actors (NGOs, persons) constitute themselves (and others) as subjects of
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rights (Isin 2009: 371) – is a useful lens to understand how those individuals who do not formally belong to the political community can act as citizens. As argued by Isin (2009: 371), acts of citizenship not only articulate claims and constitute claimants, but also create new sites of contestation, belonging and struggle. While social movements of refugees and undocumented migrants might offer an insight into new projects of citizenship beyond the state, more attention should be paid to community arts practice as a site of contestation for citizenship which does not necessarily involve formal claims for the recognition of certain individuals as rights-bearing subjects. Acts of citizenship can involve claims for the recognition of minority rights (Kymlicka and Norman 2000), which are typically articulated in linguistic speech acts (Austin 1975), often at the expense of expressive culture as a way of knowing and making claims (Taylor 2003: 18). Yet, poetic-expressive devices such as acting and music styles, enunciation and gestures are as important as textuality to enable minority or excluded groups to articulate relationships of belonging, conflicts over citizenship and claims to rights. Performance, for example, is a powerful vehicle of cultural meaning because how something is performed is as crucial to its meaning as what is performed (e.g. the script, or the content of a play) (Goldfarb 1980; Berezin 1994: 1242).

Acts of citizenship also involve a dimension of learning (Stevenson 2001). This can be seen as a form of cosmopolitan citizenship that shifts the focus of citizenship onto common experiences, learning processes and a discourse of empowerment (Delanty 2002: 64). In this view of cultural citizenship, identities are not seen as fixed and stable entities that need to be accommodated into the polity in order to enhance citizenship. If we accept that people learn citizenship in everyday life and through participation in the political community, then the relation between self and others is crucial for the making of citizenship.

Against this backdrop, this chapter argues that, through participation in community arts projects, forced migrants can gain a voice, be listened to and acquire visibility in the wider public sphere by entering into conversation with others in situated contexts. In finding ways of engaging with others whose access to cross-cultural dialogue is severely limited, community arts practice allows migrants and refugees to gain access to the public representation of themselves (and others) (see Gilbert and Lo 2008). In this way, refugees and asylum seekers are able to challenge the politics of hyper-visibility whereby certain government and media narratives cast refugees as dangerous and a security threat (see Malkki 1995: 7). Refugees can be a threat and hyper-visible when they are seen at the margins of the nation (e.g. entering illegally the country illegally as broadcasted television news reports), but their positive contributions to social and cultural life in the recipient society are often invisible in the wider public sphere, in part, because they lack adequate qualifications and knowledge to speak up and counter their dehumanisation in a range of media and government narratives. More attention should be paid to community arts practice as a setting where forced migrants of various kinds can resist their enforced invisibility in everyday life. Artistic practices can be expressive of the identity of the groups that produced them while also asserting belonging and inclusion. Arguably, then, alternative public representations of
migrants and refugees, which originate from community arts practices, have the potential to desecuritise migration and asylum issues through engagement with a range of audiences, civil society organisations, local communities and state institutions. Alternative visual, textual and multimedia representations of refugee and migrant experiences and histories are often designed to raise public awareness of the state’s failure to embrace its humanitarian responsibilities. But, more importantly, they are also capable of conferring visibility on ‘other’ cultural practices and ways of life, which have been unjustly ignored, by allowing those who are legally categorised as non-citizens to act as citizens in new communicative spaces. These new communicative spaces open up a new universe of possibilities of meaning and representation of both us (citizens) and them (non-citizens) because, as Isin (2009: 379–80) reminds us, unlike routinised social actions such as voting, taxpaying and enlisting, activist citizenship makes a difference by breaking routines, understandings and practices. Community arts projects involving forced migrants can potentially create new communicative spaces as an interstice, a space of freedom and transgression, where the political border separating citizens (us) and non-citizens (them) along the lines of formal state membership can be contested. The desecuritisation of asylum and migration issues calls, therefore, for an understanding of borders as sites of intense connectivity, cultural mix and negotiations of difference that are capable of promoting societal and political transformation (Rumford 2006, 2008; Cooper and Rumford 2011; Rovisco 2010), rather than as ‘lines in the sand’ (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009) designed to keep those deemed dangerous from entering the political community. Artistic and cultural practices by and about migrants and refugees, who have been excluded from the routine activities of political life (e.g. voting, taxpaying), can create new affective and intellectual engagements of audiences with everyday life experiences of exclusion and discrimination endured by certain social groups. As noted by Gilbert and Lo (2008: 189): ‘the performing arts, along with other cultural sectors, have thus faced the particular challenge of finding ways to engage with Others whose presence at the borders of the nation has been marked by both hypervisibility and invisibility and whose access to cross-cultural dialogue has been severely limited’. Thus it could be argued that community arts can also generate among a range of interlocutors – audiences, cultural producers and artists – greater awareness and reflexivity about the symbolic and political borders separating ‘us’ (i.e. the members of the political community) from ‘them’ (i.e. with those who do not belong to the political community while also ‘being there’). Directing the research lens to community arts projects involving refugees and asylum seekers enables one to analyse how the latter negotiate their access to resources and networks of belonging as well as their recognition as subjects ‘with the right to have rights’.

**Participatory arts, digital media and refugees in the UK**

In the UK, a commitment to international human rights legislation is challenged by a focus upon protecting UK borders and shaping asylum policy in order to
reduce the flow of people seeking asylum and refuge. The UK government is currently deploying juxtaposed borders, processes of ‘remote control’ and control zones, in order to manage the flow of people trying to gain entry to the UK (e.g. from Calais). Temporary leave-to-remain visas for refugees rather than permanent asylum visas were introduced by the 2005 ‘New Asylum Model’ and a ‘points’ system for potential immigrants was introduced to ‘only allow into Britain the people and skills our economy needs’ (Blair cited in Philo et al. 2013: 24). The 2006 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act not only increased penalties for anyone employing people illegally, but also increased the difficulty of obtaining citizenship and extended the qualifying period to eight years. As refused asylum seekers became more likely to be detained in refugee centres or deported, a number of charities and NGOs in civil society, refugee community organisations, community arts organisations and certain government agencies (Arts Council) have played a significant role in increasing the public visibility of the plight and abuse of people seeking asylum in the UK, as well as in highlighting their contributions to social and cultural life. Yet this discursive frame sits uneasily with the way in which press coverage of asylum and migration is often linked to public discourses about security, terrorism and global threats in a changing world. In this context, the distinction between forced migration (a category that includes refugees and asylum seekers) and economic migration is important because, in the UK, television news and press coverage of migration and asylum issues tend to conflate forced and economic migration. The blurring of the categories of forced and economic migration has also meant that it is increasingly difficult to completely separate economic and human rights reasons when looking into many migrants and asylum seekers’ reasons for mobility (Castles 2003: 17). The figure of the asylum seeker is usually tied into the debate about illegal immigration, which is considered the result of ‘abuse of’ and ‘problems in’ the asylum system (Philo et al. 2013: 57). Yet, the fact that asylum seekers suffer abuse, discrimination and exclusion in their migration trajectories (people-smuggling, detention centres), and the fact that they are deprived of the cultural citizenship entitlements granted to other migrants, is likely to have an impact on how they engage with local service providers, make sense of their identities and represent themselves through the arts in public space. For example, those suspected of entering the country illegally, or making unfounded asylum claims, are often deemed ‘bogus asylum seekers’ and, therefore, excluded from the labour market and welfare benefits. While the experience of detention and forced dispersion prevents these asylum seekers from inclusion into mainstream British society, they are equally subjected to intense scrutiny and suspicion until they are eventually deported or win the right to remain (see Sales 2005). Furthermore, as noted by Sales (2005: 452), since those applying for formal citizenship status are required to demonstrate language skills and a knowledge of citizenship, those suffering trauma see their possibilities of gaining citizenship rights significantly reduced because they are required to acquire a language without being given the opportunity to learn it. Thus it is important to recognise the differentiated experiences of migration, displacement and settlement of refugees and asylum seekers (new arrivals and those on temporary visas).
An important social setting for refugees and asylum seekers to develop social networks, new relations of communication, and to negotiate their identities is community arts practice. The 2008 report *Arts and Refugees: History, Impact and Future* (Kidd et al. 2008) argues that refugee engagement with the arts fosters participation, well-being and inclusion. There is a line of research that highlights the transformative role of the arts in creating a space of dialogue to bring into voice refugee and migrant experiences of displacement, belonging and exile (O’Neill 2008, 2011). Looking at the relation between arts, forced migration and diaspora in the context of the UK, this research directs the analytical lens to the artistic process, i.e. the mechanics of the collaborative process between the refugee as storyteller, the artist and the researcher, in representing the experience of asylum, rather than the end-product (i.e. the artistic performance or exhibit). Recognising the need to counter processes of stigmatisation and exclusionary vocabularies in media discourse, this body of work has identified a range of cultural methodologies – such as poetics, visual representations and participatory action research methodologies – to both study and transform the everyday life experiences of asylum seekers and refugees in the UK. It is the artistic process that, ultimately, helps forced migrants of various kinds to develop the skills and confidence they need to cope with their new life in the UK. While this work has shown that refugee arts projects can promote inclusion and participation, there is here little sense of the actual communicative spaces that enable refugees and asylum seekers to negotiate their identities as they attempt to bridge differences with others and engage with a range of audiences.

In a different vein, research conducted by Gilbert and Lo (2008) and Gilbert and Nield (2008) is specifically concerned with how activist theatrical explorations of asylum in Australia enable particular kinds of affective and intellectual engagement of the audience. The underlying assumption here is that the ‘play’ potentially activates among its audience a state of responsiveness and receptiveness to the plight of asylum seekers and refugees. The most common type of ‘play’ has been the verbatim text constructed from letters, interviews and other documented accounts of refugee experiences and is typically performed by professional actors. This research has shown that the performance of asylum is not only concerned with issues of representation in an artistic context – what does it mean to represent someone’s experience as a refugee – but also with engaging particular audiences with an artistic end-product (i.e. the theatrical performance). One of the key aims of theatrical explorations of asylum issues has been to counter the dehumanisation of asylum seekers in a range of media and government discourses and to find new ways of engaging in a cross-cultural dialogue with ‘others’. By directing the research lens to the conditions of cultural production, i.e. the connections between the cultural producers, texts, actors and audiences, this research has shown how theatrical performance can challenge exclusionary vocabularies and attitudes towards refugee and asylum seeker in public space. In this way, it highlights not only representations of the corporeal trauma and pain of the refugee and the asylum seeker, but also the ‘structures of feeling’ (care, compassion) with which refugee performance approaches its subjects and addresses its audiences (see Fisek 2008). As artists can adopt a more experimental approach, subverting and at times playing with questions...
of refugee identity, the focus is placed on ‘artistic performance’ as an end-product that has the potential to transform cultural understandings of refugee and asylum issues, rather than the artistic process. Yet this body of work pays scant attention to the experiences of artistic and cultural engagement of concrete asylum seekers and refugees in situated everyday life contexts. In fact, most activist theatre dealing with asylum and refuge is performed by professional actors, not by refugees or asylum seekers themselves, and addresses specific high-brow audiences.

The fact that many asylum seekers and refugees are denied basic human rights (e.g. the right to work and access to language classes) and face conditions of displacement and exclusion of various kinds have prompted, in the UK, responses from community arts organisations and charities in the cultural and voluntary sectors. These responses emerge primarily in the form of participatory arts, which refer to a range of creative projects (e.g. drama, video, photography) that engage participants in meaningful ways, and aim to activate critical thinking and decision-making, transforming participants into active citizens (Lockowandt 2013: 3). Since the mid-2000s, initiatives and participatory projects such as the London-based ‘Photo Voice’ participatory photography project, ‘Music for Change’ in Canterbury, the ‘Living Here Project’ at London’s Oval House Theatre, the ‘Shared Horizons’ digital photography project at the Yorkshire Sculpture Park and the ‘Refugee Heritage Programme’ at the London Museums Hub have been instrumental in giving refugees a voice and a space for communicating ‘who they are’. In recent years, inspired by the work developed in the Center for Digital Storytelling (CDS), participatory arts projects started to use digital storytelling methods to offer asylum seekers and refugees the chance to enter into dialogue with others. Digital storytelling is a workshop-based process, which integrates storytelling, creative writing, photography and the use of multimedia technologies, to allow participants to tell their story, usually in the form of a recorded personal narrative voiced over a set of still or moving images (see Dreher 2012; Grossman and O’Brien 2011). As Alexandra (cited in Grossman and O’Brien 2011: 49) puts it: ‘this longitudinal practice of developing a self-selected autobiographical story, crafting the script, designing the storyboard, making the images and editing the final audio-visual composition’, impacted significantly on people’s lives – if only for two hours a week, providing a sanctuary of possibility.

Digital storytelling is a popular form of participatory media that is increasingly used in community arts projects aimed at refugees and asylum seekers (especially young people) to offer them an opportunity to exercise civil and communication rights (Salazar 2010). Arguably, then, the personal stories enabled by digital storytelling are more than ‘voice acts’ of marginalised communities claiming a recognition for cultural rights (see Dreher 2012). They emerge as acts of citizenship (Isin 2009) that have the potential to contest those narratives of security which construct refugees and asylum seekers as a threat to the nation, by facilitating a safe space of dialogue and discussion aiming at the creation of alternative representations of refugee experiences and histories.

While it is hard to deny that refugees, forced migrants and asylum seekers have had few opportunities to represent themselves through the arts in the wider public
Community arts, new media and desecuritisation

sphere, more research is needed on the actual communicative spaces in which refugees and asylum seekers attempt to connect with distant others – by being heard in the wider public sphere (Silverstone 2006). The underlying assumption here is that participatory media practices that rely on the possibilities of digital media (e.g. the digital storytelling workshop, digital photography) are capable of fostering new relations of communication and connectedness that allow refugees to enter into conversation with ‘others’. Digital media can, in fact, enable connection to transnational audiences in digital public spheres that subvert from below the national model of the public sphere (see Dayan 2009: 21). While the internet as a communicative space is usually associated with new forms of sociability, interactivity and connectivity generated in cyberspace, one must not lose sight of the moral implications of the kind of communications that are generated with the use of digital media. In his work on the moral status of online communication, Silverstone (2003, 2006) raises the important question of whether these interactive spaces sustain responsibility and are truly hospitable spaces where the ‘other’ can be heard. Thus one must ask, for example, in which contexts and under what conditions digital stories are exchanged, treated as a resource and given recognition and authority? (Couldry 2008). Reflecting upon their involvement in the FOMACS participatory media project in Ireland, Grossman and O’Brien (2011: 42) argue that ‘cultivating a space for “voices” to be spoken is arguably much easier to negotiate than is the challenge of creating or indeed opening up spaces for diverse “voices” to be listened to’. If one accepts that voice matters when one is actually heard by others, then, it is important to consider, as noted by Couldry (cited in Grossman and O’Brien 2011: 43), the ‘profound inequality in the distribution of symbolic resources in the global media system, and how many voices, audiences and cultural practices are, ultimately, ignored’.

While the digital storytelling method enables, for example, asylum seekers and refugees to use digital technologies for the making of short stories, opening access to a range of symbolic and material resources and facilitating the development of new skills, it is less clear who are the audiences to whom given media productions will be shown and who is listening to the stories being told. More importantly, because, in participatory arts, the end-products (e.g. short digital stories recorded in DVD, photography, drama performance) are never directed to the whole galaxies of audiences that form national publics (see Dayan 2009: 24), the visibility of these digital stories in the wider public sphere is a priori quite limited. Arguably, then, alternative visual and textual representations of asylum and migration issues tend to circulate along restricted interpersonal networks of policy-makers, community workers, researchers and facilitators, which limits the possibilities of desecuritisation as a challenge to undemocratic state practices.

Participatory arts and the politics of voice

If one accepts that acts of citizenship involve an expression of the need to be heard via a dialogical relation with others (Reinach cited in Isin 2009: 379), one must also ask to what extent participatory media projects are capable of generating a
genuine public dialogue between participants, facilitators, media makers, artists and diverse audiences, in communicative spaces where desecuritisation as a struggle for emancipation is possible. To what extent are participatory arts capable of generating communicative spaces where the political borders separating us and them along the lines of state membership can be contested? As argued above, much of the scholarly and policy-oriented literature on refugee engagement with the arts places emphasis on how the arts foster participation, inclusion and new relations of communication. The key assumption here is that participatory action research methods and participatory arts-based work are a therapeutic form of social integration that transforms the lives of refugees and asylum seekers by enabling them to gain a voice (O’Neill 2008, 2011; Kidd et al. 2008). The combination of art forms with narrative/biographical forms can create a safe space of dialogue and reflection where the participants become, eventually, able to ‘tell their story’. As noted by O’Neill (2008: 10), ‘working with an ethnographer and an artist the storyteller (e.g. the migrant, refugee, asylum seeker) can find ways and means of representing her story facilitated by the collaborative process’. In the literature, the transformative role of art is usually tied to a celebration of the power of storytelling in bringing migrant and refugee experiences into voice. The connection between the possibilities of storytelling and the dynamics of speaking up is apparent, for instance, in the participatory digital photography project, the Moving Lives project (run by PhotoVoice) – a four-year participatory photography project aiming to assist the integration of young refugees in London (see Orton 2009). The final phase of the project involved a mentoring scheme – called ‘New Londoners’ – in which fifteen young refugees were partnered with fifteen emerging and successful London photographers. While the mentees were selected because of their potential as young photographers, digital photography – which requires little formal training and gives instant results – rapidly became a ‘tool for communication, observation and creativity’ (Orton 2009: 4). As argued by Liz Orton, who managed PhotoVoice’s Moving Lines from 2003 to 2008, ‘the images become part of the ongoing conversation they are having with their new home, as they learn to live and settle in London. … Photographs can create a distance between the person and the subject, and this depersonalization can help a person who wants to talk but might find it difficult. It is through discussion in safe dialogue spaces – involving mentors, mentees and facilitators – that a non-verbal art form such as digital photography allows learning, not just about image-making, but about the world around us, and about each other’ (Orton 2009: 4, 6). In the context of participatory digital photography, storytelling unfolds primarily in the artistic process and is not necessarily associated with an end-product (e.g. recorded personal narrative), as is the case in the digital storytelling workshop. While the focus of storytelling might be on past life, and the pain and suffering associated with displacement, it is important not to lose sight of how refugee experiences are also powerfully shaped by the cultural exchanges facilitated by participatory arts in situated contexts. Participatory arts can offer refugees and asylum seekers the opportunity to explore the meanings of belonging and citizenship beyond the constraints of legal categorisations, the uncertainties associated with the possibility of deportation and
the marginalisation and abuse they often experience in their everyday routines. In this regard, Tina Muir, a drama practitioner and researcher, notes, from her observations as a participant and observer in the Oval House Theatre’s Living Here drama workshops: ‘the “loose interactions” time allows the young people to relate to each other in a different way and explore alternative aspects of citizenship to that which they experience in the institutionalised school space. … Oval House Theatre provides an opportunity for them to practice being part of a community, and to feel a sense of belonging to somewhere; to be a citizen of Oval House Theatre and to feel “in place”’ (Muir 2009: 24).

Participatory video projects constitute another important environment for participatory arts practice involving young refugees and asylum seekers. Combining group facilitation with video production methods to engage a group in collaborative production of a video narrative or message, participatory video projects offer alternative forms of engaging communities and increasing their capacity for advocacy and to learn new skills (e.g. computer or technical skills, project management, planning). Participatory video projects, such as those facilitated by Insights, an organisation operating in France and the UK, aim at strengthening local community networks and target policy and decision-makers early on in the process to ensure that the final video product is disseminated through screenings, DVDs and online platforms. Insights, for example, makes sure the video product reaches influential individuals and organisations capable of effecting change (see Lockowandt 2013: 30–1). However, there is a tension between producing a high-quality video product, which is able to engage a range of audiences, and focusing on the process of participation, which is usually informed by an approach that ensures – as in the case of Insights – that ‘the vision of the project is not on a video “product” but rather on the process of participation’ (Lockowandt 2013: 31). Thus while digital technologies afford the creation of a new media environment in which video narratives and messages can potentially reach a range of audiences, the focus remains on developing safe spaces of dialogue and participation rather than on concentrating efforts to produce a high-quality product. This also means that the voice of asylum seekers and refugees is more likely to be heard in the enclosed spaces of dialogue and participation generated by participatory arts workshops, rather than in the wider public sphere through the final video product.

While it is hard to dispute the claim that participatory arts projects, such as PhotoVoice digital photography workshops and Oval Theatre House’ drama workshops, can successfully encourage inclusion, communication and belonging amongst the project’s participants, questions remain to whether there is a wider communicative space beyond the space of the participatory workshop, and to whether acts of citizenship and alternative public representations of migrant and asylum issues can effectively challenge the hyper-visibility of refugees and asylum seekers as a security threat to the nation. For example, Muir (2009: 27) recognises that there are limits to the potential of the Oval House Theatre’s drama workshops in fostering inclusion and participation in mainstream society: ‘during their workshop session at Oval House, the young people became a community.
This community may not exist outside the wall of Oval House, but in the safe space created during the workshops, the young people were able to interact to one another, re-negotiate their identities and experience a sense of belonging to that place’ (italics added for emphasis).

Participatory arts, new communicative spaces and desecuritisation

Scholarly and policy-oriented literature places emphasis on the potential of participatory arts to break down negative stereotypes. For example, the 2013 report ‘Inclusion through the Art’ (Lockowandt 2013) concurs with the 2008 Arts and Refugees report (Kidd et al. 2008) that the positive outcomes of participatory arts include overcoming language barriers, building communication skills, as well as forming positive relationships between the host community and participants and overcoming negative stereotypes. In a similar vein, O’Neill (2011), who has led several interdisciplinary research projects that employed participatory action research (PAR) in partnership with community arts organisations and forced migrants, argues:

PAR also challenges processes of othering and subjugation, and raises ethical and political issues in relation to the politics of representation and recognition. … Involvement in the research as participants and co-researchers can validate one’s experiences, through witnessing or simply being listened to. Involving participants as co-researchers democratizes and transforms their role from passive subject/participant to active participant in collective research …

(O’Neill 2011: 19, italics added for emphasis)

However, it is debatable whether participatory action research methods actually challenge the ‘othering’ of refugees and asylum seekers, in part, because it is hard to see how the voices of the participants are able to reach wider audiences beyond the academy and community arts practice, in part, because the claim that PAR transforms the refugee and asylum seeker participant from a passive subject into an active subject is in itself problematic and can be seen, in fact, as contributing to the process of othering of forced migrants. The participants (the migrant, the refugee, the asylum seeker) are often not seen as legitimate and equal discussion partners who are able to negotiate on their own terms participation in cross-cultural public dialogue. If asylum seekers, refugees are constituted – by practitioners, media-makers, researchers and policy-makers – as being a priori passive, voiceless and uprooted subjects rather than ‘people like us’, how can participatory arts effectively challenge relations of belonging defined by the Manichaeian opposition between us (citizens) and them (non-citizens)? How can participatory arts pave the way for desecuritisation as a strategy of emancipation and everyday practices of de-bordering that enables those who have been considered dangerous to speak up and be heard in the wider national public sphere?

The treatment of the refugee as a generalised and ideal-type figure is part of a long-established ‘standardized way of discussing people who have been displaced
Community arts, new media and desecuritisation

across national frontiers’ (Malkki 1995: 9). As insightfully noted by Malkki (1995: 8), much of the policy-oriented literature and international humanitarian agencies dealing with refugees tend to share the premise that refugees are necessarily a problem – they are ‘constituted as an anomaly requiring specialized correctives and therapeutic interventions’ (Malkki 1995: 8). This discursive construction of the refugee also pervades the literature of participatory arts, particularly, through its celebration of the therapeutic role of participatory arts practice. The insistence on the therapeutic potential of the arts is consequential in terms of fighting the politics of invisibility because, rather than seeing the participants as ordinary persons who make contributions to social and cultural life, they are primarily constituted as someone lacking in agency and skills to effectively operate in mainstream society. As the 2008 Arts and Refugees report puts it:

The primary objective (the use of the arts/creativity in community arts practice) is to offer opportunities for participation that engage individuals in a creative or learning environment. The outcomes will vary but may include, alongside skills development, increased self-esteem, self-confidence and language skills, as well as an increased awareness of cultural and artistic life in the UK.

(Kidd et al. 2008: 13)

Furthermore, it is difficult to see the participants as artists on their own merit when the artistic practice is seen as ‘a creative aid in the process of integration’ (Orton 2009: 4). Arguably, then, participatory arts practice in the context of community arts can also contribute to the process of othering of refugees by being caught in what Salverson (1999) calls an ‘aesthetic of injury’, which invites superficial empathy and reproduces configurations of hegemonic power in identifying the traumatised and oppressed refugee as a victim (see Salverson 1999: 37; Gilbert and Lo 2008: 192). By incorporating the other’s difference into a form of knowledge that emphasises perceived differences between us (oppressors, citizens) and them (oppressed, non-citizens), participatory arts involving forced migrants struggle to create alternative societal relations that are capable of reconfiguring the relationship between belonging and citizenship in the wider public sphere. This othering of refugee identities and experiences is well articulated in the words of a young participant in the ‘New Londoners’ PhotoVoice project: ‘We have had different experiences from other young people and it’s important that other people learn about those experiences, but we don’t want them to make us different’ (see Orton 2009: 7).

Against this backdrop, one needs to ask whether, in the context of participatory arts, digital media can shape a new media environment that opens access to wider networks of belonging. While computer-generated communication (CMC) is increasingly part of the broader mediation process that has become fundamental for our social and cultural lives, one must also not lose sight of how the resources provided by this new media environment can be used, misused, distorted and enhanced (see Silverstone 2006: 167). As we have seen, refugees, asylum seekers
and forced migrants are given an opportunity to work as media collaborators and storytellers in a range of arts-based community practices. However, I want to suggest that the celebration of the therapeutic and transformative role of storytelling, which enables refugees and asylum seekers to tackle some of the problems they face (e.g. traumatic experiences, negative stereotypes), loses sight of the importance of the politics of voice as a practice and a value that includes both speaking and listening (Couldry 2010; Grossman and O’Brien 2011). Storytelling can be problematic because the narrative’s tendency towards individualising empathy does not necessarily contextualise the individual’s story in the specificity of culture, history and place. Community, as a result, is often eclipsed by the traumatised individual (see Dawes 2007: 197). The digital storytelling method, for example, ensures that the participants have ownership over the representation of themselves. One of the guiding principles for participatory work at the Center for Digital Storytelling, which regularly works with young refugees and marginalised individuals, is ownership: ‘Storytellers have the right to freedom of expression in representing themselves, in their stories. They should be provided with the space and flexibility to describe what they have experienced, within the parameters or thematic concerns of a given project, and without being coerced or censored’ (see Lockowandt 2013: 17). The constitution of the refugee as a storyteller is, in part, a response to media representations of refugees as a mass or faceless and nameless people. Media narratives tend to focus on groups of refugees as potential invaders, rather than on individual stories of courage or torment. Hence, as argued by Hopkins (2009: 136), using narrative in research about refugee issues has the potential to bring the subject to life and to work as a powerful political weapon in the name of human rights. However, there is also a sense that personal testimonies and stories about refugees’ past lives have done little to challenge the tenets of the broader debate on asylum issues in the UK. As Orton (2009: 7) puts it: ‘Refugees continued to be understood according to their “refugee-ness” rather than all other things that make them a person’ (italics added for emphasis). While individual stories of refugee experience often stem from the creation of safe spaces of dialogue for marginalised groups, they also circulate in a communicative space that rarely extends beyond the scope of the participatory arts workshop and the academy. These individual stories tend to perpetuate the universalising image of the refugee as a displaced person, i.e. as someone ‘who has lost all connection with his/her culture and identity’ (see Malkki 1995: 11) and is no longer unproblematically a citizen of a polity. All in all, participatory arts, with their focus on shared ownership and decision-making between facilitators and participants, have struggled to develop a politics of voice which enables forced migrants to speak up by bringing their individual stories before national and transnational publics. It could be argued, nonetheless, that what is missing, in the context of participatory arts in the UK, are effective strategies for making stories about forced migration heard in the wider national public sphere. As argued in this chapter, the digital storytelling workshop and other art-based uses of storytelling do not effectively contest practices of exclusion of refugees and other types of forced migrants because
they continue to be constituted as an ‘other’ – i.e. a non-citizen excluded from membership of the political community – not necessarily a dangerous one, but a needy, vulnerable and traumatised one. This is also to say that participatory arts involving forced migrants have so far struggled to develop effective strategies of desecuritisation, which are characterised by a different relation from the one of enmity – a relation which is not rooted in the exclusionary logic of security – and does away with the possibility of discriminating between different categories of others (see Aradau 2004: 400). As participatory arts projects struggle to connect forced migrants and their artistic creations to diverse audiences and public spaces, it is not surprising that alternative representations of refugee and asylum experiences have done little to challenge the media and political representation of asylum seeker as security threat to the nation. The 2013 Home Office’s illegal immigration campaign that sanctioned the circulation of ‘go home or face arrest’ van advertisements (Taylor 2013) suggests, in fact, that fears and uncertainties around invasion for illegal immigrants remain a key political issue in British migration management policies.

Note

1 Forced migration refers to people who migrate primarily for human rights reasons (Castles 2003).

References


8 Bordering the indefinite nation
Pakistan, the Taliban and desecuritised religion

Catarina Kinnvall and Ted Svensson

Introduction

Since the general election in February 2008, which marked the end of General Pervez Musharraf’s autocratic rule, Pakistan has faced numerous grave security challenges, none of which are likely to be resolved within the near future. The most acute is the intensified ‘talionisation’ of significant parts of the region bordering Afghanistan. Apart from the unsettling developments in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as regards the military’s ability to counter Taliban militancy, activities of jihadi groups throughout the country and nationalist insurgents in Balochistan remain key security concerns amidst considerable numbers of suicide attacks since 2007. The Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008 and the involvement of the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) resulted in pressure on Pakistan by the international community to take immediate retributive measures, and in January 2013 the permanent standoff between Pakistan and India along the Line of Control intensified when India accused Pakistani troops of having beheaded an Indian soldier. In addition, the killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 by US soldiers covertly operating on Pakistani soil and the extensive use of American drones on Pakistani territory have added further tension to the relations between the US and Pakistan (see Fair 2012a).

To this should be added the devastating consequences of the flooding in July and August 2010 which brought about not only millions of internal refugees (Warraich et al. 2011), but also a precarious balance between the civilian government, the military and militants in efforts to help victims and gain legitimacy for their actions in the affected areas (for an analysis of the international response to the disaster, see Amoore and de Goede 2011). Most commentaries on Pakistan are, accordingly, profoundly negative about imminent positive change and provide bleak pictures in terms of solutions to current security predicaments.

In contemporary Pakistan – and particularly in the co-constitutive discourses on Pakistan as a space that is caught up in security challenges that stem from the territories of India and Afghanistan and as having to bear the burden of the United States’ attempts to annihilate the threat from al-Qaeda activities – notions of nationhood and religious identity are conjoined. Religion and the shared Muslim
identity of the majority of citizens acquire the function as a stabilising anchor both for membership in the nation, i.e. in an institutionalised organic whole, and for the securing of a historical foundation for the nation.

Much of the destabilisation in the form of talibanisation – if understood as ‘Islamization of Pathan [or Pashtun] nationalism’ (Nasr 2004: 205) – can be traced back to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–89), which caused millions of Afghans to flee to Pakistan as refugees, placing severe demands on Pakistan’s economy. This was particularly the case for the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then North West Frontier Province, NWFP) and Balochistan, and their presence encouraged continued Pakistani involvement in the Afghan civil war (1989–2001). The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was deeply involved in Afghan politics in terms of organising, training and arming the Taliban in Afghanistan – the regime that controlled most of the Afghan state from the late 1990s until its ouster in 2001. In addition, thousands of Pakistani young men and boys, together with Afghan youth from the refugee camps, mostly Pashtuns, fought with mujahedeen groups who contested the Soviet occupation and later with the Taliban after the Soviet withdrawal (Malik et al. 2009). The number of religious seminars, so-called madrasas, grew significantly during this period and Amir Rana at the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies has estimated a growth from 576 in 1979 to around 20,000 in 2008 (interview, 9 October 2008; cf. Nasr 2000a: 142–3). Rana also points out that only twelve parties were active in FATA and the NWFP in 1979, while this number had increased to 243 in 1999, all with religiously shaped agendas. Most of these were jihadist or sectarian in their beliefs, working actively against the democratic system.

Another reason for the growth of the Pakistan Taliban movement – also referred to as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – can be traced back to 2003. When Pervez Musharraf, then President of Pakistan, in early 2002 decided to join the Americans in the ‘War on Terror’, many Pakistan terror groups active in Kashmir were banned. These groups had received support from the ISI during the 1990s, which had used them to conduct a proxy war in Kashmir (International Crisis Group 2009; Swami 2007). In 2003, the Kashmir veteran Maulana Ilias Kashmiri – at the time leader of the group Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) – moved to North Waziristan. This was the beginning of Kashmir veterans assembling in FATA to fight foreign troops, among them Masood Azhar, leader of Jaish-e-Mohammad, as well as disillusioned military officers from Kashmir (Crone 2009; cf. Acharya et al. 2009: 96 and Franco 2009: 274ff.). These networks attracted both local Taliban sympathisers and foreign jihadists (from e.g. Chechnya, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) who provided military expertise, while leaders close to al-Qaeda often provided the radical ideology (Crone 2009; International Crisis Group 2009). However, while al-Qaeda and other foreign fighters have a global strategy, the Pakistan Taliban has predominantly been concerned with local or regional interests. Recent yet unsuccessful initiatives have been made to invite the Pakistan Taliban to negotiations and a dialogue on peace (BBC 2013, 2014).

How should we understand the wider context of these developments? When the US decided to shift focus from Iraq back to Afghanistan and to increase its
involvement in Pakistan in 2009, South Asia as a region again caught the attention of the world. The role of Pakistan became a main concern not least because of the increase in terrorist activities, but also because of its weak government and its status as a nuclear power.⁴ The linkage between Afghanistan and Pakistan was made explicit in the concept of ‘AfPak’, which illustrates how US foreign policy came to view Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single interconnected narrative and space (Bashir and Crews 2012: 2, 6). The late Rickard Holbrooke, the US administration’s former Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, popularised the term:

> [f]irst of all, we often call the problem AfPak, as in Afghanistan Pakistan. This is not just an effort to save eight syllables. It is an attempt to indicate and imprint in our DNA the fact that there is one theater of war, straddling an ill-defined border, the Durand Line, and that on the western side of that border, NATO and other forces are able to operate. On the eastern side, it’s the sovereign territory of Pakistan. But it is on the eastern side of this ill-defined border that the international terrorist movement is located.

(2009)

Such depiction is consistent with the portrayal of the Durand Line as an ‘international border’ that – rather than ‘separate people and limit transactions’ – represents ‘the main reason [to] why people interact’ (Dorronsoro 2012: 31). Gilles Dorronsoro writes that ‘[t]he intensification of exchange comes from the fact that resources and capital have different values on each side of the border’, and the border area might hence both be regarded as ‘a transnational space’ and as inducing ‘tribes’ to ‘exploit economic opportunities and gain recognition from their national governments’ (2012: 31, 40).

The AfPak strategy was from the outset criticised in Pakistan and elsewhere, not least because it constitutes a narrative that collapses the distinction between Afghanistan and Pakistan in representations of the border region as a hostile space. It was also a strategy not fully endorsed by the Pakistani military. Although Pakistan has allowed NATO supplies across its territory and provided tacit endorsement to strikes by US drones on its territory (Fair 2012a), the military has resisted US pressure to broaden an offensive against its own militant groups to include Afghan insurgent groups based in Pakistan havens. Increasing resentment against the US drones policy among the general public has further deepened the tension between Washington and the Pakistani government.

The question to be addressed here is the extent to which this situation constitutes a fundamental challenge to the ideational underpinning and territorial integrity of the Pakistani state, and to what degree religion and religious actors are part of shaping and changing these boundary concerns? Is religion an instrument that is being used strategically by Taliban sympathisers, religious movements, the military and other forces to construct and govern the boundaries around Pakistani identity, or do religious elements in fact respond to some other socio-psychological concerns that go beyond strategic manipulation and governance from above?
In this chapter we address these questions by focusing on three aspects of religious discourse in relation to security and governance, where each is discussed within the context of Pakistan. First we consider some general aspects of religion where we emphasise how religion shares a number of features with nationalism and nationhood in its emphasis on borders and boundaries. Second, we discuss how religious discourses and narratives may act as security providers in times of uncertainty; and third, how, why and when religion is likely to become securitised in response to such uncertainty. This is followed by an analysis of the extent to which narratives of security have been governed in relation to global discourses on terror as well as how the securitisation of Islam has served as a powerful linkage between militants and the Pakistani establishment. Here we outline a number of security discourses that constitute components of two larger narratives on how Pakistan is encircled by an unreliable Afghanistan and hostile India, on the one hand, and how FATA and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa became the arena for violent conflict between the NATO/United States and al-Qaeda/the Taliban, on the other. The discussion of religion, and particularly Islam, as a securitising force is counterbalanced by an analysis of the elections in 2008 and 2013 that indicates that the acceptance of religion as a security narrative is less pervasive than commonly argued. Finally, we suggest some ways in which religion can become desecuritised in the region.

Religion in a global world

The rise of the modern state in Europe after the absolute monarchies involved the settlement of people within state boundaries, fostering internal integration and homogenisation in which nationalism was to reflect the will of the people. Such ‘a people’ were seen as a unified force and the ideal was that the boundaries of the state should reflect those of the nation (see Calhoun 1997: 66ff.; Giddens 1984). As a discourse, nationalism thus relies on an essentialised historical narrative of the nation-as-this and the people-as-one, which are supposed to guide social and political action in the name of a particular ethn (being Pakistani for instance) and a certain imagined national space (Pakistan as the locus of Pakistanness) (Torfing 1999). Such discourses on national identity have often been linked to religious justifications and legitimisations and did, in the case of Pakistan, result in the two-nation theory professed by M. A. Jinnah and the Muslim League. This theory, which found realisation in the establishment of Pakistan in 1947 (see Svensson 2013), maintained that Muslims and Hindus constituted separate nations, thus ascribing Muslims and Hindus nationality on the basis of membership in a socio-religious community.

Despite this intricate linkage between religion and nationalism, the religious element in the study of nationalist movements is often neglected or dismissed. One reason for this can be found in the modernist narrative and its wish to depart from the ‘primitive Sacred’ to the ‘modern Secular’ (Casanova 2008). This narrative equates religion with irrationality and superstition, often in opposition to the progress of science, secularism and the inherent rationality
of the Enlightenment (Berger 1999; Haynes 1999). Religion, compared to the nation, is also commonly viewed as being deterritorialised – as a transnational space or movement – thus obscuring how both national and religious identity make claims to a monolithic and abstract identity, i.e. to one stable identity that answers to the need to securitise self and subjectivity (Kinnvall 2004, 2006). Through its persistent confrontation with modernity, religion has increasingly come to be seen as a distinct ‘entity’ that is clearly distinguishable from less religious existential spheres. As a clearly defined historical body it thus becomes a stabilising anchor in an otherwise chaotic and changing world, linking the past and the present to future action.

In Pakistan, generations of rulers have turned to religion in order to unite a divided and composite country. Through processes of Islamisation of the Pakistani state and society, the political elites have often used the narratives provided by religious leaders to divert attention away from other issues at the same time as more resources have been devoted to religious control. This was most evident during the rule of General Zia (1977–88) who turned to Islam to give moral cover to his regime’s increasingly authoritarian policies. Through a process of Islamisation, combined with economic development and strict control of the press and political parties, General Zia attempted to unite a society internally divided and factionalised. Islamisation meant an attempt to introduce traditional Islamic law and social custom into policy-making, making sharia (revealed law) the supreme law of the land as spelt out in an ordinance in June 1988. Islamic study and Pakistan studies were made compulsory for all students at all levels and history books were rewritten in order to create a unified Muslim community. This met with little resistance from the masses, but the educated elite resisted the policies and the execution of Zulfiqar Bhutto (the previous leader) in 1979 was heavily criticised at home and abroad at the same time as the relations with Washington went from bad to worse due to Pakistan’s continued nuclear programme (Malik et al. 2009; Hussain 2008; Piquard 1997; Jalal 1995).

Religious narratives as security providers

The lack of unity in terms of Pakistani citizenship and nationhood that finds expression in talibanisation partly stems from the paradoxical function of religion as a basis for national identity. Since Pakistan was originally instituted on the foundation of the above-mentioned two-nation theory, which suggested that Muslims in British India and the subcontinent’s Princely States constituted a separate nation, the underpinning logic of the state is linked to the idea that its citizens are foremost members of the same collective through their mutual creed. Religious belonging, however, both appears to be inadequate as a fundament for mobilising cohesion and inclusiveness and, simultaneously, transpires as the sole basis for a shared sense of belonging. According to Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, the role of religion in contemporary Pakistan should be understood in relation to the instrumental function it acquired in the late 1970s (2010: 111). Or as Akhtar expresses it:
When the immediate threat of mass upheaval was contained by the hanging of Bhutto in 1979, the ruling military junta led by General Zia proceeded to dismantle the organic bases of popular politics and reassert a state-centred patronage politics that was draped in the idiom of Islam and backed up by the use of coercive force.

(Ibid.)

It is an account that implies that the present securitisation of religion in Pakistan ought not to be regarded as exclusively linked to ‘religious’ groups. Conversely, the dominant institution in Pakistan, the military, has recurrently employed it to secure its own position in society and in the political sphere. It might, consequently, be suggested that religion has functioned, and still functions, as an inclusive, unifying vessel and foundation for Pakistani identity. It has, hence, become the locus of attempts to secure and stabilise – i.e. to govern – the Pakistani nation state. The entwinement of national belonging with notions of survival, and with a need to be vigilant towards state failure and disintegration, turns religion into an unwarranted and undesirable focal point for securitising practices. As a governing process religion is more than a psychological experience based on the individual mind; it has ideological functions that serve oppressive interests. Nomisation, or the order of meaning in society, is never neutral or altogether positive but is mediated through social relations (Vanaik 1997; Haynes 1997).

Nevertheless, for religion to have political consequences it needs to become institutionalised in some form or other and someone, a leader(ship), needs to turn it into an ideology (Laustsen and Waever 2003). But such leadership must not necessarily be religious. As evident in Pakistan, politicians, the military or other prominent spokespersons have justified their policies and doctrines with the aid of institutionalised religious narratives. Within this institutionalisation process religion often comes to refer to bounded entities, such as mosques, gurdwaras, churches, religious organisations or political parties (Haynes 1997). Similar to nationalism, religion supplies existential answers to individuals’ quests for security by providing an essentialised picture of totality, unity and wholeness. At a personal level, the individual is relieved from the responsibility of having to choose as God has set the rules and made them difficult to contest (Juergensmeyer 2000; Mol 1976). Religion thus provides order from the chaos and uncertainty in the world by providing answers to questions concerning existence itself, the external world and human life, the existence of the other, and what self-identity actually is. In providing answers to these questions, a notion of ‘truth’ is often installed, implying an automatic exclusion of those who do not adhere to such a truth (Alam 1999; Bidwai et al. 1996). The question in relation to Pakistan is how successful the idea of the religious nation has been in terms of providing such security and identity?

As Tariq Ali asked in 1983: ‘[t]he question which now increasingly haunts the new generations in Pakistan is not simply whether the country can survive, but whether its existence was necessary in the first place?’ (1983: 9–10). It is a doubt that originates in the query whether the motive and impetus for establishing Pakistan as a state representing South Asia’s Muslims had been exhausted or perhaps never
realised in the first place. What, in other words, is the rationale for a state that departs from its stated objective; what is the legitimacy of a state that is deficient as regards coherence, stability and inclusiveness? Ali’s incredulous position stemmed from three connected dissatisfactions: namely, the state of Pakistan after over three decades of independence, the numerous regional identities that did not receive satisfactory acknowledgement from the state and the discrepancy between the experience of becoming Pakistani for those who deliberately left the United Provinces in North India and those who, without undertaking a journey, one day found themselves in the subject position of being Pakistani citizens (1983: 28). These matters, as demonstrated below, provide the backdrop to a whole range of problems entwined with the contemporary governance of borders.

One consequence of the above is that, throughout Pakistan’s existence, there has been a need to lay down a founding myth, a consistent and totalising underpinning narrative, and to mobilise an operable and legitimate underlying principle. An early attempt is detectable in the introduction of a motion, by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, on the aims and objectives of the Constitution in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in March 1949 (Constituent Assembly 1949). The idea of Pakistan remained somewhat vague at this stage. Here was, however, an opportunity to imbue it with a level of certainty. Liaquat Ali Khan, in the speech that accompanied the motion, said:

Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of this sub-Continent wanted to build up their lives in accordance with the teachings and traditions of Islam, because they wanted to demonstrate to the world that Islam provides a panacea to the many diseases which have crept into the life of humanity today.

(Ibid.)

The statement tried to overwrite prevailing ambiguities – partly emanating from M. A. Jinnah’s insistence on Pakistan as a genuinely secular state in an address to the Constituent Assembly in August 1947 – and to make it transparent that Pakistan ought to be conceived as a natural result and product of a drive to actuate a society and nation by Muslims, for Muslims. The above enunciation hence represented an endeavour to ascribe singularity and fixity to what it meant to be both Muslim and Pakistani. It also projected a uniform conception of Islam. It did not, in other words, allow for hesitation regarding the integral character of the category of the ‘majority’. Then, as today, an imperative aspect of nation building, and of harmonising the nation and the state, was the articulation of these two projects as always-already existing – thus opening up the prospect for contestations in the form of securitising gestures.

**The securitisation of religion**

The nation as always-already existing in conjunction with a uniform conception of Islam cannot be separated from post-colonial conceptions of the secular and the sacred, however. It, moreover, cannot be detached from border thinking
in the immediate region, which is intensely marked by, on the one hand, state disagreements on legitimate territorial expanse – as found in the unresolved conflict over Kashmir and in Afghanistan’s position on the Durand Line as ‘illegitimate’ (on the latter, see Tarzi 2012: 23; Riedel 2012: 138ff.) – and, on the other hand, separatist and autonomy initiatives threatening to break up existing states.

The relationship between religious and secular nationalists began during the colonial era and was played out in relation to the dissolution of colonial empires. The question that has occupied religious and secular nationalists in post-colonial societies has had to do with how the post-colonial state should be constituted, whether it should be secular, democratic, religious or embrace any other defining feature. The fact that many post-colonial societies settled for a secular version of nationhood, seemingly inherited from the colonisers as a way to bridge religious (or other) tension, has simultaneously made the state vulnerable to criticisms of Westernisation, modernisation and moral decay. In Pakistan, the post-colonial state has, as noted above, been caught up in an intricate oscillation between and negotiation of the secular and religious, which is both spawned by and reinforced through border politics.

In response to such ambiguity, religious leaders can talk about the moral and ethical failings of the state as a way to assert their own religious doctrine. In a more fundamentalist sense, this can also morally sanction the use of violence. As Mark Juergensmeyer (2000: 383–4) has noted, in the absence of government approval, religion provides a meta-morality which can disregard regular moral restrictions on the dehumanising of others and even killing. In this sense religion can provide the basis for a new national consciousness and may even be able to provide a new political leadership. At times of structural marginalisation, real or perceived discrimination or other forms of exclusionary practices, the use of violence in the name of religion can seem enormously empowering. Religion thus provides a powerful narrative that is easily securitised by and in relation to competing narratives and fragmented identities.

Looking at Pakistan at its inception in 1947 it could be argued, however, that the manifold articulations of counter-narratives to officially sanctioned statehood confirmed Pakistan as a state construct that could hardly be expected to exhibit a capacity to provide stability, cohesion and a unified pattern of identification. In addition, the discontent expressed by those who experienced displacement and who undertook the journey to the imagined ‘homeland’ for South Asia’s Muslims, the mohajirs, further enhanced the impression that attempts to inscribe the state with a sense of singularity and totality were destined to fail. The Pakistani state has, in other words, since its foundation, been perceived as a problematic amalgamation of fragmented (and fragmenting) identities. It was a view that, by most accounts, was corroborated through the establishment of Bangladesh in 1971. The disintegration of Pakistan into two independent states at first appeared to represent an end to the projection of Islam and Muslim identity as a basis and anchorage for shared nationhood.

However, what – at present – constitutes a break with earlier representations of disjointed nationhood is the tendency to stress ‘Islamist militancy’ as the most
acute and pressing threat to ‘Pakistan’s internal security’ (Fair 2008: 49). Rather than being asked to accentuate the high number of internal cleavages along the fault lines of regional or linguistic identity, we are now urged to identify radicalisation and talibanisation as the most severe threats to the unity and viability of Pakistan. A related shift is the description of Pakistan as the main breeding ground for deep-seated hostility and opposition to the ‘West’. Cathy Elliott has, for instance, drawn attention to how British media while reporting on the assassination of Benazir Bhutto situated ‘a stylized Pakistan’ within a wider ““bi-polar” paradigm’ wherein ‘the “West” and its supposed “Other”’ came to represent distinct poles’ (2009: 250). Within this dichotomous ‘paradigm’, Pakistan is recurrently ‘portrayed as male-dominated, threatening, Islamic, extremist, anti-democratic, backward, and barbarous’ (ibid.). The naming of Pakistan as ‘the most dangerous place in the world’ (The Economist, 2008) must, evidently, be rendered in the light of these wider discursive trends.

As mentioned in the introduction, there has been a growing inclination to entwine the fate of the region with the stability of the rest of the world. It is a tendency that Juan Cole’s depiction of a sequence of violent events epitomises:

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\text{[t]he horrific bombing of the Islamabad Marriott in September 2008, continued attacks on United States and NATO military garrisons in Afghanistan, and assassination attempts on Afghan president Hamid Karzai all point to a Taliban resurgence in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Political instability in both countries continues to cause concern about security threats to NATO societies.} \quad (2009: 221)
\]

Developments in Pakistan as well as along its – in part disputed – borders with Afghanistan and India are portrayed as encapsulating an embryonic potential to destabilise the region as a whole and to engender insecurity and material destruction in distant places. Acharya et al., for example, find it pertinent to designate FATA as ‘the ground zero of global terrorism’ (2009: 95). It is a conception that implies the global impact and expanse of localised circumstances\(^\text{11}\) and it is, accordingly, linked to the assertion that the enactment and repercussions of violence that originate in the tribal areas ‘[spans] the entire world’ (ibid.). Such a diagnosis of Pakistan’s regional and global significance informs and underpins wider patterns of practices and policy-making in the domains of security and geopolitics. It, for example, contains the securitisation of religious narratives in which Islam is portrayed as a potential threat against global modernity.

Religion and place: Space as ‘ungovernable’ and Pakistan as a frontier state

In addition, the view of Pakistan as the world’s most dangerous place is derived from the prevalent narrative of the Pakistani state as equivalent to a space that is ‘ungovernable’ (see Mohammad 2008; Bashir and Crews 2012: 4).\(^\text{12}\) The term ungovernable ought here to be read, with Robina Mohammad, as corresponding
to the notion that Pakistan is marked by an escalating level of violence, that strategically important areas are beyond the reach of ordinary law, regulatory practices and state intervention, and that these two factors produce ‘an unruliness that continually frustrates governmental strategies’ (Mohammad 2008: 571). A related narrative is that of certain parts of Pakistan as amounting to a ‘sanctuary’ and as being ‘out of the reach of the state’ (Acharya et al. 2009: 96; see also Nasr 2000b: 181, 183). The sway of the Pakistani division of the ‘Taliban movement’ has, according to Acharya et al., arrived at a stage where one might even speak of the existence of ‘Taliban fiefdoms and parallel administration’ (2009: 104).

However, in addition to the conception of a declining ability of the state to exercise presence and authority, there is recognition that Pakistan, since the general election in 2008, has been committed to a process of (unstable) democratisation – an impression which was confirmed by the 2013 election (Grare 2013: 990–1). Part of the dilemma that Pakistan faces while trying to enforce presence and influence in the border region adjacent to the Durand Line, as well as in its attempt to mobilise and reproduce a cohesive national identity, is related to what Akhtar has designated ‘the crisis of the frontline state’ (2010: 107). Whereas the epithet ‘frontline state’ in the past referred to Pakistan’s strategic significance as a symbolic and material buffer against communism (Hussain 2005: 115), the character of being a frontline state today derives from its current place within the officially abandoned ‘War on Terror’ (Akhtar 2010: 111; Mohammad 2008: 575ff.). Interestingly, the figuration of Pakistan as a frontier state is articulated at the same time as the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is considered to be increasingly blurred and indistinct. The latter is, on the one hand, an effect of the predicament of establishing a firm bifurcation between us/them, since it is difficult to distinguish with certainty what relation the state has to the Taliban movement on both sides of the border. The exact contours of the ‘architecture of enmity’ are, in other words, vague (see Amoore 2009: 51). On the other hand, it is a consequence of the overlapping and fluid patterns of identification and the continual ‘transgressive’ cross-border mobility of those inhabiting the ‘frontier’ region. The notions of Pakistan as an ungovernable space and a frontline state are intrinsically, yet ambiguously, linked.13

Securitising ‘Islam’: The militants and the Pakistani establishment

At present, Pakistan is host to a diverse number of militant groups active all over the country as well as in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. According to Imtiaz Gul, most Pakistani jihadists are ethnic Pashtuns from FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa who joined the Taliban in Afghanistan during their rule in Kabul (1996–2001) and who then mainly retreated to the Waziristan region of Pakistan (interview). It should be pointed out that the pro-Taliban movement in Pakistan is not united, but rather networked together by an adherence to a common ideology of jihad against ‘infidels’ and their supporters. There are, as established above, two narratives that have come to frame the activities of those groups considered to comprise
the Pakistani branch of the Taliban movement: first, the notion of Pakistan as precariously situated between India and Afghanistan and, secondly, the perception of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as ‘sandwiched’ between the NATO/United States and al-Qaeda/the Taliban.

These narratives are variations of the conceptions of Pakistan as constituting a frontline state and as an ungovernable space. Within both of these, the proper place and meaning of religion transpire as a main point of contestation. It is a contestation that both engages organisations and parties with an explicit religious agenda and the various institutions and agents of the Pakistani state. The Pakistani state, while through its practices and rhetoric expressing a distance from the religiosity of militant organisations operating under the umbrella of talibanisation, simultaneously deploys religion in order to securitise physical borders in the region and to reproduce a more symbolic sense of unity, totality and wholeness. For example, Kashmir confirms this via its function as a non-negotiable symbol of solidarity and commonality among the sub-continent’s Muslims.

The competing notions of Islam, being Muslim and, above all, Pakistan that are disseminated in and through the state’s quest for increased authority in areas considered marginal and ungovernable testify to an intensified portrayal of the balance between religion and the nation in a Pakistani context as a matter of urgent concern. Concrete examples include the killing of the TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud in November 2013 and the murder of Salman Taseer, then Governor of Punjab, as retaliation for his opposition to existing blasphemy laws. It is a matter that is entangled in representations that convey apprehension regarding the future viability, even the future existence, of Pakistan. The civilian government as well as the military establishment embrace religion in order to uphold and ascribe a national consciousness with meaning. These two agents are not, however, seeking to facilitate the emergence of a new political leadership, which would – similar to a Taliban-governed Afghanistan – base its legitimacy in the meta-morality of an institutionalised religion.

The balancing of religion and nationalism is perhaps most evident in the narratives on Pakistan among the military establishment. As argued earlier, religion gains influence through institutionalisation. Hence, there have been a lot of questions raised about the commitment of Pakistan’s security establishment to fight the militant organisations. In particular, the role of the country’s powerful, but shadowy, ISI agency persists as the subject of much debate. Most of this debate has focused on the ISI’s relationship with the Taliban, since the latter were very much a creation of the ISI as part of the army’s doctrine of ‘strategic depth’ (e.g. see Hussain 2005: 200). This doctrine projected Afghanistan as a friendly satellite that would ensure Pakistani forces geographic strategic depth in case of a war with the perennial rival India and India’s much more powerful military. In addition, the army perceived the Taliban as an instrument in Pakistan’s ambition to become a significant player in the new great game for energy resources in Central Asia. While the country ostensibly sided with the US after 9/11, many believe that the army and the ISI have continued to secretly support the Taliban.14 Whereas Pakistani authorities deny such patronage on the
record, numerous senior security personnel have admitted some support for the Taliban (see BBC 2009).

Ayesha Siddiqa has detailed the army’s political and economic involvement in Pakistani civil society (2007). The system of perks and privileges associated with what Siddiqa refers to as milbus (military business) allows the military leadership to get the support of the officer cadre, especially in undertaking actions against the civilian regime. While the discipline serves the interests of the military leadership, it adds to the imbalance between political forces, the fragmented civil society and the armed forces. In this political game, the military emerges as a much more cohesive and stronger force than the other players. It, in addition, allows the military to describe itself as the guardian of ‘Pakistan’s “ideological frontier”’ and to disseminate an image of being ‘the sole institution capable of securing Pakistan against myriad domestic and external threats both to itself and to Pakistan’s citizenry’ (Fair 2011: 574; see also Shaikh 2008: 605). The power and authority of the military, underscored by its financial autonomy, also undermines accountability in the organisation (Siddiqa 2007). The armed forces have historically been bound together with political parties and militant groups in a process of reinforcing each other’s strength. Islam has been a convenient securitising tool to form such unspoken alliances. In this regard it is interesting to note Ishhtiaq Ahmed’s (interview) argument that the Taliban and other jihadist groups are as much against a civilian government as they are against foreign troops, as well as his claim that more important than strengthening counter-terrorism measures is to strengthen law enforcement agencies and work to empower what he calls the ‘mainstream mullah’ to speak out against suicide bombings.

He thus hints at a need to desecuritise religion – i.e. religion needs to be removed from the realm of the politics of existential survival to facilitate cooperative problem-solving (Buzan et al. 1998; Sheehan 2005) – in order to establish a governable space in which the frontier border, and the legitimating grounds of the Pakistani nation state, are no longer perceived as inherently contested. Such desecuritisation would vitiate the legitimacy of religion as a securitising force for both Taliban recruitment and military alliances with the Taliban.\(^\text{15}\)

In addition there is a need to seriously address the role of Kashmir and India in this process. In the interviews conducted for this chapter, there was common agreement that neither of these could remain neglected if a curtailment of the influence of securitised religion in Pakistan is deemed desirable. Here it is important to take seriously Gul’s argument that there is a need to approach Pakistan with at least some degree of trust as mistrust ‘only encourages those elements within the Pakistani establishment who are still driven by the dreams of pan-Islamism and who certainly sympathize with, if not support, the al Qaida and Taliban resistance against western imperialism’ (2009: 87).

**Religion vs. secularism: The 2008 and 2013 elections**

To the above image of Pakistan as a fragile, curtailed and contested state, it is necessary to append the tentative shift towards a democratic political system
that has occurred during the last six years. The military dictatorship of Pervez Musharraf, which was forcibly installed through a coup in 1999, came to an end after the general election that was held in February 2008 (for details, see Adeney 2009). It is a development that – although the period after has borne witness to an uncertain and discordant process of democratisation (see Fair 2011: 588; Shah 2013: 10ff.) – provides the basis for a modicum of optimism. Akhtar, for example, maintained that, in the wake of the crumbling of military rule, the ‘mainstream political parties’ found themselves in a situation where they were ‘presented with a historic opportunity to restructure the oligarchic system of power’ (2010: 106). The elections in May 2013 confirmed this when Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), through peaceful and democratic methods, replaced the incumbent government, led by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).

An essential constituent of the aforementioned narrative on Pakistan as being ungovernable is the seeming discrepancy and distance between a government that professes secularism and secular ideals and a populace that is sympathetic towards the status of religion as a nation-bearing ethos. However, such an understanding was, to some extent, diluted by the election result in 2008. In divergence from the impression of an intensified popularity and influence of militant organisations as well as religious parties, the election resulted in a reduction in votes for the alliance of religious parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) (Adeney 2009: 161; see also Akhtar 2010: 116; Shapiro and Fair 2009/10: 82). In 2013, religious parties were again only marginal actors, while the former cricket player Imran Khan’s Tehrik-e-Insaaf became the third largest party after PML-N and PPP (Journal of Democracy 2013).

In contrast to a construal of present trends in Pakistan that accentuates the centrality of religion in acts of securitisation, the election outcomes testify to an attenuated and even marginalised position for those who propagate a Pakistani state that foremost embodies religious ideals. The electorate, conversely, has expressed a desire for a state that does not depart from a mixture of religious and secular expressions. Evidently, while considering what the two elections and the behaviour of the electorate signify – especially in relation to the 2008 election – the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 needs to be taken into account.

To further complicate the picture, one might insert Cole’s remark that accounts disseminating a notion of Pakistan and Afghanistan as principally marked by the rise in terrorist and extremist activities tend to ‘deeply distort the two complex societies’, as it discounts that ‘most people in both countries are not rigid Muslim fundamentalists’ (2009: 221). To this he adds that the majority of violent challenges to the Pakistani state are not, in any significant way, linked to Islam (2009: 229). Rather than stressing the role of religion in the ongoing process of talibaniisation, Cole insists that it is a development that ought to be grasped as, in part, the effect of a ‘rural poverty’ that markedly differs from conditions in Pakistan’s urban areas (2009: 231). Nonetheless, it might be worth enriching Cole’s claim, by adding insights provided by Fair on the recruitment to militant outfits or so-called askari tanzeemat (2008). In her study, the scenario that emerges is that those who join militant organisations with an Islamist profile tend to be well educated in
comparison with wider patterns of education in Pakistan, that most of them are young men who either become militants directly after finishing school or have experienced a period of unemployment and, finally, that these young men are not foremost drawn from the madrasa education system (ibid.).

As argued by Ashgar Ali Engineer (2009), the link between madrasas and terrorist activities is not entirely clear and much evidence relies on anecdotal accounts (cf. Nasr 2000a: 140). A study by the Pakistan Institute of Peace (Rana 2009) shows, for instance, that most of the Pakistani madrasas blame the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan for suicide bombings in Pakistan. However, a majority of them back the democratic process in the country and a peaceful solution to the Kashmir issue. There is also a need to distinguish between those who support a movement and those who join it (ibid.; see also Grare 2013: 994). In addition, joining is not the same as acting to support violence, which, in turn, is not the same as committing violence. Most of the people joining Islamic political movements in Pakistan do it as an act of support rather than committing violence themselves (Rana 2009). Nevertheless, religion is often used to rationalise violence, and violence becomes strategic as much as a psychological choice to correct a perceived or stated sense of deprivation, grievance or injustice. In sum, it can be argued that, in the present case, religion need not be securitised even as it constitutes a powerful defining identity, but it can provide a space for confronting societal elements that insist on homogeneous, exclusive interpretations.

**Constructing security: The desecuritisation of religion in Pakistan**

If viewed in the light of nation and state building since independence, the present challenges faced by Pakistan represent a continuation of destabilising factors and dynamics rather than the manifestation of entirely novel types of antagonism. However, two remarkable aspects of the ongoing wave of Talibanisation are the vacillating relation the army has with the Taliban movement and the contestation regarding the meaning and place of religion in the re/production of a coherent national consciousness. We, in addition, need to be wary – as the 2008 and 2013 election results imply – about accepting depictions of contemporary Pakistan as caught up in widespread radicalisation, and regarding accounts that foremost emphasise the madrasa education system as a base for recruitment to militant organisations.

What, in conclusion, does an analysis of Pakistan tell us about the governance of borders and the possibility of securitising religion? What does it signal regarding whether we should consider religion as an instrument used for strategic considerations or if it is more accurately construed as closely related to socio-psychological aspects of the securitisation of identity? Our study suggests that it is important to acknowledge that religion is a powerful, constitutive and perhaps definitive component of culture. In this sense modernity has not been able to destroy religious belief systems in Pakistan and elsewhere despite the expectations of some modernist theoreticians. The problem hence is not religion
per se, but the securitisation of religion in the process of governing borders. Such borders include physical borders and frontiers in the state’s quest for increased authority in areas considered marginal and ungovernable. But they also involve the borders around Islam itself and the meaning of being Muslim and Pakistani. In this sense, it is not a question of either/or as securitised religion, on the one hand, plays into the contestation between competing societal forces as outlined above, often in quite an instrumental sense, while it, on the other, tends to provide a socio-psychological response to those who experience a lack of alternatives or access to ‘mainstream’ society.

Such feelings of vulnerability are related to perceived injustices, lack of education and social opportunities and can only be addressed through structural reform (cf. Blair et al. 2013). In other words, desecuritisation of religion does not mean obliteration of religion, it means removing it from the realm of security using religious and other means to do so. It implies dismantling the narratives in which the militarisation of Islamic doctrine is justified and limited in much public discourse. It also, however, includes engaging those societal forces able to provide alternative religious scenarios to the Taliban extreme, such as Ahmed’s ‘mainstream mullahs’ and madrasas that support democratisation (see also Oldenburg 2010: 159). However, the desecuritisation of Islam in Pakistan will be difficult unless serious attempts are made to address the intricate issues of Kashmir, the enduring antagonistic relation with India and the ambiguities of the Durand Line as a recognised and viable state border. These are, evidently, issues that go beyond the perceived or real borders of Pakistan and, hence, involve a need to consider how to produce a regional security environment that does not induce competing national discourses foremost tinted by essentialised and securitised versions of religion.

Notes

1 Some parts of this study are based upon a study visit report and interviews conducted by Kinnvall within an EU FP7-funded project titled EURASIA-NET. The interviews were conducted with Director Amir Rana, Pakistan Institute of Peace; Professor Ishtiaq Ahmed at the Department of International Relations at the Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad; Imtiaz Gul, chairman of the independent Center for Research and Security Studies in Islamabad; Javaid Sadiq, editor of the Urdu National News.

2 By Aqil Shah described as ‘hybridized authoritarianism’ (2003).

3 Such a reading is consonant with Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair’s suggestions that ‘[t]he Pakistani Taliban … is interested in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan’ and that the immediate objective of this ‘loose network of tribal-based Pakistani militants’ is the forced departure of the ‘Pakistani military’ from FATA (2009/10: 86). It, however, also needs to be stressed that any attempt at a strict separation between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban builds on the assumption that the Durand Line resembles a ‘proper border’, a perspective not necessarily shared by those who live in ‘the Pashtun areas along the border’ (Franco 2009: 269). Claudio Franco instead describes the two Taliban fractions as being participants to ‘a regional, transnational conflict with Pashtun roots’ (2009: 289).

4 For some it equalled ‘a crucible of terror and the most dangerous country in the world’ (Riedel 2012: 2).
5 Here it ought to be stressed, with Shapiro and Fair (2009/10: 85ff.), that al-Qaeda and the Taliban are distinct from each other. What we refer to is the prevalent tendency to collapse such a distinction.

6 There is, however, a shortage of empirical material that allows for certainty regarding the extent of ‘Islamisation’ in key spheres of Pakistani society (Fair 2012b: 444).

7 Securitisation is here, together with Buzan et al. (1998), understood as the process in which an issue, once presented and accepted as an existential threat, prompts reactions outside the normal bounds of political procedure. To securitise an issue that has not previously been viewed in security terms is to challenge society to promote its value by committing greater resources to solving the related problems. To desecuritise an issue, in contrast, means removing it from the realm of the politics of existential survival, thus making it easier to resolve through cooperative means of problem solving (Sheehan 2005: 54).

8 To be ontologically secure and to avoid existential anxiety means, according to Anthony Giddens (1991: 51ff.), that we can provide ‘answers’ to fundamental existential questions (for detailed discussion, see Kinnvall 2004; 2006).

9 In the Pakistani context, this is particularly worrisome owing to the entrenched character of numerous instances of intergroup rivalry – perhaps best exemplified by the sectarian violence between Sunni and Shiite groups (see Nasr 2000a, 2000b).

10 Or, as Farzana Shaikh, to encourage a recognition of how ‘[t]he shifts from Pakistani nationalism … to Islamic cultural nationalism and further to international “shariati” cultural (trans)nationalism’ represent the most significant ones ‘in Pakistani nationalism since independence’ (2008: 595). Particularly as it potentially reinforces and augments a constitutive ambivalence, namely, is the source of state authority and legitimacy situated in the domestic, the transnational or the universal (2008: 595, 597)?

11 These should not, however, be entirely dissociated from the overall pattern of challenges to the state from a multitude of groups, including Balochi, Sindhi and Pashtun nationalism (see Akhtar 2010: 110) nor from the sectarian violence that went through a worrying growth during the 1980s and 1990s (see Nasr 2000a, 2000b).

12 Amoore and de Goede have suggested that these ‘ungovernable’ spaces are made ‘governable’ via the ‘twin strategies of drone attacks and financial targeting’ (2011: 196).

13 While considering the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan, we cannot disregard the ‘porosity’ and lack of impermeability of the actual border (see Marsden 2008). However, according to Magnus Marsden, the border has, since 2001, undergone a process whereby it has attained a certain degree of fixity and ‘closure’ – a development that, to some extent, has come to impede ‘[t]he region’s interconnected frontier economy’ (2008: 227).

14 Fair notes a parallel incongruity, i.e. the seeming inconsistency between Pakistan’s support for what she refers to as ‘“Kashmir” groups’ and its attempt to quell ‘its own domestic Islamist militants’ (2011: 571).

15 Here, with Blair et al., it needs to be acknowledged that it appears as if ‘poor Pakistanis dislike militant groups more than their middle-class counterparts’ and that this disapproval ‘is likely driven by exposure to the externalities of militant violence’ and hence ‘stronger among the urban poor’ (2013: 46).

16 In a diverging analysis, Shapiro and Fair observe that in the urban setting there does not seem to be a strong correlation between poverty and support for militant groups (2009/10; see also Blair et al. 2013). To grasp the grounds for ‘public support for militant organizations’, they insist that we need to recognise that it is spawned both by a consideration of ‘political incentives and a perception of the strategic environment’ (Shapiro and Fair 2009/10: 116).

17 Amin Tarzi has e.g. argued that ‘an initial step to legitimize the border would be the incorporation of FATA into Pakistan proper’, as it ‘would stop Afghan claims that Pashtuns living in FATA are not full Pakistani citizens’ and ‘make it more difficult for the … insurgents and terrorists to incubate in the region’ (2012: 28).
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9 New political community and governance at the top of the world
Spatiality, affinity and security in the Arctic

Annika Bergman Rosamond and Ben Rosamond

Introduction

The Arctic region, the area of the Earth’s surface lying north of the Arctic Circle (latitude 66° 33’ N), covers a region of some 20 million km², much of which remains uninhabitable. The territorial claims of the six Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Russia and the United States) formally extend only to zones of 200 nautical miles beyond their coasts.1 Much of the space of the Arctic is thus beyond the formal jurisdiction of nation states. Part of the Arctic is borderless because ‘no country or group of countries have sovereignty over the North Pole or the Arctic Ocean around it’ (European Commission 2008: 1). However, the so-called ‘High North’ is also embedded within orthodox bordering processes in which the Arctic coastal states have sought to demarcate and expand upon their most northern frontiers. The geopolitics of the Arctic is, on the face of it, classically Westphalian – what Strandsbjerg (2012) calls the ‘politics of sovereign control’. As such, it reproduces certain historical and communitarian bordering practices and narratives that sit within a conventionally realist conception of geopolitical rivalry. Indeed the idea that the Arctic region is embroiled in a struggle among a group of states seeking to secure territorial claims has been the subject of much attention from both academia and the media. This ‘scramble for the Arctic’ (Sale and Potapov 2009) – a phrase that deliberately and vividly evokes the ‘scramble for Africa’ among European colonial powers between 1880 and the outbreak of the First World War – is usually presented as a classic case of inter-state competition over untapped natural resource endowments and navigation rights that have become accessible following the melting of sea ice in the context of climate change. Moreover, the Arctic is manifestly the site of state practices that have come to be understood in terms of ‘securitisation’ (Buzan et al. 1998).

As Kinnvall and Svensson contend in this volume, ‘borders are often rooted in historically contingent practices and discourses that continue to be related to national ideologies and identities in which emotional bordering tends to be loaded into national celebrations’. This is not to suggest that territorial expansion into Arctic space is the emotional signifier of all people living in Canada, Norway or Russia, but rather that the contemporary foreign policy identities of
these countries are increasingly couched within Arctic language and bordering practices. We explore some examples of this phenomenon below. But, at the same time, it is important to recognise that the depiction of Arctic geopolitics as Westphalian geopolitics tends to provoke particular conceptualisations of both the problems and challenges that exist in the region on the one hand, and the available solution sets on the other. The recognition that Arctic space is being imagined and shaped through geopolitical understandings that, while dominant and perhaps commonsensical, remain contingent is an important analytical and normative step. In short, the Arctic poses opportunities for scholarship that seeks to problematise borders in favour of new forms of governance and community, by moving away from ‘an exclusive and primary concern with conventional nation state borders … to a concern with borders being dispersed throughout society’ (Perkins and Rumford 2013: 267), or indeed beyond national society.

Political community is historically associated with sovereign territoriality, bounded space and a distinct citizenry, rather than vast open landmasses that are only partly inhabitable. However, community takes many shapes and forms—some of which stretch beyond national frontiers and solidarities. The Nordic region is an example of a transnational community or ‘regional international society’ (Schouenborg 2012) which rests on shared values and points of identification beyond borders. The Arctic, despite its distinct geography and relative emptiness, has since the end of the Cold War undergone a period of institutionalisation (Bergman Rosamond 2011), similar to that of the Nordic states, even if it is too early to talk about a shared overarching Arctic identity. The bareness of the Arctic and the scarcity of human beings have not prevented regional and indigenous governance projects from emerging or transnational loyalties and affinities from being recognised (Arctic Governance Project 2010: 2). If the Arctic region is home to various experiments in transnational governance, then it is at the same time characterised by a variety of subnational challenges to the purity of Westphalian sovereignty.

Oran Young captures something of the distinctiveness of the Arctic when he refers to it as a ‘region of peripheries’ (Young 2005: 9). We might think of this peripheral property of the Arctic in two senses. The first is purely territorial in that—except for Iceland—it is the ‘edges’ or frontier zones of extant nation states that constitute Arctic international space. The second sense is societal in that the Arctic regions of the states in question are home to indigenous or ‘first nations’ populations. These populations not only stand as peripheral groups within their own countries; they are also separated by existing national borders. The Inuit people live across three countries—Greenland, Canada and the United States (Alaska). The formal status of Inuit populations has come to be recognised within the structures of Canadian federalism. The Inuit language is the official language of the Northwest Territories (NWT) and the northernmost part of the NWT, Nunavut, was formally granted territory status in 1999. Nunavut’s total area (over 2 million km²) is around the size of Western Europe, yet it houses a population of a little over 33,000. In a similar vein, the European Arctic region of Sápmi, a space associated with the Sami people, covers the territories of Norway, Sweden,
Finland and Russia. The three Nordic countries all house Sami parliaments, even though the proportion of Sami people within the transnational region is little more than 5 per cent of the total.

The dialectic between Arctic transnationalism and indigenous peoples’ subnationalism might be thought of as the starting point for alternative conceptions of both the nature of Arctic space and the substance of its normative content (i.e. which values are embodied by Arctic space). Such alternative understandings of space, community and governance may be enabled and enhanced by growing acceptance of politicisation around anthropogenic climate change, the effects of which on the Arctic region are destabilising of existing geopolitical settlements (Luedtke and Howkins 2012) and potentially spectacular in ecological terms. While melting sea ice in the region can be read as a driver of the neo-Westphalian geopolitics described above (Masters 2013) or as a rationale for the creation of liberal institutionalist regimes of governance in the region (Berkman and Young 2009), the physical and symbolic effects of Arctic warming provide some impetus for new spatial imaginaries of the Arctic (Gerhardt et al. 2010) that go beyond standard anarchic or institutionalised conceptions of international space, by giving such projects both a normative and a techno-scientific hook on which to hang.

The Arctic harbours untapped natural resources, melting ice blocks and new sea routes connecting the world in very concrete borderless ways. As suggested already, it is one of the most visible sites of anthropogenic climate change, where the very physical character of the region would seem to be in a period of transformation. There are roughly 4 million inhabitants of the Arctic, but they are spread out across a vast region, much of which remains uninhabitable. In this chapter we take these features and the foregoing discussion as a starting point for two related discussions. The first part of the chapter considers the particular problems that would attend any attempt to think about the creation of a sense of political community across a space defined by sparseness and disconnection as well as squabbles over landmass and natural resources. Of course, the Arctic is not unique as a space with a relatively small human population scattered over a large and partially uninhabitable area that falls within a number of actual and potential jurisdictions (Kotkin 2007; Sternberg 2014). That said, it does provide a striking example of how those geopolitical characteristics intersect with manifestly physical changes to the environmental characteristics of a governable space. The discussion commences by situating the Arctic within a historical and strategic context and then moves on to unpack the distinctiveness and subjectivities of the unravelling securitisation discourses and practices that are presently associated with the Arctic. As hinted above, we propose that the arguments for rethinking political community in the Arctic are strong since a sense of common affiliation potentially offsets discourses and practices of securitisation – ‘the move out of the logic of normal politics’ (Hansen 2012: 528) and desecuritisation – ‘the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 4). The key insight of the Copenhagen School approach to security studies is that security and associated concepts such as ‘threat’ are not objective or material givens, but are rather constructions that come into
being though speech acts. So a referent object (say the ‘Arctic’) becomes securitised when securitising agents utilise language suggesting that the object has become threatened/exceptional or has entered into a state of emergency. Securitisation requires a relevant audience to be persuaded by the claims of the securitising agent and for consequent practices and behaviour to reflect and reproduce this constructed norm. Desecuritisation is thus this process in reverse. Securitisation is a key mechanism in the reproduction of a realist logic of international society. It follows that the securitisation of the Arctic is constitutive and reproductive of realist-like state behaviour and of the reinforcement of Westphalian imaginaries in and for the region. We suggest, as a result, that any attempt to reconfigure the Arctic normatively needs to contemplate the region as a shared social space rather than simply a geopolitical hotspot.

The second part of the chapter tackles issues of governance. Political science and political theory typically treat governance as something that occurs once the spatial parameters of the territory to be governed have been settled. Foucauldian and other critical approaches tell us something different that is highlighted perfectly by the Arctic case: that the negotiation of the spatialities of governance is an ongoing process – and that this is a process that is integral to the practice of governance itself. This, we argue, has two implications. The first is that the practices of the ongoing international politics of the Arctic are constitutive of the Arctic’s spatiality and identity. The second is that this process of spatialisation limits (and enables) the range of possible forms of community, affiliation and citizenship that might be able to arise in the region. However, the assumption that the emergence of social links between people is possible, even though those people live very far from one another and exist within distinct jurisdictions, creates possibilities for the imagination of formation of new forms of community.

The geography and historical context of the Arctic

The Arctic region falls within the territorial jurisdiction of eight countries: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. However, only Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and USA are Arctic coastal states, while Finland, Iceland and Sweden lack such status and, as such, they have been excluded from certain high-level talks. However, these jurisdictions do not cover the full extent of Arctic territory. The territorial claims of the Arctic states formally extend only to zones of 200 nautical beyond their coasts. This means that the North Pole and the surrounding area of the Arctic Ocean is not part of any state. As we briefly return to below, this arrangement is potentially challenged on the basis of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the resultant geopolitical manoeuvrings have been one source of the recent academic and media interest in the Arctic region.

The Arctic region was for long associated with polar exploration, the quest for navigable sea routes across northern seas and attempts to survey and document the uniqueness of its vast land and ice mass. As an imaginary, it was an empty space rather than being territorially bounded and institutionally connected. During
the Cold War, the circumpolar north was caught up in the Westphalian bipolarity that defined the international system at the time. As is the case today, there were attempts to extract natural resources during that period as well (Archer and Scrivener 1986), even if the current scramble for oil and gas exceeds equivalent efforts during the Cold War. There were few attempts to lock the Arctic into institutional arrangements during the Cold War, thus disabling the emergence of new forms of transnational community and identity. Nor were there many attempts to give voice to indigenous peoples in the region (Palosaari and Möller 2003: 259). Nonetheless, the 1980s witnessed a period of reduced rivalry and the emergence of détente in the Arctic, with the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev urging the two superpowers to peacefully settle their differences in the circumpolar north. Gorbachev’s (1987) vision for the Arctic was to privilege ‘human interests’ and to ensure that a ‘zone of peace’ would be established. His normative ideas about stability, environmental protection and peaceful governability on top of the world are suggestive of post-Westphalian norms having some presence in the Arctic prior to the end of the Cold War.

The Arctic: The site of (de)securitising discourses and practices

The Arctic is often imagined as a site of tension and geopolitical quests for sovereign expansion and unexplored natural resources. The Arctic, moreover, is habitually constructed as a space of business opportunity or an emergent conflict zone. Such arguments are a form of closure that leaves little room for critical analysis of space, identity, security and desecuritisation.

Such imaginaries are often narrated in singular realist-inspired language that pays little attention to normative drives for the constitution of shared social spaces and points of identification. To assume that such imaginaries are permanently sedimented in people’s minds is detrimental to the reconstitution of the Arctic as a dialogic community (Linklater 1998). However, as Lene Hansen has argued, certain ‘[s]ecuritisations, which have become institutionalised to such an extent that they no longer are in need of explicit articulations to justify their status, pose a particular challenge for desecuritisation attempts’ (Hansen 2012: 532). The normative task is to ensure that such articulations do not permanently sediment themselves in discourse and practice. The Arctic is both an expression of securitising speech acts as well as demilitarisation and new forms of governance. Palosaari and Möller (2003: 255) deliver a balanced picture of the Arctic by defining it as a ‘story’ defined by ‘marginality, centrality, securitisation and desecuritisation, militarisation and demilitarisation’. There are signs of states seeking to expand their military presence in the Arctic, with Russia, for example, positioning an Arctic brigade on the Kola peninsula to safeguard its oil and gas interests (Daily Telegraph 2011). American scholar Scott Borgerson (2008: 65) reflects on the sovereign disputes and anarchical features of the Arctic by defining it as a ‘coming anarchy’, and argues that the absence of an Arctic international treaty that ‘guarantees an orderly and collective approach to extracting the
region’s wealth’ is the reason for this (Borgerson 2008: 67). Moreover, the five principal Arctic coastal states have, as we have noted above, sought to expand their entitlement to their continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean so as to gain access to the natural resources that might be found above or below the seabed. The competing claims for territorial gains have been represented in various media outlets in archetypical Westphalian language, thus reproducing and sustaining an impression of the Arctic being the site only of a moment of securitisation, rather than of potentially new forms of governance and commonalty (Politiken 2009; Rusnet 2009; Reuters UK 2009; Barents Observer 2009; Guardian, 13 May 2009; New York Times, 28 March 2009; Daily Telegraph, 14 August 2007). The British newspaper the Daily Telegraph wrote in 2011 that ‘Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway are all locked in a race to grab a slice of the northern wilderness after US researchers predicted that global warming might leave the area ice-free, and therefore more easily navigable and explored, as early as 2030’. One of the most alarmist securitising stories is Russia’s symbolic decision to plant its nation’s titanium flag on the Arctic seabed in 2007, as way of laying claim to resources in the Arctic, an action that international media outlets have at times used to illustrate the tense geopolitical situation in the circumpolar north (Bergman Rosamond 2011). Denmark has engaged in such symbolic acts by planting its national flag on the barren, uninhabited 1.3km2 Hans Island – a territory that is also claimed by Canada. A Russian security strategy titled ‘Principles for Russian Politics in the Arctic in the period to 2020’ was launched in 2009 in which Russia warned that the vast oil and gas resources in the Arctic could lead to conflicts and that ‘military force cannot be ruled out’ (cited in The Times 2009).

Russia has developed an Arctic brigade for the purpose of defending its natural reserves in the High North. The brigade is expected to be fully operational in 2015 (Daily Telegraph 2011) and in 2013 Russia engaged in explicit securitisation by reopening a Soviet airbase on the Novosibirsk Islands in the Arctic (BBC News Europe 2013: 1). This, however, should be countered by the efforts by Russia and Norway to settle their disputes concerning their respective geographical and natural reserve claims in the Barents Sea (New York Times 2010). Moreover, Vladimir Putin (then Prime Minister) announced in the same year that ‘it is imperative to keep the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation’ and that disputes can be resolved by abiding with international law (cited in Deutsche Welle, 23 September 2010). The Kremlin has also claimed ownership of the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater ridge that runs for 1800 km across the Arctic Ocean. In 2010, in an effort to convince the United Nations that Russia is the rightful owner of a large proportion of the Lomonosov Ridge, its government submitted an application to the UN Commission for the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2012 to extend its continental shelf. Canada has made similar claims to the Lomonosov Ridge. However, in 2010 both claimants agreed that the UN should settle their dispute over the ‘resource-rich underwater Arctic mountain range … Lomonosov Ridge’ (BBC News 2010). Denmark and Norway have also indicated their intention to extend their parts of the Lomonosov Ridge.
On its website Al Jazeera America reported on the Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird’s announcement that Canada plans to expand its territorial base in the Arctic in an effort to maximise its economic profits through the extraction of resources, leading Russia and President Putin to react harshly. In Baird’s words: ‘Obtaining international recognition for the outer limits of our continental shelf … will be vital to the future development of Canada’s offshore resources … Canada is going to fight to assert its sovereignty in the north but I think we will be good neighbors in doing so’ (Al Jazeera America 2013: 1). Canada has even laid jurisdictional claim to the North Pole.

The brief empirical overview above sustains our initial claim that the Arctic coastal states reproduce certain historical and communitarian bordering practices and discourses that sit within a conventionally realist conception of geopolitical narratives. However, criticisms have been launched against such conflict narratives. For example, Juha Käpylä and Harri Mikkola (2013: 2) argue that the Arctic is embedded within ‘relatively well-functioning regional and international governance mechanisms’ that ‘further defuse the interstate conflict potential in the region’ and that it ‘is most likely to be related to complex global dynamics that may spill over to the region’. This suggests that there is strong interconnectedness between the Arctic and global developments more broadly. Holtsmark and Smith-Windsor (2009: 25) warn against ‘alarmism’ in constituting the Arctic security narrative. In their words, ‘all actors … should be aware of the need to avoid unfounded alarmism in discussions of High North security issues. All Arctic powers … have expressed their full support for existing legal regimes and governance structures’ (2009: 25). James Stavridis, a retired US Navy admiral and Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, makes a similar claim:

The likelihood of a conventional offensive military operation in the Arctic is very low, despite some commentators’ overheated rhetoric. While there are many diplomatic and ecological challenges, the odds are good that the international community will eventually find its way to a true zone of cooperation around the Arctic Circle and manage to avoid turning the region – the last frontier on Earth – into a zone of needless conflict. But there are issues that must be addressed as competition rises in the High North if we are to avoid high tension.

(Stavridis 2013: 1)

By privileging human interests and promoting multilevel forms of governance over ‘overheated rhetoric’ deep-seated bordering practices can be challenged and pockets of cosmopolitanism established. This involves promoting desecuritisations that ‘transform the identities and interests of self and others by unpacking ‘the friend-enemy distinction possibly to the point of a whole-scale transformation where “the enemy” shreds its identity, as was the case with the Soviet Union as the Cold War ended’ (Hansen 2012: 236). Rather than constructing the Arctic as a strategic battleground for sovereign advancements alone, and as such
reproducing naturalised and orthodox understandings of bordering, space, identity and security, it is important to view the squabble for the Arctic as a temporary speech act or indeed the manufacture of a ‘state of exception’ that can, in turn, be moved out of the emergency zone into a political comfort zone. The normatively charged question then is whether ‘should we treat this as a matter of danger and exceptionality or is it not worthy of this labelling?’ (Hansen 2012: 546).

To desecuritise the Arctic in this fashion also entails giving voice to those who might have felt excommunicated from various high politics ventures, with emphasis on indigenous people, which is a key thesis in Linklater’s (1998) new political community project. This involves not only pursuing dialogue across borders and promoting the rights of indigenous people but also, crucially, engaging in the mutual ‘act of listening’ (Robinson 2011) to a greater extent. It is central that scholarship and practice can be criticised for failing to take on board with any degree of seriousness the sentiments of the actual people who are affected by key decision-making processes. So far international studies scholarship has only in some limited sense explored the ethical concerns of the actual peoples of the Arctic. This might be because there are so few people living in the Arctic, even if millions of people, if not the world in its entirety, are affected by anthropogenic climate change and new strategic and commercial developments in the area. A normative research agenda then would need to research the potential for and theorise transnational solidarities among the indigenous peoples of the Arctic as well as those between national policy-makers across borders. This could counter the neo-colonial ‘scramble for the Arctic’ (Sale and Potapov 2009) and inter-state competition over untapped natural resource endowments and navigation rights.

Indigenous groups increasingly team up, as part of a bottom–up attempt to challenge prevailing securitising practices, in particular to question the squabble for oil and other minerals in the Arctic. To this end the indigenous people of the Arctic issued a ‘Joint Statement of Indigenous solidarity for Arctic Protection’ in 2013:

We the Peoples of the North have for too long experienced the oppression of our Peoples and the barbaric destruction of our land. It is time that we join forces and demand that the oil companies and the Arctic States change their path and start to listen to the voices of the Indigenous Peoples residing in these lands … Our culture and history cannot be bought off and replaced with pipelines and drill rigs.

(Joint Statement 2013: 1)

Although not explicitly stated in the text, the indigenous peoples seem concerned about their ontological security, or ‘security of being’ (Kinnvall 2004) as they charge the Arctic states with the destruction of their lifestyles and senses of indigenous selves. In their words: ‘our way of living defines who we are and we will stand up and fight for our nature and environment’ (Joint Statement 2013: 1). As Catarina Kinnvall and Paul Nesbitt-Larking (2013: 347) contend, ‘the securitisation of borders is not simply about manipulating and mobilising opinion
but also describes the process through which individuals and groups struggle to cope with uncertainty and insecurities. The commercial interests of various oil companies and mining firms and the ‘scramble for the Arctic’ more broadly are not only inconsistent with indigenous self-identities, but also challenge their sense of future certainty. The Arctic, then, needs to be constituted within language of human security and rights, embracing city dwellers, regional communities and indigenous peoples alike. To embed the Arctic within such notions of security and rights requires scholars and practitioners to think of the Arctic as a site of dialogue, tied together through new loyalties and institutions (Bergman Rosamond 2011). Moreover, there needs to be an ‘identification of critical questions regarding needs for governance, the formulation of normative guidelines or principles pertaining to governance’ (Arctic Governance Project 2010: 2). The Arctic Council (AC) is central here since it embraces all the Arctic states and representatives from the indigenous communities (Bergman Rosamond 2011). It has thus acquired the identity of an international organisation equipped with a certain measure of moral agency (Erskine 2003). Its self-narrative is that of a collective agent that ‘has proved to be an important forum for increased mutual understanding and cooperation in the circumpolar area and has provided a major contribution into the well-being of the inhabitants of the Arctic’ (Arctic Foreign Ministers 2006). However, Rikard Bengtsson (2011: 59) contends that although the AC is ‘an all-inclusive’ institution, it has a ‘weak structure, which means that Arctic issues run an inherent risk of being caught in geopolitical logics applied by great powers, and cannot project attention to all the issues within its jurisdiction’. Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt promotes a liberal conception of the AC by noting that, ‘in the Arctic, we have now moved from accelerating confrontation to warm cooperation’ (Government Offices of Sweden 2011: 1).

The governance of Arctic space

In this section we build upon the previous discussion to consider what might be termed the ‘spatial politics’ of the Arctic. The key point here is to acknowledge that the question of the governance of the Arctic is not simply a matter of competing technical and normative visions of how to regulate, order, control and distribute power within the region. These are not unimportant matters, of course, and they are still fundamental to our argument here. But to discuss and adjudicate among contrasting visions of the Arctic is to miss an important step in the process of governance: the very constitution, reproduction and representation of the regional space described by ‘the Arctic’ (see Cameron and Rosamond 2014). As Thrift puts it, ‘to govern it is necessary to render visible the space over which government is to be exercised’ (Thrift 2005: 134). It follows that space should not simply be seen as a settled, prior entity over which technologies of control are then exercised over which normative debates then ensue (Pickles 2004; Elden 2013b; Rosamond 2012a, 2012b). Greater attention needs to be given to the ways in which ‘the Arctic’ is known and the ways in which it is rendered ‘legible’, to use Scott’s influential formulation (Scott 1998).
If ‘the Arctic’ is typically known as a space of geopolitical rivalry, then such a formulation will clearly set parameters around the range of possible technical and normative solution sets. The problem becomes a question of how to deal with the security dilemmas that follow from states pursuing their sovereign ambitions to consolidate and expand their territorial reach in the region. While such a politics is obviously enabled and limited by questions of legal entitlement to the pursuit of territorial claims (Strandsbjerg 2012), the derivative solution sets nevertheless follow the traditional contours of international politics, as theorised by mainstream international relations scholarship. To know the Arctic in this way provokes two imaginaries of its future. One – broadly realist in orientation – treats the Arctic as a region where the norms of inter-state conflict, cooperation and diplomacy will yield a territorial settlement that may or may not be stable. The other – broadly liberal institutionalist in focus – seeks to resolve the inter-state security dilemmas of the Arctic region through the development of some sort of regime that replaces zero-sum relative gains logic with an institutionalised logic of absolute gains (Osherenko and Young 2005). Needless to say, it is possible, especially within the second of these, to associate the Arctic’s security dilemma with the visible and scientifically validated fact of anthropogenic climate change, but the imaginary of the region that informs such a position still thinks about the Arctic in proto-Westphalian terms. Because the primary geopolitical logic is understood to be the quest for sovereign control, the Arctic is understood as a bordered space, where those borders are extant and emergent boundaries between national jurisdictions. We may have a normative preference for the second (liberal institutionalist) account of the problems and solutions associated with the Arctic, but this does not exhaust the range of possible alternative ‘Arctics’ that may emerge through different practices of spatial constitution, reproduction and representation.

We will return to the matter of the Arctic spatial constitution, reproduction and representation in due course, but for now it is worth thinking through the parameters of what other conceptualisations of ‘Arctic’ space might be possible. The realist and liberal institutionalist versions of the Arctic are ideal types that emerge from the foundational idea of the Arctic as a space of sovereign competition. An alternative constitutive premise that could yield alternative (ideal-typical) conceptions of Arctic space and its governance is cosmopolitical. Cosmopolitical spatial visions also branch off into two variants, which in quite different ways conceptualise the Arctic as borderless. The first is the understanding that any space is governable through the market. The market in its pure form is cosmopolitan, in that it substitutes the universal value of free commercial exchange for the particularistic, communitarian values of national interests. Here the Arctic is primarily thought of as an economic space whose resource distribution and ecological issues can be resolved through the application of neoliberal economic precepts (Newell and Paterson 2010; Peck 2010).

The second version of cosmopolitcs is civic-based rather than market-based. Instead of the liberal universal of the market, it is premised first and foremost upon the fundamental equality of all human subjects regardless of their spatial
or temporal placement. As is well known, this type of cosmopolitanism – which is associated with the spread of universal civil and political rights – stands in direct opposition to bordering practices that separate human beings into particular national communities. This opposition emerges not simply out of philosophical differences between cosmopolitan and communitarian thought, but also from the type of exclusionary and oftentimes violent politics that follows when states act in the name of particular national communities as referent objects (Gilroy 2005). Post-national cosmopolitan civic sentiment does not simply mobilise around the rights of peoples across borders. It can also emerge from a concern for planetary ecology (Valencia Sáiz 2005) where categories that defy bordering such as ‘the environment’ or ‘the planet’ become the referent objects around which acts of government and governance are organised. In this imaginary the Arctic becomes a space of diverse peoples, scattered geographically, but united in a common concern for a regional ecology whose fate is symptomatic of the planetary environment as a whole. What is distinctive about the Arctic, of course, is the preponderance of subaltern indigenous peoples. Many cosmopolitan thinkers have identified the need for the rights of indigenous groups to be properly recognised before the promise of cosmopolitanism can be delivered (Linklater 1998) and for the voices of subaltern populations to be fully integrated into the dialogic mechanisms of cosmopolitan politics (Dobson 2005).

These four ideal-typical imaginations of Arctic space are mapped out in Table 9.1. The point of this thought experiment is to show that the spatial character of the Arctic is amenable to multiple constructions, and that these constructions carry within them quite distinct understandings of the issues that confront the ‘Arctic’, the primary agents/subject within the Arctic and the types of governance solutions that are technically and normatively appropriate within such a space. The basic conceptions of the Arctic mapped out here, while simple analytical descriptors, are also normatively charged. Indeed, we suggest that the much of the governance of the Arctic in the coming decades will involve the successful reproduction of one of these ideas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9.1 Ideal typical conceptions of Arctic space</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Foundational Logic</strong></td>
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<td>Variant</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conception of ‘the Arctic’</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>A space of Westphalian geopolitics</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Presumed outcome</strong></td>
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The following paragraph illustrates the typical way of talking about the Arctic in popular and academic discussions:

The impact of climate change has changed international society’s view of the Arctic region, because of the issues at stake and the challenges which these changes imply: rising sea levels due to the melting of the Greenland ice-sheet, the opening of new maritime routes due to the summer melting of the Arctic pack ice, easier access to natural off-shore resources in a region where environmental risks remain high, the migration of fishery resources, security issues, and the settlement of territorial disputes, cooperation between regional players (including Russia and the USA), cohabitation between world powers in an area with regional governance etc. Lastly the Arctic does not leave the world of defence indifferent either, particularly the nuclear powers. The Arctic, where nuclear submarines cross paths is indeed a privileged area for the coverage of a wide part of the earth close to the main nuclear powers’ home ports.

(Degeorges 2013: 1)

This is not to single out this extract for particular attention, but rather to suggest that it is representative of the ways in which the Arctic is constituted in public discourse. Its spatial characteristics are wrapped into the latent assumption that the region is defined by a political logic of sovereign competition. Economics matters, but in this understanding the good of market exchange is clearly subordinate to the logic of inter-state competition. Any economic imperatives implied by this conception of the Arctic emerge less from a neoliberal cosmopolitics and more from economic nationalist motivations. The posing of the Arctic as an IR/security problem, albeit one driven by the imperatives (and opportunities?) of climate change, begets IR-type solution sets. The governance possibilities for the Arctic are thus thought about as a choice between an anarchic subsystem of the international system on the one hand or an evolving cooperative international regime on the other. The primary subjects within either imaginary here are states, and this is made possible – tautological in fact – by the foundational assumption that the defining characteristic of the region involves competition among sovereigns.

The constitution of Arctic space in this way is not merely a matter of discursive scholarly, journalistic and policy utterance. It is also a matter of legal inscription. State-led bordering practices in the Arctic are enabled and constrained by the prevailing legal order (UNCLOS), which itself conceptualises the law of the sea as a matter of the apportioning of sovereign territorial rights (Strandsbjerg 2012). The accumulation of knowledge about the Arctic through the development of statistical indices and, in particular, through the deployment of technologically advanced forms of underwater surveying to resolve jurisdictional claims (Arvelo 2014) has the effect of reinforcing the ‘sovereign competition’ version of the Arctic. Indeed these forms of knowledge are fundamental to the reinforcement of this particular conception of the Arctic at the expense of others.

Indeed the articulation of dominant discourse, technology and knowledge through measurement would seem to have settled the question of the constitution
of ‘the Arctic’. Those with preferences for the containment of aggressive bordering practices that exploit rather than mollify the effects of climate change in the circumpolar north should instead work for collective regime solutions that bind states into cooperative institutions premised on the appeasement of regional anarchy. This would seem in turn to exclude, emphatically and decisively, alternative ‘Arctics’ such as the ideal type derived here from notions of civic cosmopolitanism and ecological sustainability.

Perhaps, but as this section suggests, it is possible to think through forms of Arctic governance that are premised on radically different conceptions of the region. The combination of the cosmopolitan rights of Arctic peoples is a powerful script here, not least because the actual juridical constitution of Arctic states is far from the settled Westphalian spatio-temporal fix that is imagined in the dominant discourse. For example, Aboriginal peoples are formally recognised by the Constitution of Canada. The Arctic region of Nunavut, which is demographically dominated by Inuit and other aboriginal peoples, was formally constituted as a territory of Canada in 1999.

Another case in point is Denmark, whose extensive claims in relation to the region emerge from its complex post-colonial relationship with Greenland. Greenland is formally an ‘autonomous country’ within the Kingdom of Denmark. In practice this means that Greenland is autonomous in matters of internal affairs, although for the time being it relies upon substantial fiscal transfers from Denmark. Denmark is sovereign over Greenland in matters of foreign policy and defence. Meanwhile the 2009 Self-Government Agreement establishes the Greenlandic population as a people with the right to self-determination in international law (Statsministeriat 2009). In short, to suggest that Denmark has geopolitical interests in the Arctic needs to be placed within the complex context of Greenland’s gradual evolution towards full independence.

These brief examples serve to show that the geopolitical map of the Arctic is rather more fluid than might be gleaned from the dominant discourse of the region. The emphasis on peoples, be they deserving of subnational recognition and autonomy or perhaps (in the case of the Greenlandic people) sovereign self-determination, is a hook upon which the beginnings of a civic cosmopolitan version of the Arctic might be hung. Plus, as a number of writers have emphasised, the recognition of aboriginal rights gives space for the articulation of aboriginal forms of knowledge about the space over which they – in many cases – claim moral authority. As Dalby puts it, ‘[a]boriginal lives and the cultural disruptions of modernisation in remote northern areas directly confront the links between knowledge and specifications of particular place’ (Dalby 2003: 181).

The articulation of subaltern/aboriginal ways of knowing the Arctic – of rendering it legible as a space – might perhaps be best expressed when conjoined with ideas about environmental sustainability, which increasingly enjoy scientific as well as moral authority. In Canada there is a twenty-year history of bringing indigenous knowledge into dialogue with conventional science (Bielawski 1995) and the voluminous multi-disciplinary literature on the topic is suggestive of a growth of such encounters in the Arctic north (see e.g. Cruikshank 2012).
Moreover, it is doubtful whether there is anything as potentially destabilizing of traditional forms of international politics and sovereign practice as the transplanetary phenomenon of climate change (Gerhardt et al. 2010).

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have developed two broad, but fundamentally related ways of thinking about the Arctic in terms of the themes of this volume: bordering and security. The first move examined the region in terms of the practices of securitisation and desecuritisation. The second move considered the possibilities for the emergence of alternative conceptions of Arctic space. What is very clear is that the recent securitisation of the Arctic and its prevailing spatial construction are locked within a Westphalian imaginary. States compete with other states over cartographic bragging rights in a struggle for the consolidation and expansion of their legally sanctioned territorial jurisdiction. Oddly, this reversion to classical international political behaviour is stimulated by an obviously ‘new’ security challenge: anthropogenic climate change. What is startling about the Arctic in this context is that a region so obviously affected by climate change has given rise to a form of realpolitik that is often thought to be wholly unsuited to the challenges brought about by global warming. Securitisation is, as we have noted, associated with a form of depoliticisation – the identification of an issue as ‘exceptional’ or the object of an ‘emergency’ and its subsequent removal from the purview of ‘normal politics’. What this case shows is that depoliticisation dynamics have helped to tilt the balance against more civic cosmopolitan understandings of the Arctic. It is these alternatives that the practices of securitisation exclude and marginalise. Securitisation as practised in the Arctic is also about the accentuation, and thus the reproduction, of those bordering techniques most associated with state-centred international politics.

This does not imply that the Arctic is destined to evolve into an anarchic sub-region of the international system. Indeed, we have tried to show both empirically and through our thought experiment that the premise of sovereign competition can yield alternative Arctics, although these remain locked into a Westphalian imaginary where – at best – anarchy is contained through institutional innovation and where ecological, energy, navigational and other issues are thought of as collective action problems that can be addressed through suitable institutional designs. An Arctic regime of absolute gains may be preferable, but it leaves states as the primary referents in the region and actually sustains extant bordering practices.

The transcendence of state bordering practices is a fundamental feature of a version of the Arctic that articulates questions of ecological sustainability to cosmopolitan ethics in general and to the rights of indigenous peoples in particular. Given the overwhelming importance of environmental change to the region and the preponderance of native communities whose prior claims over parts of Arctic territory have been (at least partially) acknowledged, it is actually quite hard to see how, in cold analytical terms, the region can fit into the conventional
vernaculars of academic IR and sovereign state practice. This offers some hope that alternative counter-hegemonic versions of Arctic space might be able to secure political traction. But the fact that the prevailing media, intellectual and policy discourse is so disinclined to think otherwise about the Arctic is testimony to the power of securitising utterances and the associated technologies through which the Arctic is constituted, represented and reproduced.

Notes

1 The 200 nautical mile limit is supplemented by the potential to claim territory that is connected to a state’s continental shelf.

2 For example, they were not invited to the Arctic Ocean Conference in Illulissat, Greenland, that was organised by the Danish Foreign Minister at the time and the Greenlandic Premier in 2008. More importantly, they were not party to the influential Illulissat Declaration that committed the five Arctic coastal states to settle any disputes between them through the application of international law (Bergman Rosamond 2011).

3 It is worth noting the very particular character of Arctic territoriality. Because the region is primarily oceanic, the distributive territorial politics of the region are not confined to the matter of how horizontal cartographic space is carved up. It is also a question of vertical space, and how jurisdictional questions over the seabed are resolved (see Elden 2013a; Steinberg 2001, 2013).

4 Nunavut covers an area a little short of 2.1 million km² across much of Arctic Canada. This area is larger than the combined territories of France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Yet Nunavut’s population stands at a mere 35,591 (www.stats.gov.nu.ca/en/home.aspx).

References


Annika Bergman Rosamond and Ben Rosamond


10 Conclusion

Catarina Kinnvall and Ted Svensson

As the chapters have confirmed, borders are installed and experienced in ubiquitous ways and, therefore, of imperative political significance. Borders – the modes whereby they are made possible, upheld and come to inform movement, self-identity and processes of othering – are, as the chapters have shown, reliant upon governing procedures and perceived efforts to attain security. As a consequence, reformulations of the underpinning logics to and of governance impact on the manner in which borders are put in place and repeatedly performed and inscribed – as Mark Bevir’s chapter on joined-up governance demonstrates. It is equally apparent that reconsiderations of what security denotes have consequences on perceptions of the validity, necessity and exact location of distinctive borders.

According to Bevir’s genealogy of how joined-up governance came to be applied to security policy, there was a fundamental change after the Cold War as theories of security and securitisation now focused on non-traditional threats and security came to be seen as dependent on the provision of a range of socio-economic goods. Of importance is how security and policy became intertwined in the management and delivery of relevant socio-economic goods that were deemed to constitute the essence of security. The chapter makes visible how policy-makers began to emphasise ‘joined-up’ or ‘whole-of-government’ arrangements in order to administer an expanded notion of security, especially issues that were deemed to be outside the realm of single government agencies. Joined-up governance thus refers to a specific policy agenda focused on efficiency and effectiveness in which the fostering of public, voluntary and private networks and partnerships constitute the core technologies. Part of this arose as an effect of a process in which new agendas of ‘human security’ and ‘good governance’ meant a relocation of resources earlier spent on military power towards the prevention of new, often non-traditional and non-state-based, security threats.

Anthony Cooper and Chris Perkins’ chapter concurrently attests to the reduced centrality or primacy of state borders as reflective of territorial expanse and embodied in conventional border crossings and to the ways in which mobile conceptions of borders and, especially unwarranted mobilities, often affirm separations that are sedimented into and constantly rehearsed in state enactments of control, certainty and singularity. They elucidate how a marked change from borders to bordering builds on and incarnates the recognition of borders as subtle and as permeating the
ordinary life of societies – a process referred to as the securitisation of everyday life. As the borders of the state are becoming more elusive and dispersed, corroborated by UK bordering practices for instance, traditional borders are being reinstated and reformed to convince the public about the ‘realness’ or facticity of borders as a defining facet of entry or exit. In this context, the concept of ‘border’ represents a foundation for several intertwined bordering activities that, according to Cooper and Perkins, can most fittingly be described as the ‘imposition of status functions’. It thus needs to be acknowledged that mobile borders – i.e. borders that require movement to accomplish their purpose – no longer are automatically grounded or contained in material features. As a result they are not immediately or in an unmediated fashion perceived as borders but have become, to echo Cooper and Perkins, ‘un-border-like’. This level of diffusion does not, however, only translate into augmented surveillance and control. In addition, it creates space for resistance to the everyday regulation of people and things.

The consequences of what Cooper and Perkins’ chapter describes as state endeavours to perform territorial bordering, i.e. to prove that borders are working by exposing the mobile bordering process to the public, mirror Tugba Basaran’s concern regarding the far-reaching and worrying effects of redefining humanitarian acts as security acts, thus challenging the core features of humanitarianism. What, Basaran asks, will be the consequences of this for the very core of humanitarianism – the notion that there is such a thing as a distinct and inclusive humanity? If she is right in her assertion that ‘[t]he sovereign constructs the “official humanitarian space” to privilege foreseeable, manageable, organised forms of humanitarian care, as part of a care, control, surveillance and policing continuum’, then these are indeed distressing developments.

An aspect that needs to be taken into account, and which is put forward for consideration in the Introduction, is that – although borders might be spoken of as vacillating, ambiguous, oblique – they are impressed and, to some degree, determined by already existing notions of belonging and distance or, to repeat the title of this volume, of connectivity and dispersion. The work that goes into reproducing notions of nationhood and citizenship is a core facet of governing borders and security. Two chapters that enable insights into how this is negotiated by ‘newcomers’ and by those who are not fully welcomed into the political community – e.g. migrants, asylum seekers and refugees – are those by Paul Nesbitt-Larking and Maria Rovisco. Nesbitt-Larking’s contribution, through its narrative analysis of how citizenship is imagined and enacted by young Muslims in Canada, effectively conveys that borders are not only territorial imaginations, but are actually and meaningfully engraved in bodies and minds. Bordering is, consequently, as much a social psychological process as it is spatial, through which narratives of belonging become subjective inscriptions.

Similarly, Rovisco’s chapter on arts as a manifestation of community in multicultural Britain affords us with an account of how asylum seekers and refugees are provided with participatory opportunities to question and redefine the relationship between citizenship and belonging. In her chapter, Rovisco expounds how such projects can be seen to open up secure dialogical spaces that affect
debordering and desecuritisation processes on a daily basis. Unfortunately, this does not always change the ways in which media, the embedding society and the political establishment tend to represent asylum seekers as a national threat, as these connections between migrants and their artistic creations often fail to reach beyond the immediate group of individuals that are engaged in these community arts practices.

As expressed in the Introduction, some border conceptions endure and are more commanding than others. It is, hence, necessary – as Nesbitt-Larking and Rovisco attempt to do – to investigate and establish how these overarching border concerns that are often motivated by security considerations are reflected, negotiated and resisted in everyday circumstances. If a chosen practice by the British state is to employ billboard vans to persuade illegal immigrants to leave or face specific consequences, as analysed by Cooper and Perkins, where and in what ways does this correspond to and inflect on how the refugee as a legal category is perceived as an existential threat to the borders of the national community? Rovisco’s chapter suggests that the act of participating in community arts practices enables forced migrants and asylum seekers to understand how they are being perceived by the general public, at the same time as it cannot guarantee seamless or augmented access to the public sphere. Here, we start to perceive what the varying and unequally distributed potential for mobility – and the related power relations – mean in terms of the particular place that is assigned to and provided for forced migrants and other abject populations. We can, furthermore, start to envisage what a response to questions about the inclusion and exclusion of populations from acts and emblems of citizenship might look like. Rovisco’s chapter, for instance, depicts how the voice of asylum seekers and refugees – for all the good intentions – stands a better chance of being heard in the confined spaces of participatory workshops than it does in the wider public sphere.

Here, Nesbitt-Larking’s contribution is instructive in that it treats citizenship as an open category related to the lived experience of global subjects, rather than narrowing it down to legal prescriptions or universal ideals. It does this by trying to conceptualise the events and circumstances in which citizens make sense of themselves in relation to specific time(s), places and political interactions. The key finding of Nesbitt-Larking’s study, hence directly connecting it to Rovisco’s chapter, is that citizenship practices are affected by normative and prescriptive understandings of bordering as a social psychological process, which is informed and structured by ideas of place, network and territory. He accordingly argues that we are increasingly prone to attach ideas about our existential selves to those narratives that affect and redefine our personal biographies. The wider setting of this, if the chapters are read in conjunction, forces us to take seriously the ways in which security is joined together with sovereign practices and how these come to constitute the normalising narratives of bordered communities – from personhood to nationhood to citizenship. But they also illuminate the potential for negotiating and resisting such narratives in the everyday of political interactions.

In relation to the above-mentioned attempts at restricting change and placelessness in a more narrative sense, Katherine Allison’s chapter points to the
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emerging need to take the recurrent bordering moments of liberal governmentality into account if we wish to question the assumed and often iterated conceptual division of liberal and non-liberal spaces. In her assertion that we need to draw attention to how liberal governmentality in itself is the product of continuous relations to and of difference, Allison validates the necessity of engaging with the perceived and real scope of liberal rule, as stated in the Introduction. However, she puts into question the, by now, conventional and much-rehearsed assumption that a Foucauldian analytic is non-applicable outside of a European context. Allison insists that we rather need to approach Afghanistan and the example of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda of global governance as an indication of where potential sites for the enactment of border thinking and critiques of a Eurocentric binary between a West/non-West governmentality reside. Here, it – in an inverse way – speaks to Basaran’s engagement with how sovereign authorities make efforts ‘to guide human conduct, to look away from human suffering and even to permit death in support of security policies’.

Although the border thinking that is being stressed in Allison’s chapter does not convey or conveniently allow for any space beyond liberal modernity to be identified, an emphasis on such defining junctures or acts of bordering does provide a position from which the construction of liberalism (in all its different shapes) can be theorised and dissected. One of the main premises of Allison’s overall argument – namely, that a profound and deep-seated Eurocentric vision is contained in efforts to make visible a clear-cut divide between advanced and peripheral liberal or non-liberal societies – underscores the need to, as she contends, analyse the conditions under which this division is both generated and obscured. In other words, we must question the underlying logics of both an all-inclusive and a circumscribed liberalism in order to facilitate a border thinking that relies on a double-sided notion of responsibility, i.e. one that takes seriously liberalism’s hierarchical and imperialistic underpinnings and binary constructions.

This position is complementary to Basaran’s argument that we increasingly see how humanitarian acts that seek to assist or aid ‘strangers in distress’ – through provisions of medical support, transport or temporary housing for example – are legally discouraged, and even penalised, in liberal democracies. The consequence of this is that some people are seen as less worthy of humanitarianism, which basically rewrites the moral compass of humanity. The immediate effects are that the notion of a single humanity is questioned on the basis of security concerns as some populations are excluded and that a distinction between two kinds of humanitarianism is being made – one that is (state) sanctioned and thus circumscribed and one that abides by the ideal figure of the Good Samaritan. Within the setting of Basaran’s analysis, security is being used to provide the state with a particular regulatory role through which humanitarian spaces are and can be governed. By making humanitarianism synonymous with security, humanitarian spaces become closely regulated and monitored by the state – which in turn, it is argued, shrinks this space as well as constrains and undermines any acts of contemporary Good Samaritans.

Basaran’s chapter, with its emphasis on how the state defines access, control and management of humanitarian spaces, thereby affirms the call in our own piece
which, above all, attends to the use of religion in Pakistan to securitise borders of national belonging and territoriality – to move beyond efforts to desecuritise religion that solely equate to attempts to demote or overcome religion as a basis for political mobilisation. Instead, in the case of Pakistan specifically, religion ought to be subtracted from security calculations through religious and other means, which, in turn, indicates a need to erode, alter and replace influential narratives that, at present, legitimise and authorise a militarisation of Islamic doctrine. Viewed in this light, Islamic doctrine, similar to Basaran’s conception of humanitarian space, is being appropriated by the state and its regulations and, as a result, is turned into a political act that is becoming increasingly resisted. Basaran’s core argument, in addition, coheres with Bevir’s proposition that the contingent underpinnings of joined-up security and especially suggestions that its evolvement mirrors ‘a neutral and scientific response to new policy problems’ ought to be contested.

The book’s two final chapters constitute a joint contribution to our knowledge regarding the contested formation of regions, and the regional security considerations that underpin such formation. As the case of Pakistan exhibits, narratives of spaces as ungovernable or devoid of governance practices conceal the manifold attempts at investing these with clear geographical borders that can frame and delimit community boundaries. Our analysis maintains the importance of recognising how religion amounts to a significant, crucial and seemingly inherent constituent of border work and thinking. In our chapter, this is an insight that arises through an engagement with Pakistan’s longstanding and constitutive endeavour to ascribe and infuse unity to a range of fragmenting and fragmented identities. In this specific instance, religious creed is concomitantly an insufficient foundation for the realisation of an enclosed and unified national identity and the exclusive ground for commonalities and a sense of mutual belonging. The problem in the case of Pakistan, is – as we write in our chapter – not religion as such, but how religion is being securitised to govern equivocal and contested borders. The concerned borders comprise not only territorial borders in Pakistan’s and the Taliban’s respective pursuit of presence and authority in areas often portrayed as marginal and ungovernable. They also, as our chapter expresses it, involve the borders around Islam itself and the meaning of being Muslim and Pakistani.

Annika Bergman Rosamond and Ben Rosamond similarly argue that Arctic space is being imagined and shaped through geopolitical understandings that, while dominant and perhaps commonsensical, remain contingent on particular notions of borders as national rather than as transnational and indigenous at the same time. Being a contested space, the Arctic – like Pakistan – poses opportunities for scholarship that seeks to problematise borders in favour of new forms of governance and community, by moving away from conventional ways of looking at borders to see them as being dispersed through or beyond national societies. The proposition made by Bergman Rosamond and Rosamond to rethink political community in the Arctic by moving it away from the discourses and practices of securitisation which keeps it outside of normal politics and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere, can be compared to our proposition.
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that religion ought to be removed from security calculations through religious and other means. Such a desecuritising move involves what Bergman Rosamond and Rosamond term a normative research agenda, in which transnational solidarities among the indigenous peoples of the Arctic are theorised as well as those between national policy-makers across borders. This, they argue, could work as an antidote to conventional readings of borders as nationally defined and thus counter the neo-colonial ‘scramble for the Arctic’ and inter-state competition over untapped natural resource endowments and navigation rights.

However, any research agenda would have to come to terms with the multiple ways in which the Arctic is being spatially constituted, reproduced and represented, as each alternative will set the parameters around the range of possible technical and normative solution sets. As illuminated throughout this volume, the Westphalian imaginary – often constituted in terms of the liberal state and its governing potential – remains a powerful narrative in which security and borders become both interwoven and resisted. The process of connectivity and dispersion is therefore inherently political and any research agenda wishing to counter essentialist securitising practices will have to supplement alternative imaginings with substantial demands for equal voice and influence in construing these imaginations.

In sum, the overall contribution of this book can be condensed into three main points: (a) states are often quite successful in their attempts at territorial bordering, even though this requires novel notions of governance to be advanced and acted upon and that mobilities as such need to be governed and treated as necessitating securitising moves; (b) for all the inclusionary potential contained in non-traditional construal of security, acts of citizenship, expanding circles of participatory community-making and critical self-narration, and despite the hopes attributed to humanitarian undertakings – ingrained and powerful narratives of belonging continue to restrict and limit access to the broader public sphere and to the political community proper; and (c) even areas that are typically and regularly described as devoid of legitimate, successful and effective authority-claims and that, in addition, are seen as containers of incompatible, even hostile, bordering processes are pervaded by security considerations that strive to achieve and reassert certainty as regards their spatial functioning within regional and global politics.